

THE INTENDED MEANINGS OF LINGUISTIC FORMS



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THE INTENDED MEANINGS OF LINGUISTIC FORMS

A Thesis
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by

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1. Eternal truth will be neither true nor eternal unless they have fresh meaning for every new social situation.

(F.D. Roosevelt, Address, University of Virginia, June 10, 1940)

2. Literature is language charged with meaning.

(Ezra Pound, ABC of Reading, 1934, ch.2)

3. What is the short meaning of the long speech?

(J.C.F. Von Schiller, Piccolomini, 1799, Act. 1, Sc.2)

4. "Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare went on. "I do," Alice hastily replied, "at least- at least I mean what I say- That's the same thing you know!" "Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter. "Why you must just as well say that 'I see what I eat' is the same thing as 'I eat what I see!'"


(Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Ch. 7.)

5. Humpty Dumpty: "And only one for the birthday presents, you know. There's glory for you." "I don't know what you mean by 'glory'." Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled temptuously: "Of course you don't- till I tell you. I meant there is a knockdown argument for you!" "But glory' does not mean 'a nice knockdown argument'." Alice objected. "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean- neither more or less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

(Lewis Carroll, op. cit., Ch.8.)

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
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
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
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
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A. Y. A. L.

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INTRODUCTION

The more I grow in this turning globe, the more I realize that it is the common ignorance of "meanings" which is to blame for the present distressful condition of human race. Ever since the time of the great great grandfather of human race, common ignorance of the meanings of life and existence, the meanings of love and peace, and some other "fundamental" meanings has caused the world's bitter sorrows and bestial sins. It is like the symptom of a disease whose only cure is knowledge about meanings.

This crucial concern about meanings has greatly motivated me to write this paper. Obviously it does not mean that the present paper will have something to do with the formidable "fundamental meanings" mentioned above, about which even the scientist's and philosopher's maps of knowledge contain far more unexplored territory than areas of confirmed hypothesis. I would not pretend to have some kind of authority nor capability in both 'science' and 'philosophy'. Yet it is a truth universally acknowledged that before we reach the top of the ladder, we should first step the first rung; just like one who should first learn the rudiments of music before one could properly appreciate a Beethoven Symphony.

It is true then that before we attempt to make any exploration and study of the meanings of life and existence, love and peace, etc., etc., which are truly basic for our earthly existence, we should first study the meanings of words, sentences, and discourses, which are the building blocks of language and human thoughts. And yet even the study of "meaning" in the latter sense, which is called

semantics still baffles many linguists. According to Dr. Gloria Soepomo Poedjosoedarmo in her series of lectures on semantics for the doctoral students of the English Department of IKIP Sanata Dharma, it is difficult to find two linguists who agree concerning either the scope of semantics or its place in linguistics.

From the same source we know that linguists do generally agree that language has two aspects: signifier and signified (Ferdinand de Saussure), form and content (H.A. Gleason), and form and meaning (other linguists). In this paper, the terms linguistic form and meaning refer to these two aspects of language.

Linguists of the twentieth century tend to concentrate their study on the form aspect rather than on meaning aspect simply because form is more tangible and easy to analyse. The form of sentences can easily be dissected into its constituents morphemes into phonemes. While the study of meaning means investigating the intangible, which the father of American linguists, Leonard Bloomfield, logically frowned upon. Some linguists like Chomsky, Fillmore, Hayakawa, Edward Bendix do attempt to study meaning; yet their ways of analysis and classifications are far from being mutually complementary.

The focus of their study varies. Paul Ziff in Semantic Analysis (1960) says that words primarily, and not utterance or sentences, are generally said to have meanings. While Edward Bendix in his Componential Analysis of General Vocabulary has the opposite of view to that of Ziff's, in that every lexical item has to be stated in a syntactic environment. Hayakawa in his book Symbol, Status, and Personality also stated that the best way to find out what a word means is not to look it up in a dictionary, but observing how it is used.¹

1. Soepomo.P., Gloria, 'The Place of Semantics in Transformational Grammar,' unpublished paper, IKIP Sanata Dharma, 1977, p.1.

The thesis of this paper is that, like what Hayakawa says, in order to know the intended meaning of a lexical item, we have to consider its syntactic environment and by analogy, to detect the intended meaning of a sentence, we should take account the larger language unit, discourse; and to ideally understand a discourse we should familiar ourselves with human experience and ideas which serve as the 'environment' of the discourse.

Aim and Limitation of Scope

The aim of this paper is to show that a linguistic form may have various meanings and that the intended meanings are determined by the use of the linguistic forms in their respective contexts. We often fail to know how the meaning of a word for example is affected by its context. Sometimes we do not see that the meaning of a single word is affected or decided by its context. Or it can be a whole sentence that needs to be interpreted along with the accompanying sentences. For example, when a passage set for precis includes the sentence, 'New towns will spring up and old towns expand,' we may write 'New industrial towns will be built', although the context should have shown that the writer was envisaging the building of new seaside holiday resorts. Hughes and Hughes, on p. 19 of Learning and Teaching compare children with animals in two consecutive paragraphs. In the second paragraph the reader is intended to compare animals' play with children's play, because the writers have been comparing animals with children in the previous paragraph. Readers who do not pay attention to the context may interpret the second paragraph as comparing the play of intelligent and unintelligent children. An attempt has been made in this paper to show that the intended meanings can be detected from the contexts.

The scope of this paper is limited in some ways. The

aim of this paper necessitates the limitation of the data collection. If the aim is to show that a word may have various meanings and the intended meaning is shown by the contexts, culling words from every page of the existing dictionaries would be either a sheer nonsense or horrible redundancy. So in the second chapter of this paper I just select fifty words from Hornby's The Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, (1973). The same thing holds true for chapter three and four. The sentence exemplification in chapter three is deliberately chosen just from some particular religious literature, The Holy Bible, Dhammapada, Thomas a Kempis' The Imitation of Christ, and Maharshi's Transcendental Meditation. And for the discourse explication in chapter four, I deliberately choose only three short essays of three master essayists: E. M. Foster's "My Wood", E. B. White's "The Ring of Time", and James Thurber's "Sex ex Machina."

B. The Organization of the Paper

I have divided this paper into five chapters. After the acknowledgement, there comes the table of contents which is immediately followed by the introduction. In the introduction we find the brief illustration of the backgrounds of the present paper, the aim and the scope, and the organization of the paper. As the title suggests, chapter one provides the theoretical backgrounds for the succeeding chapters. Here we find the traditional definition of a language, and the explication of the significant symbols which make communication possible. Under the subheading 'Speech Components and Language Variety' I depict the birth of an utterance which, according to Dr. Soepomo Poedjosoedarmo, undergoes a long and intricate process of conditioning which factors he aptly called speech components. Then we make a brief excursion to the brief discus-

sion of form and meaning. The end of chapter one shows that context is the determinant of the intended meaning.

Chapter two is concerned with the intended meaning of a lexical item. It shows that a word may have several meanings and that the intended meaning is determined by its verbal context. As it was mentioned before, I culled fifty words from Hornby's dictionary as further exemplification. Chapter three logically deals with the larger linguistic form or language unit, a sentence. It shows that the meanings of a sentence may vary but the intended meaning can be detected from the appropriate contexts. Fifteen sentences selected from various religious literature are explicated for further clarification. Chapter four exhibits the validity of the preceeding analysis if they are applied to the largest language unit, a discourse. The short essays from three well-known writers are explicated as examples. Chapter five, the final and the shortest chapter, concludes the paper. A good conclusion brings the reader's attention back to the central idea of the paper. And since the conclusion is the end of the paper, it should give the reader a sense of finality. So in the conclusion I present no new ideas because any new material in the conclusion will serve only to confuse the reader. And I just do not want to do so. I just follow the ordinary procedure of paper writing: say what you are going to say, say it, and say it again briefly. And the conclusion is immediately followed by the suggestions which are by no means complete and elaborate.

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES

This chapter serves as a theoretical background for the succeeding chapters. As the title suggests, this seemingly irrelevant chapter is preliminary in its nature. The theory is deliberately not elaborated. English is used as the language of exemplification, but, of course, as it gradually becomes apparent, the same 'analysis' could be applied for any other languages.

A. Traditional Definition of a Language

It is language, more obviously than anything else, that distinguishes man from the rest of the animal world. At one time it was common to define man as a thinking animal, but we can hardly imagine thought without words -not thought that is all precise, anyway. More recently, man has often been described as a tool-making animal; but language itself is the most remarkable tool that man has invented, and is the one that makes all the others possible. The most primitive tools, admittedly, may have come earlier than language: the higher apes sometimes use sticks for digging, and have even been observed to break sticks for this purpose. But tools of any greater sophistication demand the kind of human co-operation and division of labour which is hardly possible without language. Language, in fact, is the great machine tool which makes human culture possible.

Other animals, it is true, communicate with one another, or at any rate stimulate one another to action, by means of cries. Many birds utter warning calls at the approach of danger; some animals have mating calls; apes utter different cries expressive of anger, fear, pleasure. But these various means

of communication differ in important ways from human language. Animals' cries are not articulate. This means, basically, that they lack structure. They lack for example, the kind of structure given by the contrast between vowels and consonants. They also lack the kind of structure that enables us to divide human utterance into words. We can change an utterance by replacing one word in it by another: a sentry can say, 'Aircraft approaching from the north', or he can change one word and say 'Tanks approaching from the north' or 'Tanks approaching from the west.' But a bird has a single undivisible alarm cry, which means 'Danger!' This is why the number of signals that an animal can make is very limited, whereas in human language the number of possible utterances is infinite.

Language is traditionally and conventionally defined as a structured system of arbitrary vocal symbols by means of which members of a social group interact. ²

1. Language as a System

A language consists of a number of linked systems, and structure can be seen in it at all levels. For a start, any language selects a small number of vocal sounds out of all those human beings are able to make and use, and uses them as its building bricks; and the selection is different for every language. The number of vocal sounds that a human being can make (and to distinguish between) is quite large - utterly running into hundreds. But out of these possible sounds, most languages are content with a mere twenty or thirty as their basic material. In English, if we treat the diphthong as independent sounds, the number is about forty-five.³

2. Joseph Bram, Language and Society, p. 2.

3. Gimson. A. C., An Introduction to the Pronunciation of English, pp. 90 and 149.

All the speakers of English use what is essentially the same system of sounds. When they pronounce the word 'man' they may all use a rather different vowel sound, but all these sounds occupy the same position in the system: they all contrast, for instance with a different vowel sound in 'men', but fail to contrast with the vowel sounds heard in a whole number of other words like 'fan' and 'can'. These forty-five basic sounds are linguistically called 'phonemes'.

System can also be seen in the ways in which the phonemes can be combined into morphemes. A morpheme is a group of allomorphs that are semantically similar and in complementary distribution. "S", "iz", and "z" for instance are allomorphs of the same 'plural' morpheme "s" and they are in complementary distribution. "S" when "s" follows voiceless sounds: p, t, k, f, etc.; "iz" when "s" follows sibilant s, z, etc.; and "z" when "s" follows voiced sounds: b, d, g, v, a, etc. This plural morpheme "s" is called bound-morpheme while words are 'free' morphemes.

Words may combine into sentences. When we consider not isolated words, but whole utterances in sentences, we notice such things as stress, pitch, and rhythm, which are also systematic. Syllables vary in loudness, and in any English utterance of any length there are syllables of many different degrees of loudness; broadly speaking, however, they fall into two groups, those that are relatively loud and those that are not; we can call these stressed and unstressed syllables respectively. In English, stress is closely linked with rhythm. If we speak the following two sentences as naturally as the native speakers of English do:

There's a 'new 'manager at the 'works to'day.
There's a 'new 'boss 'there to'day.

we will probably find that the two sentences take about the same time to speak. The reason for this is not hard to see:

a speaker of English tries to space the stressed syllables evenly, that is why, although the first sentence has eleven syllables, and the second only seven, the two sentences take about the same time to speak because they both contain four time units. In the first sentence, the interval between new and man -is about the same time as that between man and works, so that the sequence manager at works has to be taken very quickly.

Thus it is clear that English in specific and any language in general are systematic. And the smallest unit in a language is phonemes which combine into morphemes which form sentences which are the building blocks of a discourse, the largest language unit. Only morphemes, sentences, and discourses have meanings.

2. Language as a Significant Symbol and Means of Communication

Symbolization is a talent of the human brain and nervous system to attach names, or symbols to the articles abstracted. Anthropologist Joseph Bram reminds us that:

We know, of course, that the word "symbol" means "things that stand for other things." The relationship between symbols and the things which they symbolize, however, is not a self-evident or natural one. ...Symbols derive their specific function from group consensus or social convention, and have no effect whatever (outside of their rather trivial physical characteristics) on any person not acquainted with such consensus or convention.⁴

The human talent to develop and utilize symbols (rather than signs, as with subhumans) makes possible the appearance of genuine speech and language. The mental ability to communicate abstract thought in terms of symbols has made possible the sharing and accumulating of knowledge and experience that is the basis of culture.

Symbols that are adequate for thinking, however, may prove quite inadequate for communication. Completely unique symbolic system could, and probably have, functioned quite

4. Joseph Bram, op. cit., p. 2.

satisfactorily for subjective reasoning but the essence of communication is the ascription of identical meanings to gestures or symbols by two or more interested people. Not all of our actions, as we have noted before, are social in nature but may involve interaction between person and non human objects. The latter kind of interaction is not communication and does not necessarily involve language, which has been called as "...a structured system of arbitrary vocal...."

We need not waste time arguing whether the chemical compound H₂O is really water, air, eau, banyu or aqua. The university and college student rarely misunderstands this phase of language - he readily acknowledges the logical proposition that the particular symbols designed to denote an object are almost always arbitrary in nature. Consensus about which symbols are to be attached to which objects is sufficient for language purposes - i.e., communication and reasoning about the objects in question.

We would agree with Alice (see page iv) that "The question is, whether you can make words mean so many different things." The hard fact is that, in general, agreement does not exist upon the way in which words are used, and this agreement cannot be ignored if language is to be preserved. There may be instances of words having been, to use John Dewey's phrase, "cluttered up with the debris of man's past experiences" to the point where we must abandon them and invent new labels for our concepts, facts, and other objects. However, we often merely redefine them and agree upon the symbolic meaning.

Symbols, regardless of their meaning or of their emotional change, do have a kind of persistency in them which excuses people for treating them as the object of knowledge. They happen to be the vehicle of knowledge, the husk not the kernel. It is they which are transmitted from person to person, from generation to generation. The "life" has gone out of them though each person and each generation puts new life into them.⁵

5. George Boas, "Symbols and History," in R. N. Anshen, Language, p. 119

The life of a symbol is, of course, its meaning with reference to other symbols, but it is more than this when considered from the point of social life. In the definition of language given above, we see once more the need for sharing objects in common, in this instance the meaning of gestures and symbols. Without such commonly held meanings, gestures and symbols are obviously useless for purposes of communication. Some of the clearest writing about the nature of gestures and communication has been done by the philosopher and social psychologist, George Herbert Mead (1863 - 1929). In his words:

What is essential to communication is that the symbol should arouse in one's self what it arouses in the other individual. It must have that sort of universality to any person who finds himself in the same situation. There is a possibility of language wherever a stimulus can affect the individual as it affects the other. With a blind person such as Helen Keller, it is a contact experience that could be given to another as it is given to herself. It is out of that sort of language that the mind of Helen Keller was built. As she recognized, it was not until she could get into communication with other persons through symbols which could arouse in herself the responses they arouse in other people that she could get what we term a mental content, or a self.⁶

Mead further emphasizes his point in these words:

Gestures become significant symbols when they implicitly arouse in an individual making them the same responses which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse, in other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed;..."⁷

Without this common meaning, gestures cannot be significant for all concerned, and no communication is possible. Anyone who has been frustrated in his attempt to communicate with very young children, mentally deficient, or mentally ill persons, with deaf persons, or with persons who do not speak one's language, need not be told the importance of significant symbols for communication.

That significant symbols do indeed call out in the person making the gesture the responses "...which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse..." in the individuals addressed is often demonstrated in our daily lives.

6. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society. p. 149.

7. ibid., p. 47.

The mother who calls "stop!" to her young child who is headed for the street, frequently respond to her own vocal gesture by stopping herself. Young children at play often carry into their action their voiced or unvoiced gestures toward other children, and not a few altercations stem from this very human tendency to our own gestures as we expect others to respond.

Equally convincing of the validity of Mead's position is the failure to achieve unambiguous communication when the symbols are ill-defined. Among other problems which social scientists have to solve is that of symbolic ambiguities. Such terms as science, sociology, psychology, religion, democracy, etc., etc., have yet to attain the status of significant symbols for all who use them. As long as such haphazard semantics exist, just so long will there be difficulty in communication process and in thinking. Of the latter process, Mead has emphasized that "Only in terms of gestures as significant symbols is the existence of mind or intelligence possible; for only in terms of gestures which are significant symbols can thinking -which is simply an internalized or implicit conversation of the individual with himself by means of such gestures -take place." 8

B. Speech Components and Language Variety

The birth of an utterance undergoes a long and intricate process. First of all it assumes the existence of a living human creature who has normal speech organs from which the meaningful sounds are modulated. Hence the quality of the sound heard depends at least on two things: the quality of the 'source' which produces it and the quality of the respondent who receives it. "Quality" here refers to the quality of sense perception. The 'embyo' of the utterance is, hypothetically of course, in the source's con-

8. *ibid.*, p. 47.

scious mind. The 'ovum' and the 'sperm' of this baby-utterance is, in my opinion, beyond human comprehension, or to say the least, still unknown to us in our present state of human knowledge.

Dr. Soepomo Poedjosoedarmo in his unpublished paper 'Komponen Tutur' calls this utterance 'embryo' "message", and the process of 'conceiving' and 'giving birth', the process of encoding. This encoding process, according to him, is influenced and conditioned by many factors which he calls Speech components. Speech components among other things include the following:⁹

1. The source's intent.
2. The source's personality.
3. The source's emotional state.
4. The source's judgement as to the respondent's relative social status.
5. The presence of third participant.
6. Speech act.
7. Speech situation.
8. Speech facility.
9. Other speech norms.

In his "Komponen Tutur" Dr. Soepomo elaborated those things mentioned above.

It is apparent then that speech components presuppose speech variety. If an English speaker's utterances vary according to how they are influenced by speech components, we will find some English "varieties" within different group of speakers. So when we talk about "English", we must not be misled into thinking that the label should in some way refer to a readily identifiable object in reality which we can isolate and examine in a class room as we might a test tube mixture, a piece of rock, or a poem. There is no such

9. Dr. Soepomo Poedjosoedarmo, 'Komponen Tutur' p. 2.

object. The label 'the English Language' is in fact only a shorthand way of referring to something which is not, as the name may seem to imply, a single homogeneous phenomenon at all, but rather a complex of many different 'varieties' of language in use in all kinds of situation in many parts of the world. Naturally, all these varieties have much more in common than differentiate them - they are all clearly varieties of one language, English. But at the same time, each variety is definably distinct from all the others.

One of the clearest examples is the difference between spoken English on the one hand, and written English on the other. Another example would be the range of varieties which we would distinguish as regional dialects: a person speaks differently according to where he is from. A native speaker of English is unlikely to confuse the types of English current in New-York with those current throughout London area, for instance; in the case of Javanese speakers, we will readily apply labels of origin to people whose accents are different from our own (Yogya accent) - Banyumasan, Cirebonan, Surabayan, and so on. Again, there are noticeable, though dissimilar, differences between varieties, which are due to the sort of person who is talking or writing and the kind of social situation he is in. To take some examples from spoken English, most people would have little difficulty in recognizing whether a dialogue they overheard (without seeing the participants) was taking place between a mother and her baby, between two scientists 'talking shop', or between two businessmen over a telephone. We would also distinguish quite easily a BBC announcer reading the news from a lawyer defending his client in court, and both these from a clergyman giving a sermon, even if all we had to go by (and this is the important point) was evidence in a tape-recorded ex-

tract, with no clues, other than the language used, as to the status and role of the participants.

These are just a few examples of the varieties of English. We can immediately add many more from our own experience. We may not be able to say precisely what a variety is, what differentiates it from another, what types exist, how many there are or whether they are all as clearly distinguishable as the examples given above. We as the supposedly educated speakers of English are, in a sense, multilingual, for in the course of developing our command of language we have encountered a large number of varieties, and, to a certain extent, have learned how to use them. A particular social situation should make us respond with an appropriate variety of language. So a native speaker of English uses one variety of English at home, another with his friends, a third at work, and so on.

Strictly speaking, every speaker of English uses a special English, which is different from another speaker's, his speech is called 'idiolect'. Then he uses certain speech variety according to where he is from, his social status, his age, his ethnic group, his religion, etc., etc. In our Javanese speaking society where speech levels dominantly employed, broadly speaking there are two kinds of Javanese variants: ngoko and basa. When we talk about "style", we refer to those language varieties, whether it is formal, informal or literary; and the kind of speech we use, whether it is restricted or elaborated. The 'occupational' situation will produce a distinct linguistic variety. Occupational linguistic varieties of this sort have been termed registers.

Thus we know that the 'determinants' of language variety among others are: social status, geographical backgrounds, sex, ethnic group, and context.

As the so called educated speakers of English, we will be able to estimate the relative social status of the following speakers solely on the basis of the linguistic evidence given here:

Speaker A

I done it yesterday.

He ain't got it.

It was her what said it.

Speaker B

I did it yesterday.

He hasn't got it.

It was her that said it.

If we heard these speakers say these things we would guess that B was of higher social status than A. Different social groups use different linguistic varieties. In 1966, the American linguist, William Labov published in The Social Stratification of English in New York City the result of a large-scale survey of the speech of New York. And he found that language markedly varies according to the social strata of the speakers.

As far as Javanese is concerned, we have known for a long time that different dialects and accents are related to differences of geographical backgrounds: People from Yogya speak markedly different Javanese from those coming from Surabaya, Purwokerto, Cirebon, even from the neighbouring Javanese speakers of Bantul and Wonosari. Likewise in England for instance, it is possible to speak of the Norfolk dialect or the Suffolk dialect depending on where the speakers come from; or we apply labels of origin to people as Cockney, Scouser, Geordie, etc., which all refer to the existence of geographical dialects or speech varieties.

It is known from linguistic research that in many societies the speech of men and women differs. In some cases the differences are quite small and are not generally noticed: they are probably taken for granted in the same way as, say, gestures or facial expressions. For example, in many accents of American English it has been found that women's vowels are

more peripheral (more front, more back, higher or lower) than men's. In different parts of the English speaking world, female speakers have been found to use forms considered to be 'better' or 'more correct' than those by men. Why should this be? Probably women in their society are more status conscious than men. And men are more favourably disposed to non-standard linguistic forms than women because working class culture (which uses non-standard language) has associations with masculinity

If we see American films or watch TV which happen to show Negro society in America we will immediately recognize that the Negroes speak quite different kind of English from the white men do. The reason is clear: they are from different ethnic groups. If we go for a stroll along Malioboro street and ask a miss Hwa-Hwa there to speak Javanese, we will find that she speaks a different kind Javanese from that of our neighbour Mr. Abdullah Husein bin Mohammad who is of Arab descendant.

In our society, a man might be laughed to scorn if he were to wear a skirt. This, too, has its counterpart in language. To give a boxing commentary in the language of the Bible or a sermon in legal language would be either a bad mistake or a joke. Language, in other words, varies not only according to the social characteristics of the speaker (such as his social status, sex, and ethnic group) but also according to the social context in which he finds himself. The same speaker uses different linguistic varieties in different situation and for different purposes. If a speaker is talking to the people he works with about their work, his language is likely to be rather different from that he will use, say, at home with his family. The role of the person spoken to, and in particular the role relationships and relative statuses of the participants in a

discourse belongs to an important feature of the social context.

C. Form and Meaning

Language is a structured vocal symbol which only man has the prerogative to employ it. Language is human and thus predictably imperfect and limited. The first limitation is human physiology. Man cannot see 'light' of certain wavelengths, nor can he hear more than a limited range of sounds. He may use mechanical devices to extend his ability to examine reality, but instruments too, have their limits. Even under ideal conditions, including the presence of trained observers and favourable condition of observation, we can never see and hear all that is available. Our nervous system is so constructed that we can only take a certain amount of information at one time.

A second limitation on man's ability to observe the world or in other words to use language is his psychological nature. Here we do not refer to ways in which the organism is constructed, but to internal determinants of perception resulting from past experiences. Beliefs, attitudes, and idea structures help determine what items we will select from our perceptual field, and which we will ignore. Psychological factors of perception operate as a complex screening device, allowing some stimuli to come through and others to go unnoticed. As George A. Kelly, a psychiatrist, expresses the idea, "Man looks at his world through transparent patterns or templates which he creates and then attempts to fit over the realities of which the world is composed." ¹⁰

Thus it is needless to say that our ability to understand the so called two aspects of language form and meaning is necessarily very very limited due to our own imperfections, and the imperfections of the language itself. So it is no wonder then if no two linguists ever agree as to the scope

10. George A. Kelly, The Psychology of Personal Constructs, p.59.

of semantics which operates in the formidable area of meaning, let alone find some kind of consensus as to the meaning of meaning.

They do generally agree with one another, however, to the meaning of the form aspect. It is the physical manifestations of language in sound patterns, discernable by other speakers - hearers of the language. A structuralist like Leonard Bloomfield takes 'meaning' as representing an area of human experience too diverse to account for adequately without resorting to man's knowledge of the universe and therefore the statement of meanings, according to him, is the weak point in language study and will remain so until human knowledge advances very far beyond its present state.¹¹

What I mean by 'form' in this paper is simply the symbolic representation of meaningful language units (i.e. morphemes, sentences, and discourses). When we use the word 'meaning' here, we are talking about the relationship between the symbolic representation and those which are being represented, those abstract ideas and concepts. We usually call this referential meaning. We can only detect referential meaning by observing how language is used in actual situations, and this is how a child discovers the meaning of words and sentences when it learns its mother tongue. Often as it will be shown later, the verbal context by itself can show us what a word is intended to mean.

D. The Context as a Determinant of the Intended Meaning

As it is mentioned before, language is a means of communication. And what is communicated is actually abstract thought in terms of significant symbols. Thus communication process is, in fact, the process of decoding and encoding abstract thoughts in terms of symbols. We call this abstract

11. Gloria Poedjosoedarmo., "The Place of Semantics in Early Transformational Grammar," p. 2.

thought the 'message'. And what is meant by the intended meaning in this paper is simply this decoded message. The 'contexts' are the particular situations that facilitate the message decoding.

As we will soon see in the next chapter, we can detect the intended meaning of a lexical item by observing its verbal context. Or in other words if we are trying to discover the meaning of a word in, say, sixteenth century English, we simply examine a large number of passages of sixteenth century English in which the word occurs. But we can only discover meanings in this way because: 1. We have already learned the meanings of other words in the passages by meeting them in actual situations, and 2. the passages are therefore able to present us, by what they say, with fairly clear situations or contexts. We know that symbols derive their specific function from group consensus or social convention, and have no effect whatever on any person not acquainted with such consensus or convention. Thus for example if we are given extensive tape recordings of people talking in a completely unfamiliar language, with no indication of the situations in which the utterances were made, we can never hope to discover the meaning of a single word or utterance in that language.

To show the context as a determinant of the intended meaning let us try to observe the brief three letter word "God". We immediately see that it can be understood in many different senses. Ten men may utter the word "God" as one and the same sound, but important differences of view may lie concealed beneath each utterance. The word may mean a fussy creator, capricious supervisor and arbitrary judge, or a super-benevolent Supreme Creator. The word may mean an impersonal and impartial Being who is not warmly interest-

ed in the individual lives of his faithful devotees. It may mean the abstract totality of the laws of nature or a particular individual existence, a piece of carven wood or a moulded metal image. We can detect what it really means only when we know the particular context in which the linguistic form "God" is used, for example the person who utters it. In the mind of a primitive man it is a purely animistic term, whereas in the mind of the late Indian Philosopher, Lord Hardane, it was an abstract and absolute one. Thus we will find various 'intended meanings' of "God". Like for example we will discover that, if we go through some religious literature as their proper contexts, there are racial gods like Jehovah, tribal gods, Galore, personal rulers of the universe like Vishnu, and impersonal and universal Spirits without any form at all, and that the human kind in its primitivity, worships a Deity totally unlike that it worships in its maturity.

CHAPTER II

THE INTENDED MEANING OF A LEXICAL ITEM

If we look such words as natural, good, loose, free, and real in the big Oxford English Dictionary for instance, we will find that each word contains several meanings. The coexistence of several meanings in one word, which is extremely common, is called polysemy. For example the word 'horn' may mean:

1. "One of a pair of pointed projections on the heads of oxen , sheep, goats, etc."
2. "One of these used as a musical instrument."
3. "Similar musical instruments as in the second meaning, which are made of other materials such as brass."
4. "Some other kinds of noise-producing instruments, like those used in motor-cars."
5. "A person who plays such an instrument."

There is really no danger of confusion from the coexistence of these different meanings, because we can detect the intended meaning from the characteristic contexts, for example: ex. 1. (context one): He plays the horn in the Halle.

m. 1. (intended meaning): musical instrument.

ex. 2. Jack jammed on his brakes and sounded his horn.

m. 2. the noise-producing instrument used in cars.

ex. 3. Let's take the bull by the horn.

m. 3. one of the pointed projections on the head of a bull.

Fifty Words with their Intended Meanings

1. address: ex. 1. Mr. Y will now address the meeting.

m. 1. say something in speech.

ex. 2. This letter is wrongly addressed.

m. 2. write on a letter particulars of the per-

sons, town, street, number of the house, etc.,
to which it is to be delivered.

ct.3. It's time we address ourselves to the business in hand.

m.3. be busy with.

ct.4. John pays addresses to an Indian lady but unfortunately he is rejected.

m.4. polite courtship.

2. answer: ct.1. Have you answered his letter?

m.1. reply.

ct.2. Will answer your purpose?

m.2. fulfil.

ct.3. This plan has not answered, we need a better one.

m.3. succeed, be satisfactory.

3. arm: ct.1. She was carrying a child in her arms.

m.1. the two upper limbs of the human body, from the shoulder to the hands.

ct.2. The arms of his coat is torn.

m.2. sleeve.

ct.3. The soldiers have plenty of arms.

m.3. weapons.

ct.4. The soldier belongs to the infantry arm.

m.4. division of a country's military services.

ct.5. Their coat of arms is the picture of a man holding a torch.

m.5. pictorial design.

4. bachelor: ct.1. The bachelor and the spinster finally agree to marry each other.

m.1. unmarried man.

ct.2. He got his Bachelor at Yale.

m.2. first university degree.

ct.3. The bachelor was killed when he was making love with his lady in waiting.

m.3. young knight.

ct.4. The bachelor is killed for its fur.

m.4. young fur seal.

5. band: ct.1. The iron bands of the barrel got rusty.

m.1. flat, thin strip of material.

ct.2. The band of robbers terrorized the city for weeks.

m.2. Group of people doing something together under a leader with a common purpose.

ct.3. The Beatles is the band I like best.

m.3. group of persons who play music together.

6. bar: ct.1. I prefer a bar of chocolate to a bar of soap.

m.1. long-shaped piece of hard, stiff material.

ct.2. He was placed behind prison bar.

m.2. rod or rail of wood or metal.

ct.3. Poor health may be a bar to success in life.

m.3. barrier or obstacle.

ct.4. Let's go to the milk bar.

m.4. counter at which meals, etc. are served.

7. bill: ct.1. The eagle's bill is very sharp.

m.1. horny part of a bird's mouth.

ct.2. There are some bills to pay.

m.2. statements of charged for goods delivered.

ct.3. That theatre bill spoils the view.

m.3. written or printed notice.

ct.4. Do you have a ten-dollar bill?

m.4. bank-note.

ct.5. Where is your bill of health?

m.5. certificate.

8. blind: ct.1. He is blind in the right eye.

m.1. without the power to see.

ct.2. In his blind haste, he almost ran into the river.

m.2. reckless, thoughtless.

ct.3. Some people think that the world is ruled by blind forces.

m.3. not ruled by purpose.

ct.4. Will you pull down the blinds please?

m.4. roll of cloth fixed on a roller and pulled down to cover a window.

9. blood: ct.1. He gave his blood to help his sister.

m.1. red liquid flowing throughout the body.

ct.2. His blood is up.

m.2. passion, temper.

ct.3. They are of the same blood.

m.3. relationships, family.

10. body: ct.1. We wear clothes to keep our bodies warm

m.1. the whole physical structure of a man.

ct.2. The body of the motor-car is badly damaged.

m.2. main part of a structure.

ct.3. Large bodies of unemployed men marched through the streets demanding work.

m.3. groups of persons who do something together and who are united in some way.

ct.4. A lake is a body of water.

m.4. mass, collection.

ct.5. There are countless heavenly bodies in the sky.

m.5. distinct piece of matter.

11. bottom: ct.1. There are some tea-leaves in the bottom of the cup.

m.1. the lowest part of anything, inside or outside.

ct.2. She smacks the child's bottoms.

m.2. buttocks.

ct.3. This chair needs a new bottom.

m.3. seat.

ct.4. We must get to the bottom of this mystery.

m.4. foundation.

12. call: ct.1. A call for help was heard.

m.1. shout, cry.

ct.2. He answered the call of his country.

m.2. summons.

ct.3. I paid a call to a friend's house yesterday.



m.3. short visit.

ct.4. Was the last call two spades?

m.4. player's right or turn to make a bid at
auction bridge.

13. capital: ct.1. Canberra is the capital of Australia.

m.1. city where the government of a country
is carried on.

ct.2. The pronoun "I" is written with a capital
letter.

m.2. not small.

ct.3. The corporation started on 2000.000 dol-
lars capital.

m.3. money with which a business is started.

ct.4. He made a capital speech.

m.4. excellent, first-rate.

14. clean: ct.1. Make your hands clean!

m.1. free from dirt.

ct.2. Give a clean sheet of paper.

m.2. not yet used.

ct.3. You must lead a clean life.

m.3. pure, innocent.

ct.4. "E" is a ship with clean lines.

m.4. well-formed.

ct.5. A sharp knife makes a clean cut.

m.5. even.

15. course: ct.1. The course of life is from cradle to the
grave.

m.1. forward movement in space and time.

ct.2. The mayor told the men to build a golf
course.

m.2. ground for.

ct.3. There will be a course of lectures here.

m.3. series.

ct.4. Do you often have a dinner of five courses?

m.4. one of several parts of a meal.

16. cover: ct.1. When the water boils, take the cover from the pan.

m.1. lid.

ct.2. The book needs a new cover.

m.2. bindings.

ct.3. The land was flat and treeless and provided no cover for the troops.

m.3. place or area giving shelter or protection.

ct.4. These are really murders committed under the cover of patriotism.

m.4. pretence.

ct.5. Covers were laid for six.

m.5. place laid at table for meals.

17. credit: ct.1. Do you give credit to his story?

m.1. belief.

ct.2. He is a man of highest credit.

m.2. reputation.

ct.3. No credit is given in this shop.

m.3. beliefs of others that a person, business company, etc., can pay debts, etc., or will keep a promise to pay.

ct.4. Does this item goes among the credits or the debits.

m.4. record of money etc., possessed by, or due to somebody, business firm, etc..

18. crop: ct.1. Our farmers have a good crop of rice this year.

m.1. produce of grain.

ct.2. The Prime Minister's statement produced a crop of questions.

m.2. groups of things.

ct.3. You look as if you've had a prison crop.

m.3. very short hair cut.

19. distant: ct.1. We have a distant view of Mt. Everest.

m.1. far away in space.

ct.2. She is a distant cousin of mine.

m.2. far off in family relationship.

ct.3. Instead of stopping to speak, she only passed by with a distant nod.

m.3. reserved, not showing familiarity.

20. division: ct.1. 50:5 is a simple problem in division.

m.1. a bit of arithmetic.

ct.2. The division is marching.

m.2. unit of two or more brigades.

ct.3. Agitators who stir up divisions. are dangerous.

m.3. disagreements.

21. element: ct.1. Water is a compound containing the elements of hydrogen and oxygen.

m.1. substance which has not so far been split up into a simpler one by ordinary chemical method.

ct.2. Ancient philosophers believed that the universe was composed of the four elements.

m.2. earth, air, water, and fire.

ct.3. The elements of geometry are easy.

m.3. beginnings of a subject.

ct.4. There is an element of truth in his account of what happened.

m.4. suggestion, indication.

22. end: ct.1. The house at the end of the street is for sale.

m.1. farthest or last part.

ct.2. Cigarette ends are valuable today.

m.2. remnant.

ct.3. At the end of the story, the hero died.

m.3. finish.

ct.4. He's nearing his end.

m.4. death.

ct.5. The ends justify the means.

m.5. aim.

23. fair: ct.1. Everyone must have a fair share.

m.1. just.

ct.2. His knowledge of French is fair.

m.2. average.

ct.3. Let's hope for fair weather this week.

m.3. dry and fine.

ct.4. He is in a fair way to succeed.

m.4. promising.

ct.5. She has a fair complexion.

m.5. pale.

ct.6. Please make a fair copy of this letter.

m.6. clean, without blemish.

24. fast: ct.1. The post is fast in the ground.

m.1. firmly fixed.

ct.2. He is my fast friend.

m.2. steady.

ct.3. He misses the fast train.

m.3. quick.

ct.4. My watch is five minutes fast.

m.4. showing time in advance of the correct time.

25. foul: ct.1. I can't bear drinking a medicine with foul taste.

m.1. causing disgust.

ct.2. He speaks foul language.

m.2. obscene.

ct.3. Just burn this foul rope.

m.3. entangled.

ct.4. The fire won't burn, perhaps the chimney is foul.

m.4. clogged up.

26. general: ct.1. It is a matter of general interest.

m.1. affecting all.

ct.2. Do you have a general idea of what the book is about?

m.2. not in detail.

ct.3. General Smith has been appointed ambassador.

m.3. army officer with the highest rank below Field Marshal.

27. grace: ct.1. She danced with grace.

m.1. beautiful, attractive.

ct.2. He had the grace to say that he was sorry.

m.2. feeling of what is right or proper.

ct.3. By the grace of our Lord, we are free.

m.3. God's mercy.

ct.4. Her Grace Elizabeth I visited Australia.

m.4. a title.

28. grade: ct.1. This pupil has a high grade of intelligence.

m.1. degree in quality.

ct.2. An elementary school in the U.S.A. has eight grades.

m.2. division of the school course.

ct.3. She has an excellent grade in poetry.

m.3. the mark or rating.

29. effect: ct.1. Punishment had very little effect on him.

m.1. outcome.

ct.2. We had got to improve the sound effects.

m.2. impression produced on the mind of the hearer, reader, spectator, etc.

ct.3. That is what he said or words to that effects.

m.3. meaning.

ct.4. The hotel keeper seized her personal effects because she could not pay her bill.

m.4. goods, property.

30. hand: ct.1. Are your socks knitted by hands or machine made?

- m.1. part of the human arm beyond the wrist.
- ct.2. The property is no longer in my hands.
- m.2. possession
- ct.3. The hand of an enemy has been at work here.
- m.3. influence or agent.
- ct.4. She has a light hand at pastry.
- m.4. skill.
- ct.5. The factory has taken 200 extra hands.
- m.5. employee who works with his hands.
- ct.6. Do you think he had a hand at it?
- m.6. share an activity.
- ct.7. He writes a good hand.
- m.7. handwriting.
- ct.8. The letter is given under my hand and seal.
- m.8. signature.
- ct.9. We have only three players; we need a fourth hand.
- m.9. member of a group of card players.
- ct.10. The audience gave the speaker a big hand.
- m.10. applause.

31. head: ct.1. They cut his head off.

- m.1. the part of the body which contains the eyes, nose, mouth, and brain.
- ct.2. He made his story up out of his own head.
- m.2. power to reason.
- ct.3. He has a good head for business.
- m.3. natural aptitude or talent.
- ct.4. He is standing at the head of the staircase.
- m.4. top.
- ct.5. The head of our government is President Suharto.
- m.5. position of command.
- ct.6. The ship was down by the head.
- m.6. front part.

ct.7. The speech was arranged under five heads.

m.7. main division.

32. heart: ct.1. When a man's heart stops beating, he dies.

m.1. that part of the body which pumps blood
through the system.

ct.2. He is a man with a kind heart.

m.2. centre of emotion.

ct.3. Let's just go to the heart of the matter.

m.3. essence.

ct.4. The land is in good heart.

m.4. fertility.

33. import: We import wool from Australia.

m.1. bring in goods from foreign country.

ct.2. What does this import?

m.2. signify.

ct.3. It imports to know whether his case is true.

m.3. be of consequence to.

34. index: ct.1. The increasing of luxuries was an index of
the country's prosperity.

m.1. something that indicates.

ct.2. Please see the word "Lourdes" in the index.

m.2. list of names, subjects, references, etc.,
in ABC order, at the end of a book.

ct.3. In b^3 and x^n , 3 and n are indices.

m.3. exponent.

35. issue: ct.1. Stop the issue of the blood!

m.1. outflowing.

ct.2. The issue of a newspaper undergoes a complicated process.

m.2. publication.

ct.3. Let's not argue political issue.

m.3. question that arises for discussion.

ct.4. He managed to bring the campaign into successful issue.

m.4. result.

ct.5. The poor king died without issues.

m.5. offsprings.

36. jade: ct.1. He carved some jades into the ornaments.

m.1. green stone.

ct.2. The old jade can hardly run or draw a cart.

m.2. worn out horse.

ct.3. You saucy little jade!

m.3. playful woman.

37. jar: ct.1. We felt a jar when the engine was coupled to the train.

m.1. harsh vibration.

ct.2. The fall from the horse gave him a nasty jar.

m.2. shock.

ct.3. Households without a few family jars are rare.

m.3. quarrel.

ct.4. The strawberry jar is broken.

m.4. tall round vessel of glass, stone or earthenware.

38. key: ct.1. Put the key in the lock.

m.1. metal instrument for moving the bolt of a lock.

ct.2. The key of the text-book has not been published.

m.2. set of answers to exercises or problems.

ct.3. Gibraltar has been called the key to the Mediterranean.

m.3. place, which, from its position, gives control of a route or area.

ct.4. Today we will learn the key of C major.

m.4. scale of notes definitely related to each other and based on a particular note called key-note.

39. letter: ct.1. There are 26 letters in the English alphabet.

m.1. character or sign representing a sound, of which words in writing are formed.

ct.2. Please post the letter for me.

m.2. written message sent by one person to another.

ct.3. My father is a man of letters.

m.3. literate and learning.

40. master: ct.1. The servant hates his master.

m.1. man who has others working for or under him.

ct.2. He is the master of the house.

m.2. male head of a household.

ct.3. The master mariner has been murdered.

m.3. captain of the merchant ship.

ct.4. The mathematics master is very strict.

m.4. male teacher in school.

ct.5. He got his Master of Arts at Harvard.

m.5. holder of the second university degree.

41. Note: ct.1. He spoke for an hour without a note.

m.1. short record (of facts, etc.) made to help the memory.

ct.2. I sent him the note of thanks.

m.2. short letter.

ct.3. I bought a new edition of "Hamlet" with copious notes in it.

m.3. short comment on or explanation of a word or a passage in a book.

ct.4. He is comparing notes with a friend.

m.4. observation.

ct.5. The blackbird's merry notes were heard.

m.5. single sound of a certain speed and duration.

ct.6. There was a note of self satisfaction in his speech.

m.6. quality (esp. of voice) indicating the nature

of something.

42. old: ct.1. She is twenty years old.

m.1. of age.

ct.2. He is far too old for a young girl like your daughter to marry.

m.2. no longer young or middle-aged.

ct.3. We should sometimes break old customs.

m.3. belonging to past times.

ct.4. He is and old friend of mine.

m.4. long known or familiar.

ct.5. He is old in diplomacy.

m.5. having much experience or practice.

43. plain: ct.1. The meaning is quite plain.

m.1. easy to understand.

ct.2. She wore a plain blue dress.

m.2. simple.

ct.3. He spoke it in plain words.

m.3. straight forward.

ct.4. Have you ever been to the wide plains of Canada?

m.4. area of level country.

44. queen: ct.1. The Queen of England visited our country last year.

m.1. woman ruler in her own right.

ct.2. The king and his queen were all assassinated.

m.2. wife of a king.

ct.3. Mary Brown is the queen of beauty.

m.3. woman regarded as first of a group.

45. relief: ct.1. It was a great relief to find the boy safe.

m.1. removal of anxiety.

ct.2. The General hastened to the relief of the fortress.

m.2. reinforcement.

ct.3. The man is happy to know that the relief is
on the way.

m.3. a person or persons appointed to go on duty.

ct.4. The sculptor made a profile of Julius Caesar
in relief.

m.4. method of carving or moulding in which a de-
sign stands out from the surface.

ct.5. The hills stood out in sharp relief against
the morning sky.

m.5. contrast.

46. slip: ct.1. He slipped on the icy road.

m.1. lose one's balance.

ct.2. The years slipped by.

m.2. moved quietly and quickly without attracting
attention.

ct.3. He slipped his coat on.

m.3. put on with a quick and easy movement.

ct.4. You've slipped in your grammar.

m.4. make a small error.

ct.5. Please slip the greyhound from the leash.

m.5. let go from restraint.

47. thing: ct.1. What are those things on the table?

m.1. any material object.

ct.2. Bring your swimming thing with you.

m.2. belongings.

ct.3. There is another thing I want to ask you a-
bout.

m.3. subject.

ct.4. He values spiritual things.

m.4. that which is non-material.

ct.5. That only makes things worse.

m.5. course of action.

48. understand: ct.1. He did not understand what I said.

m.1. know the meaning of.

ct.2. You don't understand what a difficult position I'm in.

m.2. realize.

ct.3. I understand that you are now married.

m.3. learn, infer.

49. verse: ct.1. I like prose better than verse.

m.1. form of writing arranged in lines each conforming a pattern of accented and unaccented syllables.

ct.2. It is a poem of five verses.

m.2. unit in a rhyme scheme.

ct.3. In chapter one verse 26 we can read the creation of man according to the Bible.

m.3. One of the short numbered divisions of a chapter in the Bible.

50. wander: ct.1. He wandered over the countryside.

m.1. go from one place to another without purpose or destination.

ct.2. Some of the sheep have wandered away.

m.2. leave the right path or direction.

ct.3. His mind wandered back to his college days.

m.3. be absent minded.

Thus it is now clear that, in fact, a word may have several meanings, but there is really no confusion which bars the success of communication because the intended meaning or the message can clearly be detected from the appropriate contexts.

CHAPTER III

THE INTENDED MEANING OF A SENTENCE

Human speech is made up of sentences. It has so far been found impossible to give a definition of the term sentence that should be acceptable to linguists, psychologists, and logicians alike, nor is it probable that such a definition will ever be forthcoming. Broadly speaking, however, we can distinguish three types of sentence structure: simple, compound, and complex sentences. When we talk about the form of a sentence in this paper, we refer to one of these.

Simple sentences are those with single main clauses (one subject and one predicate) like for example:

Love your enemies.

Let there be light.

People are created equal.

Compound sentences have two or more main clauses joined by the coordinate conjunction like: and, but, or, so and the like.

e.g. He was tired and he wanted a glass of beer.

He feels ill so he goes to bed.

He is stupid but his brother is clever.

The complex sentences contain main clauses and subordinate clauses, like for example:

If only he hadn't made that mistake we should all be happy now.

I did it because it had to be done.

He does very much as he likes.

There are also single words which are used as sentences like: Thanks! Splendid! Father!, etc., etc. They are called sentence words.

Now when we use a language to communicate some abstract thoughts or ideas, we employ the linguistic form sen-

tences, and not isolated words. And as it is previously pointed out when we talk about speech components, the process of encoding is conditioned by speech components and made more complicated by the necessity of choosing a speech variety which is appropriate to the particular situation. The ideal process of decoding the message, of course, presupposes the mastery of speech components and language variety which conditioned the encoding process.

The objective of this chapter is just to show that sentences, like words, may contain various meanings and that the intended meaning of a sentence is usually determined by the contexts. But the 'contexts' of a sentence are not so easily pin-pointed as the contexts of a word because it involves the understanding of some complicated conditioning factors. But let us assume that we have known all the meanings of the words which make up the sentence and the grammatical structure of the sentence, and even the particular situation of the encoding and the decoding process; yet, the understanding of the encoded message will be much more facilitated if we know the intent of the person who encodes it. Thus, before it is shown that the intended meaning of a sentence can be detected from the context, it is worthwhile to investigate what possible intents are there in a communication process.

A. Speech Intents and the Use of Sentences

There are, as we know, three common uses of sentence. They have been called: informative, expressive, and directive. When a sentence is used to express a matter of facts it is said that a statement of fact is thereby made - or that the sentence is used informatively. When a sentence is used to express emotion, it is said to be used expressive-

ly; and when a sentence is used to command or request, it is said to be used directly.

Here are the examples of the informative use of sentences.

"Borobudur is the biggest Buddhist temple in Indonesia" - as uttered by an Indonesian guide.

"The Adventure of Huckleberry Finn is the only one of Mark Twain's various books which can be called a masterpiece" - as uttered by a literary critic.

"Leads melt at 327° C" - as uttered by a student in a laboratory after performing experiments with lead.

Here are sentences which are used expressively.

"Poor thing" - as uttered by a woman on finding that her baby has been stung by a bee.

"How perfectly divine!" - as uttered by a woman in the presence of another woman as they see the Mona Lisa in a gallery.

Sentences are said to be used directly in these two episodes.

"Love your enemies and pray for your persecutors." - as uttered by Christ. (Matthew 5 : 45)

"Please pass the salt" - as uttered by a boy at the dinner table.

And here are two more sentences which do not belong to the three categories mentioned above.

"Out of every 10 German Mercedes - Benz drivers who sold their cars in 1980, 9 bought another Mercedes - Benz." as uttered by a car dealer.

"If you sat in a bucket of glue, you would have a sticky end." as uttered by a husband to his wife at the dinner table.

The first sentence is used to 'persuade' and the second to

'entertain' or 'amuse'.

From the above exemplification of sentence uses, we can have a classification of intents in terms of in-
forming, persuading, convincing, and entertaining.

B. The Intended Meaning and the Context

The sentence examples given above are deliberately set in their respective contexts to enable us to specify their intended meanings. The Indonesian guide means to inform her tourists that Borobudur is, in fact, the biggest Buddhist temple in Indonesia. Let us imagine that it is not a guide, but a history teacher who uttered this sentence in front of his SMA students during a history lesson. Obviously he did not want to inform the mere fact that everybody knows, he might intend to persuade his students to infer that Java used to be the centre of Buddhism. "Love your enemies" as uttered by Christ means entirely different thing if uttered by somebody else. Christ's purpose in saying this was to provide instruction concerning the conduct of our lives. But we can imagine purposes other than this one which someone might have in giving this command. For example some government official might say this with the purpose of keeping peace and order. A politician might say this with the intent to win the church vote.

The simple statement, "The nurse will take you to the operating room" - uttered by a doctor to his patient is simply used to inform the patient that he was going to be taken to the operating room by the nurse. But if this statement is uttered in the presence of a nurse, it might be intended not to inform the patient at all, but to ask the nurse to take the patient to the operating room.

"How are you?" uttered by a woman to a friend she saw as she was leaving church would mean utterly different thing if the same sentence was uttered by a doctor to his patient after an operation. The first sentence is intended to greet a friend, and the second sentence is meant to ask the patient to give the doctor some appropriate informations.

When a mother and her four-year old son go to the zoo and the mother says, "He is a tiger" while pointing to the wild animal, she means to tell her son that the beast is called a tiger. But when Mary whispers to Jane while they see John approaching them, "He is a tiger", she intends to say that he is scrappy, high-tempered, or fierce like a tiger. "What time is it?" directed by a boss to his secretary in a meeting would mean quite a different thing from "What time is it?" directed to the same person who comes very late to the office.

People sometimes facetiously say the opposite of what they mean, for example when:

"You look great in that sweater" is said with a disapproving look.

"That's really good for the typewriter" is said sarcastically when someone is erasing directly over the working mechanism.

"Your report is really something" is said with a sneer.

"Well, good for you!" is said with a tone of disgust.

False flattery and false compliments delivered under the veil of sincerity also show that the intended meanings of sentences are usually determined by the contexts. For example: "Great idea!" says a committee chairman, although he may really think the idea is useless. "You are doing a great job." says a boss although the sales volume has just dropped. "That hairdo is gorgeous" says a friend when it is

actually unbecoming.

C. The Intended Meanings of some Sentences Culled from some Religious Literature as their Original Contexts

From the preceding examples it is clear that sentences may, in fact, have several meanings and the intended meaning can be detected from the contexts. The following sentences show further proofs of the validity of the thesis. If we take the sentences out of their original contexts in which they are used, we will probably see different meanings from what they are intended to be. As it is shown before, "Love your enemies" may have entirely different meaning if it is taken out from the original contexts in which it is appropriately used.

And as it is mentioned before, "speech intents" of the language users may restrict the meanings of the linguistic forms. From the 'speech intent' point of view, the following sentences have something in common namely they are used to provide ethics for living. "S" here means the sentence, "M" the intended meaning.

1. S: A craving for the objects of the senses rises out of the illusion caused by ignorance of the real nature of the Self; just as the illusion of silver causes an attachment for it.

(from The Ashtavakra Gita)

M: This ancient teaching reaches into the deepest causes of the human misery on earth. The craving for physical possession is the main reason for man's inner imbalance. How free man would feel, if there was no attachment to material objects in him. One may ask pertinently basic questions to himself:
 "What is dearest to me on this earth? How will I

react to the loss of all my possessions and property? Will I be unhappy?" The moment of abandoning everything we now see around us, and not only what we possess, cannot be avoided. Therefore is it worthwhile attaching oneself to anything, which must be unavoidably lost? The fact itself of "possessing" certain commodities of material life is not an evil in itself, it is our attachment and fear of losing them which is the danger and a forecast of future suffering.

2. S: Look upon friends, possessions, wealth, mansions, wives, gifts, and other good fortune, as a dream or a magic show, lasting only a few days.

(from The Ashtavakra Gita)

M: The crux of the sentence is the realization of the illusory character of everything around us. Therefore, the lack of the things described if such is our destiny in this life, is rather a blessing, for the pain of breaking of attachment may be spared us in this way. Will we crave for them, when we have realize their nothingness?

There are moments when we see this clearly and it means that some 'higher' Self is in us. Sometimes we feel enchanted by earthly attachments and achievements, but isn't that the voice of the future suffering?

3. S: Bring to an end wealth, desires, and good and pious deeds, they will not bring rest to thy mind in the gloomy forest of the world.

(from The Ashtavakra Gita)

M: This looks like an ultimate step on the path of spiritual discrimination and non-attachment.

The root of evil is desire: fulfilled - it dazzles and blinds, unfulfilled - it makes one suffer as if from a deadly thirst. Both aspects finally bring suffering and the moments of false happiness during the satisfying of desire, are so short and easily forgotten, that even the memory of them is like the dead, yellow leaves, fallen from the trees in late autumn.

4. S: So long as we live in this world we cannot be without tribulations and temptations.

(Thomas a Kempis, The Imitation of Christ)

M: We must confess that worldly affairs absorb the greatest part of our time. Tribulation and temptations have their source in our attachment to this world, which is beyond all necessary measure. We often forget to render to God what belongs to God, and are occupied with the things belongings to Caesar, as was told us by the Great Teacher. Under such condition we are only exposing ourselves to troubles from outside, as well as from inside, because we cannot be perfect in our relations with the outer world thereby attracting troubles and expiation of errors.

5. S: Often we do not know what we are able to do, but temptations show us what we are.

(Thomas a Kempis, op. cit.)

M: There is no such thing as something happening to us without any reason or purpose. We are able to realize it now. Therefore temptation which comes to attack us, contribute to our self knowledge, showing us our weaknesses and

undoing. Sometimes we may imagine that we are much stronger than we really are, and thus try to omit certain necessary experiences, as being obsolete as far as we are concerned. But in moments of temptations, when we have to fight with all our power against the impure stream, which tries to swallow us, we can see through ourselves much better.

6. S: He who wishes to put on the yellow robe without having cleansed himself from sin, who disregards also temperance and truth, is unworthy of the yellow robe.

(From the Dhammapada)

M: How often it is that true asceticism is misunderstood and people like to change their labels—religious, or sects, in order to advance spiritually, as they wrongly believe! To accept the outer signs of asceticism means nothing more than a kind of very dangerous hypocrisy, which is hard to eradicate because a misguided man is then able to believe quite sincerely that he is right.

- 7..S: As rain breaks through an ill-thatched house, passion will break through an unreflecting mind.

(from the Dhammapada)

M: The idea is age-old and always true. Seeking for the most understandable parallel in the outer world, we find, that even the most gifted engineer will be unable to tighten a vital screw in his motor, and so on, without a proper screwdriver. His knowledge will be of no avail if instruments are not provided,

as finger nails will not be a substitute for them. Fuel or cooling water will constantly leak from a loose valve, until it is repaired.

And so it is with the human mind, which is, as we know, an important tool of our consciousness. No spiritual giant was ever a fool and everyone of them was a master of their mentality and not a slave of wavering thoughts, or feelings. Because feelings are ruled and can be subdued only by the higher power, which, in this case, mind in relation to them, this power must be trained and operated according to our needs. Moral purity is therefore impossible without a pure and well-trained mind.

8. S: As a solid rock is not shaken by the wind, wise people falter not amidst blame and praise.

M: The winds of human recognition, or reproach are not essential for the one who knows himself. He is aware of how ignorant are those who try to judge others, before they possess the most important knowledge of themselves.

9. S: The highest goal of spiritual experience for man is Self Realization.

(from Maharshi's Transcendental
Meditation)

M: The sage Maharshi believed that the full knowledge of our own self, or the immortal essence, is the supreme means for the achievement of all the other qualities inherent in us like Love, a high moral code, peace of mind, devotion to God, and so on. He emphasized that all evil and lack of development are a direct result of man's ignorance. Whoever knows, will not

commit stupidities, or evil and selfish deeds. The final wisdom in man enlightens his whole nature, removing the stains of materialism and egoism, both of which come as prodigal children of the basic ignorance. If we know what we really need, we will not rob, or injure others, for our supreme good lies beyond the reach of the ego personality - mind of that unholy trinity, which rules the lives of non-realizing men.

There is nothing beyond the true realization of the Self, for it is the final achievement, after which there is nothing more to learn or experience. One's evolution then to its end - "The dewdrop slips into the shimmering blue sea" thereby becoming one with the whole, or, as Christ told us, comes to dwell in the Father's House, where there are mansions for every Son of Man.

10. S: You are the light of the world.

(from The Sermon on the Mount)

M: When it says that the light of the world is in us, it refers to the immortal element in man. Certainly not the whole man, as we see him, is related to this light. That which is only temporary and mortal in us does not participate in eternity. But we know that in truth we are just that perennial element, the Spirit of Christ, the True Self of Maharsi, the Reintegrated Adam Kadmon of Hermetists, and so on. When the Great Teacher spoke about that Light in us, He meant the immortal.

11. S: Blessed are the poor in spirit; for theirs

is the Kingdom of Heaven.

(from the Sermon on the Mount)

M: The sermon on the mount is opened by a single assertion, which begins every part of the Teaching. It is the statement regarding the usefulness and sublimity of a certain inner quality in man ('blessed are they....) and is followed by a description of the kind of reward awaiting the lucky souls, who possess this spiritual quality.

To be poor in spirit cannot mean the absence of true spiritual consciousness, for then it would be a sheer deception and absurdity. The meaning is different: under the word 'spirit' there lies its shadow, so often mistaken for the spirit itself. Those who are poor in spirit are men who understand the temporary role of the mind and emotions, with their vanity and inability to lead them to any final achievement. They may use them if necessary, but do not confuse them with their own immortal core, no matter how deeply and tightly it can be unwrapped. Those who are poor in spirit, lack self-admiration, self-sublimation, and the tragic acceptance as the true Self of its caricature, which is the ego.

12. S: Blessed are those who do hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall be filled.

(from the Sermon on the Mount)

M: Another quality, which initiates man into the Kingdom of God is his striving for righteousness, or justice. Deep in our innermost recesses,

there is the desire and hope for justice, in all its manifold manifestations. Not everyone, at every moment, has ready access to this hidden treasure. It depends on the intensity of the sincere inner search in man. I remember the profound words of the Great Teacher when He said, 'Ask and it shall be given to you: seek and you will find, and knock, and the door shall be opened for you.'

In these words, there is the joyous certainty in the search for eternal justice - righteousness. The second part of the present verse of the sermon confirms them with the unconditional statement that the holy thirst will be quenched before we return to the Father's Mansions.

13. S: Blessed are the merciful; for they shall obtain mercy.

M: What is 'mercy'? When, we, in our worldly life, fulfil our duty arising from our obligations, we are only doing our ordinary work, which we are supposed to do, according to laws and condition. There is little spiritual merit in it. When people pay me what they are supposed to pay, it is the same. And in both examples, there is no spiritual element of sacrifice.

Mercy is something much loftier. When the Samaritan stopped although he could easily passed the injured man, as did others, he showed just this higher quality of his soul. For he did much more than he was 'obliged' to do. He sacrificed in effort, time, money, arranging both cure and care for the luckless



traveller. He could not expect any reward for any of that, except in his own conscience. It was a typical act of pure mercy and it is about such that Jesus tells us, invoking blessing on those of us, who have the spirit of mercy and compassion, realized not just in words, but in actual deeds.

14. S: Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.

M: We know that purity of heart embraces everything: purity of feelings, thoughts and deeds. What is the 'heart'? Certainly not the fleshy organ on the left side of our chest. The heart is the ultimate, the innermost core of man's awareness, without which he is nothing, a void. It transcends, of course, every manifestation of mind and feelings.

Christ defined the heart as the source of everything which emerges from man's activities, his thoughts, his feelings, and his deeds. Thus pure in heart is the purity of the source of all human activities.

15. S: Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.

(from the Sermon on the Mount)

M: Peace is undoubtably one of the attributes of spiritual attainment. Without peace, there cannot be any spiritual consciousness in man. A troubled mind and feelings only show a man's imbalance, wrongness, and state of suffering. How many times does one hear complaints about restlessness, nervousness, and lack of peace in man. Nobody would ever envy such states and everyone would like to be rid of them if

it can be done as soon as possible. Now we see the great role of those, who are able to contribute to peace in their fellow men. They cure the most troublesome affliction in us. Peace makes us closer to the Lord, who could be approached only in the perfect stillness of all our lower vibrations, which are called - feelings and thinking. The great saying from the Scriptures comes to mind: 'Be still and know that I'm the Lord.'

Thus, from the numerous examples given above we can rightly conclude that a sentence, too, may have various meanings and that the intended meanings can be detected from the appropriate contexts.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTENDED MEANING OF A DISCOURSE

Words are made up of parts of words such as suffixes, prefixes, and stems. And sentences are made up of words, phrases and clauses, which form the subjects, the predicates, and the complements of the sentences. Now similarly a discourse is made of sentences which combine to form a 'meaning' unity. Just like a collection of words does not necessarily form a sentence, a collection of sentences does not necessarily form a discourse. Broadly speaking, a discourse can be in the form of a piece of literature (whether it is a prose or poetry, whether it is fiction or non-fiction), a sermon, a lecture, etc., etc. Thus for example Dr. Gloria's "The Place of Semantics in Early Transformational Grammar," Shakespeare's Hamlet, Blavatsky's Isis Unveiled, Lado's Language Teaching, and Dylan Thomas' 'Fern Hill' are some examples of discourses. Thus we know that a discourse is, in fact, the largest language unit.

A. The Meaning of a Discourse

Discourse as we know is a form of communication. As it is mentioned before, the process of communication is conditioned by so many factors including speech components. The source and the respondent or in the case of the examples shown above the author and the reader, are the major elements in the communication process. The author encodes something, and the reader decodes it. By reading the form of the discourse the author is using, the reader decodes what the author encodes. Thus reading is an activity by which we receive communication from others.

Now if we study the examples of the discourses above,

we will immediately see that Dr. Gloria's paper and Lado's book do communicate what is eminently and essentially communicable - abstract knowledge; whereas Dylan Thomas' poem for instance tries to communicate what is essentially and profoundly incommunicable - concrete experience. There is something mysterious about this. If concrete experience is really incommunicable, by what magic does the poet or novelist hope to convey to us for our enjoyment an experience which he has enjoyed?

Let us fully realize the incommunicability of concrete experience. Everyone has gone through some intense emotional crisis - the quick wave of anger, prolonged anxiety about an impending disaster, the cycle of hope and despair in love. We can tell all the facts without much trouble, because the outcome and observable facts are matters of ordinary knowledge, and can be easily communicated. But can we give them the experience itself, in all its concrete inwardness - the experience which we find difficult even to remember in its fullness and intensity? If our memory of it is pale and fragmentary, how much more must be the impression we are conveying by our words. As we watch the faces of our listeners, we can tell that they are not having the experience we are talking about.

In one sense, of course, even the greatest writer cannot communicate his own experiences. They are uniquely his through all eternity. A man can share his knowledge with others, but he cannot share the actual pulsations of his life. Since unique and concrete experiences cannot be communicated, the artist does the next best thing. He creates in the reader what he cannot convey. He uses words to produce an experience for the reader to enjoy, an experience which the reader lives through in a manner similar and proportionate to the

writer's own. His language so works upon the emotion and the imagination of each reader that in turn suffers an experience he has never had before, even though memories may be evoked in the process. These new experiences, different for each reader according to his own individual nature and memories, are nevertheless alike, because they are all created to the same model - the incommunicable experiences on which the writer draws. We are like so many instruments for him to play upon, each with its special overtones and resonances, but the music that he plays so differently on each of us follows one and the same score. That score is written into the novel or poem or drama. As we read it, it seems to communicate, but it really creates, an experience. That is the magic of good fiction, which creates imaginatively the similitude of an actual experience.

I cannot substantiate what I said by quoting a whole novel or play. We can only remember and dwell upon what happened to us while we were reading some fiction which move us deeply. Did we learn facts about the world? Did we follow arguments and proofs? Or did we suffer a novel experience actually created by the author for our imagination during the process of reading?

Let me quote one of Shelley's lyrics: ¹¹

"when soft voices die,
vibrates in the memory -
odours, when sweet violets sicken,
live within the sense they quicken.
 rose leaves when the rose is dead
 are heaped for the beloved's bed,
 and so thy thoughts, when thou are gone,
 love itself shall slumber on."

The poem plays upon our senses directly by the music of its words, but more than that, it evokes imaginations and memories which blend into a single whole of significant experience. Each word is counted on to do its part, not only musically in the pattern of sounds but also as a command to remember

¹¹. Drs. W. J. Hendrowarsito, a poetry lecture for doctoral

or imagine. Shelley has so directed our faculties that, without being aware of how it happened, we have enjoyed an experience, not of our making but of his. We have not received something from him, as we receive knowledge from a scientific writer. Rather we have suffered ourselves to be the medium of his creation. He has used words to get into our hearts and fancies and move them to an experience that reflects his own as one dream might resemble another. In fact, by some strange manner of effluence, the poet's dream is dreamed differently by each of us.

The meaning of a discourse is simply what the speaker or the writer chooses to mean with creating the discourse. Shelley for example wants to communicate experience and subtle feelings. Then the meaning of his poem is the 'experience' and the 'feelings' he intends to impart to us. If a writer wants to communicate an abstract knowledge, then the 'meaning' would be the 'abstract knowledge' he is trying to convey. But we should remember that what the writer encodes is not always what the reader decodes. So a piece of literature would naturally mean one thing to one reader and another thing to another reader, just like the poet's dream is 'dreamed' differently by each of the reader. Or in other words, a discourse may have several meanings, depending on such things as: the complexity of the discourse and the proficiency of the readers. And the understanding of the intended meaning of a discourse is determined by the context, in this case, the most important conditioning factor is the decoder.

Thus Dante's Divine Comedy may have various meanings whether, for example, we view it as a treatise of 'philosophy' or as a mere comedy. Mark Twain's The Adventures

of Tom Sawyer is an adult book which children can read and enjoy. And they can continue to enjoy it ever afterward because the plot of Tom Sawyer, while quite fascinating to a child, is not the chief attraction of the novel. Thus, instead of the book's appeal being diminished as soon as one discovers how it comes out, it becomes stronger. After we once know what will happen, our attention is liberated, so to speak, from close attention to the adventure story line, and we are free to take in the characterization, the setting, and the imaginative meaning of the story. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, which is Twain's other great novel, can also be viewed as a simple story of a boy named Huckleberry or as a book which has the truth of moral passion and which deals directly with the virtue and depravity of a man's heart.

B. The Guiding Purposes behind Discourses

We have classified speech intents in terms of: informing, persuading, convincing, and entertaining. And this holds true in discourse writing. Different kinds of writing achieve different purposes. On the basis of controlling purpose, we traditionally divide all prose into three kinds: narration, description, and exposition. If we go into any university library, most of the books we find on the shelves are examples of exposition. Philosophies, histories, literary essays, theories of economics, studies of government and law, the findings of sociology, the investigation of science -all these, however different, have for their purpose to explain.

Exposition, then, is a wide net. What, we may ask, is not exposition? If the guiding purpose of the writer is to tell a story, to tell merely what happened, then we say

the writing is narrative rather than exposition. If the writer intends to tell us how something looks, to re-create the thing in words, we may call it description. A narrative arranges the material in time. Description most often organizes in space. We might think of narrative as a stage play or motion picture in words, and of descriptive as a verbal photograph or painting. Exposition organizes its subject not in time or space but by logic. The subject of the expository writer may be people, things, ideas, or some combination of these, but always he is a man thinking, interpreting, convincing, persuading. Although he may appeal to our emotions, he is more likely to appeal to our reason by using evidence and logic. In other words, exposition is less like a stage play or painting and more like a lecture, discussion, or debate.

Exposition, narration and description are far from being mutually exclusive. There is no such thing as pure expository books, pure narration, and pure descriptive works. Just as the lecturer tells a story or uses maps, charts, or slides to interest his audience and clinch his point, so the expository writer may turn for aid to narration or description. Often these kinds of writing become so fused as to be practically indistinguishable: the description of the structure of an atom is as much an explanation as it is a picture. The historical narrative is as much concerned with the why and how as with what happened. Even so, the traditional classification of prose into description, narration and exposition is useful so long as we are aware of its limitation.

As it will gradually unfold, the three short essays I choose to explicate in this paper are basically expository; yet they contain some descriptions and narrations to support the explanation. On the other hand, although Mark Twain's

The Adventures of Tom Sawyer is basically a narration, it contains the explanation of the truth of honesty and what the book says about things and feelings is never false and always both adequate and beautiful and fit for our logical minds. And it also contains the description of Tom's character. Mark Twain also describes the stage or the setting of place within which the character Tom moves about and lives - his room, his house, his school, etc. And we know that a round character like Tom has the purpose of informing, instructing, entertaining, or doing all these at once.

C. The Explication of Three Essays

As it was mentioned in the introduction, three explications of short works will be used to support the thesis of this paper that a discourse may contain various meanings and that the intended meaning, at least from the point of view of the decoder, is determined by the context; and in this case "my analysing capacity" to explicate the respective work. The three short passages will be quoted in full, and the explications will directly follow the quoted essays.

The First Essay

MY WOOD

E. M. Foster.

(from Abinger Harvest)

(1) A few years ago I wrote a book which dealt with the difficulties of the English in India. Feeling that they would have had no difficulties in India themselves, the American reads the book freely. The more they read it, the better it made them feel, and a cheque to the author was the result. I bought a wood with the cheque. It is not a large wood - it contains scarcely any trees, and it is intersected, blast it by a public foot-path. Still it is the first property that I have owned, so it is right that other people should participate in my shame and should ask themselves, in accounts that will vary in horror, this very important question: What is the effect of property upon the character?

Don't let's touch economics; the effect of private ownerships upon the society as a whole is another question - a more important question perhaps, but another one. Let's keep to psychology. If you own things, what's their effects on you? What's the effect on me of my wood?

(2) In the first place, it makes me feel heavy. property does have this effect. Property produces men of weight, and it was a man of weight who failed to get into the Kingdom of Heaven. He was not wicked, that unfortunate millionaire in the parable, he was only stout; he stuck out in front not to mention behind, and as he wedged himself this way and that in the crystalline entrance and bruised his well-fed flanks, he saw beneath him a comparatively slim camel passing the eye of a needle and being woven into the robe of God. The Gospel all through couple stoutness and slowness. They point out what is perfectly obvious, yet seldom realized: that if you have a lot of things you cannot move about easily, that furniture requires dusting, dusters requires servants, servants require insurance stamps, and the whole tangle of them makes you think twice before you accept an invitation to dinner or go for a bathe in the Jordan. Sometimes the Gospels proceed and say with Tolstoy that property is sinful; they approach the difficult ground of asceticism here, where people, they just show straight forward logic. It produces men of weight. Men of weight cannot, by definition, move like the lighting from the east unto the west, and the ascent of a fourteen stone bishop into a pulpit is thus the exact antithesis of the coming of the Son of Man. My wood makes me feel heavy.

(3) In the second place, it makes me feel it ought to be larger.

(4) The other day I heard a twig snap in it. I was annoyed at first, for I thought that someone was blackberrying and depreciating the value of the undergrowth. On coming nearer, I saw it was not a man who had trodden on the twig and snapped it, but a bird, I felt pleased. My bird. The bird was not equally pleased. Ignoring the relation between us, it took fright as soon as it saw the shape of my face, and flew straight over the boundary hedge into a field, the property of Mrs. Henessy, where it sat down with a loud squack. It had become Mrs. Henessy's bird. Something seemed grossly amiss here, something that would not have occurred had the wood been larger. I could not afford to buy Mrs. Henessy out, I dare not murder her, and limitation of this sort beset me on every side. Ahab did not want that vineyard - he only needed it to round off his property, preparatory to plotting a new curve - and all the land around my wood has become necessary to me in order to round off the wood. A boundary protects. But - poor little thing - the boundary ought in its turn ought to be protected. Noises on the edge of it. Children throw stones. A little more, and then a little more until we reach the sea. Happy Canute! Happier Alexander! And after all, why should even the world be the limit of possession? A rocket containing a Union Jack will, it is hoped, be shortly fired at the moon, Mars, Sirius. Beyond which.... But these immensities ended by saddening me. I could not suppose that my wood was the destined nucleus of universal dominion - it is so very small and contains no mineral wealth beyond the blackberries. Nor was I comforted when Mrs. Henessy's bird took alarm for the second time and flew clean away from us all, under the belief that it belonged to itself.

(5) In the third place, property makes its owner feel that ought to do something to it. Yet, he's not sure what. A restlessness comes over him, a vague sense that he has a personality to express -the same sense which, without any vagueness, leads the artist to an act of creation. Sometimes I think I will cut down such trees as remain in the wood, at other times I want to fill up the gaps between them with new trees. Both impulses are pretentious and empty. They are not honest moment towards money making or beauty. They spring from a foolish desire to express myself and from an inability to enjoy what I have got. Creation, property, enjoyment form a sinister trinity in the human mind. Creation and enjoyment are both very, very good, yet they are often unattainable without a material basis, and at such moments property pushes itself in as a substitute, saying, "Accept me instead -I'm good enough for all three." It is not enough. It is, as Shakespeare says of lust, "The expense of spirit in a waste of shame": it is before a joy proposed; behind a dream." Yet we don't know how to shun him. It is forced on us by our economic system as the alternative to starvation. It is also forced on us by an internal defect in the soul, by the feeling that in property may lie the germs of self development and of exquisite or heroic deeds. Our life on earth is, and ought to be, material and carnal. But we have not yet learned to manage our materialism and carnality properly; they are still entangled with the desire for ownership, where (in the words of Dante) "Possession is one with loss".

(6) And this brings us to our fourth and final point: the blackberries.

(7) Blackberries are not plentiful in this meagre grove, but they are easily seen from the public footpath which traverses it, and all too easily gathered. Foxgloves, too -people will pull up the foxgloves, and ladies of an educational tendency even grub for toadstools to show them on the Monday in class. Other ladies, less educated, roll down the bracken in the arms of their gentlemen friends. There is paper, there are tins. Pray, does my wood belong to me or doesn't it? And, if it does, should I not own it best by allowing no one else to walk there? There is a wood near Lyme Regis, also cursed by a public footpath, where the owner has not hesitated on this point. He had built high stone walls each side of the path, and has spanned it by bridges, so that the public circulate like termites while he gorges on the blackberries unseen. He really does own his wood, this able chap. Dive in Hell did pretty well, but the gulf dividing him from Lazarus could be traversed by vision, and nothing traverses here. And perhaps I shall come to this in time. I shall wall in and fence out until I really taste the sweets of the property. Enormously stout, endlessly avaricious, pseudo-creative, intensely selfish. I shall weave upon my forehead the quadruple crown of possession until those nasty Bolshies come and take it off again and thrust me aside into the outer darkness.

The Explication

E. M. Foster's "My Wood" is, like many essays written by accomplished authors, deceptively simple. Although it consists of only seven paragraphs, its organization exemplifies several of the classic conventions of the short essay. The introduction (paragraph one) leads into the subject with a short narrative; it then defines the subject, precisely limit-

ing it to the psychological effects of owning property; then it ends with the question that the body of the essay will answer ("What's the effect on me of my wood"). The body (paragraphs 2 - 7) is built around four major assertions that answer the question at the end of the introduction ("it makes me feel heavy," "it makes me feel it ought to be larger," "property makes the owner feel he ought to do something to it," and the implied assertion "it makes me feel selfish"). These assertions are clearly enumerated by the transitions "in the first place," "in the second place," and so on. The support of the assertions includes a modernized version of a parable from the New Testament and a number of anecdotes based on personal experience. The conclusion, which consists of only one sentence, summarizes the four major assertions made in the body. The thesis of this essay might be readily be stated: "Possession of a wood makes me feel stout, avaricious, pseudo-creative, and selfish"; this thesis statement merely combines parts of the question at the end of the introduction with the summary of the answer in the last sentence.

A thesis statement is never equal to the essay itself, anymore than a prose paraphrase is equal to a poem. The thesis statement always leaves out a great deal; in this case one element omitted is the relatively light and humorous tone, which is one of the most important qualities of the essay. We can imagine, for example, Karl Marx or perhaps St. Francis writing an essay with much the same thesis, but we would assume that the tone would be vastly different in either case. And of course it is important for the reader to consider an author's tone with great care. In the case of "My Wood" it is probably safe to say that the serious implications of the thesis statement are qualified by the humorous tone. Foster wants us to take him seriously, but probably he wants us to maintain a sort of good-natured detachment at the same time. He does

not want us to condemn capitalists, as Marx would, or to suggest that we give all we own to the poor, as St. Francis might.

Perhaps the first clear manifestation of this tone in the second paragraph, in which Foster also makes his first point about the effect of ownership. He alludes to the biblical parables (Matthew 19 : 24) of the rich man whose wealth prevented him from entering the Kingdom of Heaven. Damnation because of wealth, is, of course, a serious thing, but Foster treats the whole matter rather lightly. The rich man of St. Matthew's gospel becomes an "unfortunate millionaire" who sticks out "in front, not to mention behind" and bruises "his well-fed flanks" trying to wedge this way and that through the gate of Heaven. This rich man seems more absurd than tragic, but while we are amused by his plight we are reminded that his damnation results from his unwillingness to rid himself of unnecessary and unattractive encumbrances.

The fourth paragraph maintains essentially the same tone but is perhaps a little more explicit. When Foster sees the bird, he is pleased and thinks "My bird". But the bird "not equally pleased", flies first to Mrs. Henessy's property and then off into the distance, "under the belief that it belonged to itself." In this incident, Foster both illustrates and ridicules his possessiveness: The bird is right in believing that it belongs to itself; Foster is aware of his own absurdity in deciding first that the bird belongs to him and then that it belongs to Mrs. Henessy.

The fifth paragraph is perhaps the most direct in the entire essay. Foster suggests that the ownership of property, with all the corruption it causes, result not only from our economic system but also from "an animal defect in the soul". These are serious ideas, and perhaps he felt that a light or humorous presentation would have detracted from their signi-

ficance.

The humorous tone is again obvious in the final paragraph, especially in the mention of the "ladies of an educational tendency" who grub for toadstools and the "other ladies, less educated" who "roll down the bracken in the arms of their gentlemen friends". He illustrates the idea that property leads to selfishness by the example of the man who walled off his wood from public view. This illustration leads to another biblical parable (Luke 16:19-31) that connects damnation with riches, a note occurring again in the brief allusion to "outer darkness" that follows the summary of main points in the last sentence.

At this point of our analysis, Foster's technique seems relatively simple. The introduction to the essay asks a question the body answers, the conclusion briefly summarizes the answer. The essay has a serious thesis, but the seriousness is somewhat qualified by the humorous development of the thesis exemplified both in the light-handed treatment of biblical allusion and in the amusing illustrations of the bird and the man near Lyme Regis. But like any really good piece of writing, this essay has implications that are not immediately apparent. Let us look more closely at some of the details.

The essay begins with the reference to Foster's book on "the difficulties of the English in India." This reference may be understood as a necessary bit of exposition, an explanation of how Foster got the money to buy the wood. But it is also possible that Foster intended to imply a parallel between his possession of the wood and the British "possession" of India. Perhaps he wishes to imply that imperial possession, like private ownership, makes a nation "heavy", makes it wish to extend its boundaries still farther, makes it eager to alter that which it owns, and makes it want to safeguard its own rights of exploitation. The parallel seems plausible enough, and in the fourth paragraph there are some

allusions that support this broader interpretation. Foster refers somewhat ironically to Canute and Alexander as "happy" because of their extensive possessions. One might recall that Canute is remembered because vainly commanded the waves of the sea to obey him and that Alexander wept because he had no more world to conquer. Similarly, sending a rocket carrying the British flag to the moon is a somewhat empty gesture of conquest. And we might also remember the bird. Foster refers to the bird as "My bird", but the bird was presumably right in assuming that it belonged only to itself. Foster refers the wood as "My wood", but he eventually asks himself "Pray, does my wood belong to me, or doesn't it?" Perhaps he wants to ask "Did Alexander own his empire?" Does England own India?

A few minor comments about some aspects of Foster's technique: We have already noted the contribution his handling of biblical allusions makes to the tone of the essay. It might also be pointed out that the biblical allusion as a means of development in the last paragraph recalls its use in the second paragraph, thus giving the essay greater coherence by tying the parts more closely. This is, of course, only a minor aspect of Foster's technique, but such device as this suggests how carefully an accomplished essayist plans his work.

The Second Essay

THE RING OF TIME

E. B. White

(from The Point of
my Compass)

(1) After the lions had returned to their cages, creeping angrily through the chutes, a little bunch of us drifted away and into an open doorway nearby, where we stood for a while in semidarkness, watching a big brown circus horse go

harumphing around the practice ring. His trainer was a woman of about forty, and the two of them, horse and woman, seemed caught up in one of those desultory treadmills of afternoon from which there is no apparent escape. The day was hot, and we kibitzers were grateful to be briefly out of the sun's glare. The long rein, or tape, by which the woman guided her charge counterclockwise in her dull career formed the radius of their private circle, of which she was the revolving centre; and she, too, stepped a tiny circumference of her own, in order to accommodate the horse and allow him his maximum scope. She had on a shortskirted costume and a conical straw hat. Her legs were bare and she wore high heels, which probed deep into the loose tanbark and kept her ankles in a state of constant turmoil. The great size and meekness of the horse, the repetitious exercises, the heat of the afternoon, all exerted a hypnotic charm that invited boredom; we spectators were experiencing a languour—we neither expected relief nor felt entitled to any. We had paid a dollar to get into the grounds, to be sure, but we had got our dollar's worth a few minutes before, when the lion's trainer's whiplash had got caught around a toe of one of the lions. What more did we want for a dollar?

(2) Behind me I heard someone say, "Excuse me, please," in a low voice. She was halfway into the building when I turned and saw her—a girl of sixteen or seventeen, politely treading her way through us onlookers who blocked the entrance. As she emerged in front of us, I saw that she was barefoot, her dirty little feet fighting the uneven ground. In most respect she was like any of two or three dozen showgirls you encounter if you wander about the winter quarters of Mr. John Ringling North's circus, in Sarasota—cleverly proportioned, deeply brown by the sun, dusty, eager, and almost naked. But her grave face and the naturalness of her manners gave her a sort of quick distinction and brought a new note into the gloomy octagonal building where we had all cast our lot for a few moments. As soon as she had squeezed through the crowd, she spoke a word or two to the older woman, whom I took to be her mother, stepped to the ring, and waited while the horse coasted to a stop in front of her. She gave the animal a couple of affectionate swipes on his enormous neck and then swung herself aboard. The horse immediately resumed his rocking canter, the woman goading him on, chanting something that sounded like "Hop! Hop!"

(3) In attempting to recapture this mild spectacle, I'm merely as recording secretary for one of the oldest of societies—the society of those who, at one time or another, have surrendered, without even a show of resistance, to the bedazzlement of a circus rider. As a writing man, or secretary, I have always felt charged with the safekeeping of all unexpected items of worldly or unworldly enchantment, as though I might be held personally responsible if even a small one were to be lost. But it is not easy to communicate anything of this nature. The circus comes as close as to being the world in microcosm as anything I know; in a way, it puts all the rest of show business in the shade. Its magic is universal and complex. Out of its wild disorder comes order; from its rank smell rises the good aroma of courage and daring; out of its preliminary shabbiness comes the final splendor. And buried in the familiar boasts of its advance agents lies the modesty of most of its people. For me the circus as at its best before it has been put together. It is at its best at certain moments when it comes to a point, as through a burning glass, in the activity

and destiny of a single performer out of so many. One ring is always bigger than three. One rider, one aerialist, is always greater than six. In short, a man has to catch the circus unawares to experience its full impact and share its gaudy dream.

(4) The ten minute ride the girl took achieved - as far as I was concerned, who was not looking for it, and quite unbeknownst to her who wasn't even striving for it - the thing that is sought by performers everywhere, on whatever stage, whether struggling in the tidal current of Shakespeare or bucking the difficult motion of a horse. I somehow got the idea that she was just cadging a ride, improving a shining ten minutes in the diligent way all serious artists seize free moments to hone the blade of their talent and keep themselves in trim. Her brief tour included only elementary postures and tricks, perhaps because they were all she was capable of, or perhaps because her warmup at this hour was unscheduled and the ring was not rigged for a real practice session. She swung herself off and on the horse several times, gripping his mane. She did a few knee stand -or whatever they are called -dropping to her knees and quickly bouncing back up on her feet again. Most of the time she simply rode in a standing position, well aft on the beast, her hands hanging easily at her sides, her head erect, her straw colored ponytail lightly brushing her shoulders, the blood of exertion showing faintly through the tan of her skin. Twice she managed to do a one-foot stand - a sort of ballet pose, with arms outstretched. At one point the neck strap of her bathing suit broke and she went twice around the ring in the classic attitude of a woman making minor repairs to a garment. The fact that she was standing on the back of a moving horse while doing this invested the matter with a clownish significance that perfectly fitted the spirit of the circus -jocund yet charming. She just rolled the strap into a neat ball and stowed it inside her bodice while the horse rocked and rolled beneath her in dutiful innocence. The bathing suit as self-reliance as its owner and stood up well enough without benefit of strap.

(5) The richness of the scene was in its plainness, its natural condition- of horse, of ring, of girl, even to the girl's bare feet that grip the bare back of her proud and ridiculous mount. The enchantment grew not out of anything that happened or was performed but out of something that seemed to go round and around and around with the girl, attending her, a steady gleam in the shape of a circle -a ring of ambition, of happiness, of youth. (and the positive pleasures of equilibrium under difficulties). In a week or two, all would be changed, all (or almost all) lost: the girl would wear make up, the horse would wear gold, the ring would be painted, the bark would be cleaned for the feet of the horse, the girl's feet would be clean for the slippers that she'd wear. All, all would be lost.

(6) As I watched with others, I become painfully conscious of the element of time. Everything in the hideous building seemed to take the shaped of a circle, conforming to the course of the horse. The rider's gaze, as she peered straight ahead, seemed to be circular, as though bent by force of circumstance; then time itself began running in circles, and so the beginning was where the end was, and the two were the same, and one thing ran through the next and time went round and around and got nowhere. The girl was not so young that she did not know the delicious satisfaction of having a perfectly behaved body and the fun of using it to do a trick most people can't do, but she was

too young to know that the time does not really move in a circle at all. I thought: "She will never be as beautiful as this again" -a thought that made me acutely aware and unhappy -and in a flash my mind (which is too much of a busybody to suit me) had projected her twenty five years ahead and she was now in the center of the ring, on foot, wearing a conical hat and high-heeled shoes, the image of the older woman, holding the long rein, caught in the treadmill of an afternoon long in the future. "She is at that enviable moment in life when she believes she can go once around the ring, make one complete circuit, and at the end be exactly the same age as at the start." Everything in her movements, her expression, told you that for her the ring of time was perfectly round, formed, changeless, predictable, without beginning or end, like the ring in which she was travelling at this moment with the horse that wallowed under her. And then I slipped back into my trance, and time was circular again -time, pausing quietly with the rest of us, so as not to disturb the balance of a performer.

(7) Her ride ended as casually as it had begun. The older woman stopped the horse, and the girl slid to the ground. As she walked towards us to leave, there was a quick and small burst of applause. She smiled broadly, in surprise and pleasure; then her face suddenly regained its gravity and she disappeared through the door.

(8) It has been ambitious and plucky of me to attempt to describe what is indescribable, and I have failed, as I knew I would. But I have discharged my duty to my society; and besides, a writer, like an acrobat, must occasionally try a stunt that is too much for him. At any rate, it is worth reporting that long before the circus comes to town, its most notable performances have already been given. Under the bright light of the finished show, a performer needs only reflect the electric candle power that is directed upon him; but in the dark and dirty old training rings and in the makeshift cages, whatever light is generated, whatever excitement, whatever beauty, must come from original sources -from internal fires of professional hunger and delight, from the exuberance and gravity of youth. It is the difference between planetary light and the combustion of stars.

The Explication

In the analysis of "My Wood" we noted that authors often communicate by implication as well as by direct statement and noted that in Foster's straightforward essay about the effects of ownership on him there were also some implications about the effects of imperialism. In reading an essay like "The Ring of Time" we must pay even closer attention to what the author implies. In fact we decide that what E. B. White communicates by implication is a good deal more important than what he communicates by direct statement. We find ourselves reading his essays as we might read a short story or a poem, looking for implied significance below the level of direct statement.

In some respects "The Ring of Time" follows the conventional pattern of the essay. The first paragraph, which serves as an introduction, even ends in the conventional way with a question, in this case, "What more did we want for a dollar?" The slightly ironic tone of this question disguises its structural function, but in fact the rest of the essay is an account of "what more" the spectators got for their dollar admission tickets.

The immediate answer to the question is presented in the second paragraph: The "what more" was the performance of the young girl. However, the full significance of her performance is not immediately apparent, even though White indicates that "her grave face and the naturalness of her manner gave her a sort of quick distinction" and comments that her appearance "brought a new note" to the gloomy building.

The third paragraph begins with what almost seems to be a digression; White comments on his self-assigned duty as "recording secretary" for the society of people who admire the circus and goes on to indicate that he feels "charged with the safekeeping of all unexpected items of worldly or unworldly enchantment" - a category that presumably would include a good deal more than circuses. At the end of the paragraph, however, he emphasizes the circus again and states what may appear to be his thesis: that the individual performances during rehearsals have more impact than the sometimes gaudy display of the three-ring circus as a whole.

The performance of the girl is, among other things, an example of the sort of impact that these individual rehearsals may have, an impact that will be lost when the girl and the horse are costumed and decorated for the actual three-ring performance. For White, the "richness of the scene was in its plainness, its natural condition" (par.5).

Furthermore, the girl's impromptu rehearsal, White says, achieves "the thing that is sought for by performers everywhere, on whatever state, whether struggling in the tidal currents of Shakespeare or bucking the difficult motion of a horse" (par.4). The girl is a "serious artist" and her performance presumably achieves what all serious artists seek to achieve. The obvious question is: What do all serious artists seek to achieve? White so far has used only the very general word "thing" to categorize this objective. In paragraph five he says that the enchantment of the performance grew "out of something that seemed to go round and around and around with the girl, attending her, a steady gleam in the shape of a circle -a ring of ambition, of happiness, of youth." This description may help to explain the 'thing' or the 'something' but it does not really define it. White's language is metaphorical, not logical. He, like a poet or a short story writer, is relying more on implication than on direct statement.

Paragraph six may provide a fuller answer to the question of what all serious artists seek to achieve. White becomes "painfully conscious of the element of time." He says that everything in the octagonal building "seemed to take the shape of a circle." Even the rider's gaze seems to become circular and finally "time itself began running in circles, and so the beginning was where the end was, and the two were the same, and one thing ran into the next and time went round and around and got nowhere." But White's verbs are verbs of seeming, not being; this sense that time is getting nowhere is an illusion. Time does not stand still, and the girl is mistaken in her supposed notion that "she can go once around the ring... and at the end be exactly the same age as at the start." The ring of time is not,

as she supposes, "perfectly formed, changeless, predictable, without beginning or end." Is this illusion of time standing still what the serious artists seek to achieve? White does not say so specifically, but apparently it is. The illusion is, in any event, the effect of the girl's performance, and we are told that she achieves what "is sought by performers everywhere."

There is a possible means of checking our hypothesis--the implied significance of the essay is that the artist creates the illusion of timelessness --for there is another kind of artist mentioned in the essay, the writer. White refers to himself as a "recording secretary" and says he feels "charged with the safekeeping of all unexpected items of worldly or unworldly enchantment, as though I might be held personally responsible if even a small one were to be lost." (paragraph 5). Is not the writer's function, then, to catch a momentary experience so that it will not be lost in the passage of time? Has not White attempted to describe such a moment in this essay, to give a kind of immortality to a performance that is in actuality ephemeral? Does not his description, like the girl's performance, make time "stand still"?

But White's views about the nature of the artist are directly implied, not directly stated, and we must be careful not to insist on discovering meanings, that can not be supported by the available evidence, in this case the actual words of the essay. An author who works through implications runs the risk of being misinterpreted, but on the other hand, he can aspire to express things that are inexpressible by conventional means. White seems aware of the distinction between communicating by direct statement which is relatively easy, and communicating by implication, or in his words, "to describe the indescribable." He con-

soles himself with the thought that his attempt to communicate by direct statement has succeeded: "At any rate, it is worth reporting that long before the circus comes to town, its most notable performances have already been given." But we have seen that this direct statement, which corresponds to what we identified earlier as White's apparent thesis, is not really the main point of the essay. His purpose is not to 'report' but to 'describe the indescribable,' and if our interpretation of the essay is correct, his attempt to communicate by implication has been more successful than the author acknowledges.

The Third Essay

SEX EX MACHINA

James Thurber

(from Let Your Mind

Alone)

(1) With the disappearance of the gas mantle and the advent of the short circuit, man's tranquillity began to be threatened by everything he put his hand on. Many people believe that it was a sad day indeed when Benjamin Franklin tied that key to a kite string and flew the kite in a thunderstorm; other people believe that if it hadn't been Franklin, it would have been someone else. As, of course, it was in the case of the harnessing of steam and the invention of the gas engine. At any rate, it has come about that so-called civilized man finds himself today surrounded by the myriad mechanical devices of a technological world. Writers of books on how to control your nerves, how to conquer fear, how to cultivate calm, how to be happy in spite of everything, are of several minds as regards the relation of man and the machine. Some of them are prone to believe that the mind and body, if properly disciplined, can get the upper hand of this mechanized existence. Others merely ignore the situation and go on to profitable writing of more facile chapters of inspiration. Still others attribute the whole menace of the machine to sex, and so confuse the average reader that he cannot always be certain whether he has been knocked down by an automobile or is merely in love.

(2) Dr. Bisch, the Be-Glad-You're-Neurotic man, has a remarkable chapter which deals, in part, with man, sex, and the machine. He examines the case of three hypothetical men who start across the street on a red light and get in the way of an oncoming automobile. A dodges successfully; B stands still, "accepting the situation with calm and resignation", and thus becoming one of my favourites heroes in modern belles-letters; and C hesitates, wavers, jumps backward and forward, and finally runs head on into the car. To lead you through Dr. Bisch's complete analysis of what was wrong with B and C would occupy a whole day. He mentions what McDougallians would say ("instinct"), what the Freudians would retort ("complexes") and what the behaviourist ("conditioned reflexes"). He also brings in what the physiologists would

say: deficient thyroid, hypoadrenal functioning, and so on. The average sedentary man of our time who is at all suggestible must emerge from this chapter believing that his chances of surviving a combination of instinct, complexes, reflexes, glands, sex, and present day traffic conditions are about equal to those of a one-legged blind man trying to get out of a labyrinth.

(3) Let us single out what Dr. Bisch thinks the Freudians would say about poor Mr. C, who ran right into the car. He writes, "sex-hunger," the Freudians would declare. 'Always keyed up and irritable because of it. Undoubtedly suffers from insomnia and when he does sleep his dream life must be productive, distorted, and possibly frightening. Automobile unquestionably has sex significance for him ... to C the car is both enticing and menacing at one and the same time... A thorough analysis is indicated... It might take heading for a complete nervous collapse'". It is my studied opinion, not to put too fine a point on it, that Mr. C is heading for a good mangling, and that if he gets away with only a nervous collapse, it will be a miracle.

(4) I have not always, I am sorry to say, been able to go the whole way with the Freudians, or even a very considerable distance. Even though, as Dr. Bisch says, "One must admit that the Freudians have had the best of it thus far. At least they have received the most publicity." It is in matters like their analysis of men and machines, of Mr. C and the automobile, that the Freudians and I part company. Of course, the analysis above is simply Dr. Bisch's idea of the Freudians would say, but I think he has got it down pretty well. Dr. Bisch himself leans toward the Freudian analysis of Mr. C, for he says in this same chapter, "An automobile bearing down upon you may be a sex symbol at that, you know, especially if you dream it." It is my contention, of course, that even if you dream it, it is probably not a sex symbol, but merely an automobile bearing down upon you. And if it bears down upon you in real life, I'm sure it is an automobile, I have seen the same behaviour that characterized Mr. C displayed by a squirrel (Mr. S) that lives in the grounds of my house in the country. He is a fairly tame squirrel, happily mated and not sex-hungry, if I am any judge, but nevertheless he frequently runs out towards my automobile when I start down the driveway, and then hesitates, wavers, jumps forward and backward, and occasionally would run right into the car except that he is awfully fast on his feet and that I always hurriedly put on the brakes of the 1935 V-8 Sex Symbol that I drive.

(5) I have seen this same behaviour in the case of rabbits (notoriously uninfluenced by any sex symbols save those of other rabbits), dogs, pigeons, a doe, a young hawk (which flew at my car), a blue heron that I encountered on a country road in Vermont, and once near Paul Smith's in the Adirondacks, a fox. They all acted exactly like Mr. C. The hawk, unhappily, was killed. All the others escaped with nothing worse, I suppose, than a complete nervous collapse. Although I cannot claim to have been conversant with the private life and the secret compulsions, the psychoneuroses and the glandular activities of all these animals, it is nevertheless my confident and unswervable belief that there was nothing at all matter with any one of them. Like Mr. C., they suddenly saw a car swiftly bearing down upon them, got excited, and lost their heads. I do not believe you see, there was anything the matter with Mr. C, either. But I do believe that, after a thorough analysis lasting months, with a lot of harping on the incident of the automobile, something might very well come to be the matter

with him. He might even actually get to suffering from the delusion that he believes automobiles are sex symbols.

(6) It seems to me worthy of note that Dr. Bisch, in reciting the reactions of three persons in the face of oncoming car, selected three men. What would have happened had they been Mrs. A, Mrs. B, and Mrs. C? You know as well as I do: all three of them would have hesitated, wavered, jumped, forward and backward, and finally run head on into the car if some men hadn't grabbed them. (I used to know a motorist who, everytime he approached a woman standing on a curb to cross the street, shouted, "Hold it stupid!") It is not too much to say that, with a car bearing down upon them, ninety-five women out of a hundred would be like Mr. C - or Mr. S, the squirrel, or Mr. F, the fox. But it is certainly too much to say that ninety-five out of every one hundred women look upon automobiles as sex-symbols. For one thing Dr. Bisch points out that the automobile serves as a sex symbol because of the "mechanical principle involved" But only one woman in a thousands really knows anything about the mechanical principle involved in an automobile. And yet, as I have said, ninety-five out of a hundred would hesitate, waver, and jump, just as Mr. C did. I think we have the Freudians here. If we haven't proved our case with rabbits and a blue heron, we have certainly proved it with women.

(7) To my notion, the effect of the automobile and of other mechanical contrivances on the state of our nerves, minds, and spirits is a problem which the popular psychologists whom I have dealt with know very little about. The sexual explanation of the relationship of man and the machine is not good enough. To arrive at the real explanation, we have to begin very far back, as far back as Franklin and the kite, or at least as far back as a certain man and woman who appear in a book of stories written more than sixty years ago by Max Adeler. One story in this book tells about a housewife who bought a combination ironing board and card table, which some New England genius had thought up in his spare time. The husband coming home to find the devilish contraption in the parlor, was appaled. "What is that thing?" he demanded. His wife explained that it was a card table, but that if you pressed a button underneath, it would become an ironing board. Whereupon she pushed the button and the table leaped up a foot into the air, extended itself, and became an ironing board. The story goes on to tell how the thing finally becomes so finely sensitized that it would change back and forth if you merely touched it - you didn't have to push the button. The husband stuck it in the attic (after it had leaped up and struck him a couple of times while he was playing euchre), and on windy nights it could be heard flopping and banging around, changing from a card table to an ironing board and back. The story serves as one example of our dread heritage of annoyance, shock, and terror arising out of the nature of mechanical contrivances per se. The mechanical principle involved in this damnable invention had, I believe, no relationship to sex whatsoever. There are certain analysts who see sex in anything, even a leaping ironing board, but I think we can ignore these scientists.


(8) No man (to go on) who has wrestled with a self-adjusting card table can ever be quite the man he once was. If he arrives at the state where he hesitates, wavers, and jumps at every mechanical device he encounters, it is not, I submit, because he recognizes the menace of the machine as such. There might very well be, in every descendant of the man we have been discussing an inherited desire to jump at, and conquer, mechanical devices before they have a chance to

turn into something twice as big and twice as menacing. It is not reasonable to expect that his children and their children will have entirely escaped the stigma of such traumata. I myself will never be the man I once was, nor will my descendants probably ever amount to much, because of a certain experience I had with an automobile.

(9) I had gone out to the barn of my country place, a barn which was used both as a garage and a kennel, to quiet some large black poodles. It was one A.M. of a pitch dark night in winter and the poodles had apparently been terrified by some kind of a prowler, a tramp, a turtle, or perhaps a fiend of some sort. Both my poodles and I myself believed at the time, in fiends, and still do. Fiends who materialize out of nothing and nowhere, like winged pigweed or Russian thistle. I had quite a time quieting the dogs, because their panic spread to me and mine spread back to them again, in a kind of vicious circle. Finally a hush as ominous as their uproar fell upon them, but they kept looking over their shoulders, in a kind of apprehensive way. "There's nothing to be afraid of," I told them as firmly as I could, and just at that moment the klaxon of my car, which was just behind me, began to shriek. Everybody has heard a klaxon on a car suddenly begin to sound; I understand it is a short circuit that causes it. But very few people have heard one scream behind them while they quieting six or eight alarmed poodles in the middle of the night in an old barn. I jump now whenever I hear a klaxon, even the klaxon of my own car when I push the button intentionally. The experience has left its mark. Everybody, from the day of the jumping card table to the day of the screaming klaxon, has had similar shocks. You can see the result, entirely unsuperinduced by sex, in the strained faces and muttering lips of people who pass you on the streets of great, highly mechanized cities. There goes a man who picked up one of those trick match boxes that whirl in your hands; there goes a woman who tried to change a fuse without turning off the current; and yonder toddles an ancient who cranked an old Reo with the spark advanced. Every person carries in his consciousness the old scar, or the fresh wound, of some harrowing misadventure with a contraption of some sort. I know people who would not deposit a nickel and a dime in a cigarette-vending machine and push the lever even if a diamond neck-lace came out. I know dozens who would not climb into an air plane even if it did not move off the ground. In none of these people have I discerned what I have called a neurosis, an "exaggerated" fear; I have discerned only a natural caution in a world made up of gadgets that whirl and whine and whiz and shriek and sometimes explode.

(10) I should like to end with the case history of a friend of mine in Ohio named Harvey Lake. When he was only nineteen, the electric bar of an old runabout broke off in his hands, causing the machinery to carry him through a fence and into the grounds of the Columbus School for Girls. He developed a fear of automobiles, trains, and every other kinds of vehicles that was not pulled by a horse. Now, the psychologists would call this a complex and represent the fear as abnormal, but I see it as purely reasonable apprehension. If Harry Lake had, because he was catapulted into the grounds of the Columbus School for Girls, developed a fear of girls, I would call that a complex. Harvey Lake never in his life got into a plane (he died in a fall from a porch), but I do not regard that as neurotic, either, but only sensible.

(11) I have to be sure, encountered men with complexes. There was, for example, Marvin Belt. He had a complex about airplanes that was quite interesting. He



not afraid of machinery, or of high places, or of crashes. He was simply afraid that the pilot of any plane he got into might lose his mind. "I imagine myself high over Montana," he once said to me, "in a huge, perfectly safe tri-motored plane. Several of the passengers are dozing, others are reading, but I'm keeping my eyes glued on the door to the cockpit. Suddenly the pilot steps out of it, a wild light in his eyes, and in a fasetto like that of a little girl he says to me, 'Conductor will you please let me off at One-Hundred-and-Twenty-fifth Street?'" "But," I said to Belt, "even if the pilot does go crazy, there is still the co-pilot." "No, there isn't," said Belt. "The pilot has hit the co-pilot over the head with something and killed him." Yes, the psychologists can have Marvin Belt. But they can't have Harvey Lake, or Mr.C, or Mr. S. or Mr.F, or, while I have my strength, me.

The Explication

Thurber's objective in "Sex ex Machina" is somewhat different from that of the other two essayists we have considered. Whereas each of them had only to demonstrate the validity of his own ideas, Thurber has the additional task of proving that someone else's ideas are wrong. In this essay he uses a traditional pattern of refutation: First he shows that his opponent's views are erroneous; then he shows that his own views are correct.

The first paragraph employs a standard strategy for introductions -the movement from general to specific. It begins with broad statements about man's uncomfortable position in a mechanized world, then mentions some of the theories about man's relation to the machine, and finally ends with a statement of the particular theory that Thurber plans to refute, namely, the attribution of "the whole menace of the machine to sex."

After this introduction, Thurber goes on to summarize the position he plans to refute. Although he includes brief summaries of four explanations of Mr. C's behaviour (par.2), he is chiefly concerned with the Freudian explanation, which he gives in detail in paragraph 3. Thurber then states his opposition to the Freudian theory, first in relatively specific terms (the last sentence in paragraph 3) and then more

generally (the first sentence in paragraph 4). The humor and common sense in Thurber's statement of his disagreement with the Freudians in the specific case of Mr.C makes the Freudian position seem absurd and prepares the reader for Thurber's more general statement of his opposition.

Of course a convincing argument requires more than a simple statement of opposition, and Thurber goes on to give some evidence that disprove the Freudian position. The Freudians maintain that Mr.C runs into the approaching car because of sexual maladjustment; Thurber's method is to point to similar behaviour in animals who have no sexual problems. He describes the case of Mr.S, the squirrel, in some detail and then lists a number of other animals who have behaved in the same way. Since these animals, all free from sexual maladjustment, hesitated before an approaching car, sexual maladjustment cannot be the cause of Mr. C's hesitation. Thurber's second way of refuting the Freudians is to maintain that "ninety-five women out of a hundred would act like Mr.C." Since it is unlikely that so large percentage of women would be maladjusted, we must again assume that sexual maladjustment is not the cause of Mr. C's behaviour. With this second piece of evidence, Thurber feels that he has successfully shown the Freudian position to be invalid. He ends his refutation on a note of modest triumph: "I think we have had the Freudians here. If we haven't proved our case with rabbits and a blue heron, we certainly have proved it with women" (paragraph 6).

Having discredited the Freudian explanation of Mr.C's behaviour, Thurber goes on to offer his own. He repeats his point that "the sexual explanation of the relationship of man and the machine is not good enough" (paragraph 7) and then tells an anecdote that "serves as one example of our dread heritage of annoyance, shock, and terror arising out

of the nature of mechanical contrivances per se." An example such as this serves at least two purposes. First, the example, since it is concrete and specific, is likely to be more interesting than an abstract statement. Second, the example constitute of piece of evidence to support a general assertion. What is true in this example is presumably true in others. Because examples are interesting and because they imply and support general theories, a skillful author will frequently use as an example, as Thurber does, to lead up to his thesis. And of course Thurber's example has the additional virtue of being funny.

In paragraph 8 Thurber states his thesis as directly as an author is likely to do. He says "If a man arrives at the state where he hesitates, wavers, and jumps at every mechanical device he encounters, it is not, I submit, because he recognizes the enticements of sex in the device, but only because he recognizes the menace of the machine as such." This sentence, like any well-formulated thesis statement, reflects the organization of the essay. The first dependent clause "Ifencounters" is a highly condensed version of the problem that Thurber found in Dr. Bisch's book. The second dependent clause "because.....device" summarizes the Freudian theory that Thurber refutes, and the third dependent clause "because....such" summarizes Thurber's own theory. An essayist will seldom state his thesis as directly as Thurber has done, but he will usually have as careful a plan as thesis implies.

Having offered this theory, Thurber goes on to support it by series of examples (paragraphs 9 and 10). The concluding paragraph acts as a sort of qualification of Thurber's position. He acknowledges that some people have complexes. Marvin Belt was such a person, and the summary of Marvin Belt's altogether illogical reasoning suggests why Thurber

thinks he has a complex. Including the anecdote about Marvin Belt is good strategy because it helps to define the distinction between a neurotic response to the machine and a reasonable response (like Thurber's and Harvey Lake's and also because Thurber's willingness to let the psychoanalysts have Marbin Belt suggests that the essayist is not so dogmatic in his theory that we will not acknowledge the virtues of his opponent's theory.

Thurber's plan of refuting his opponent's views and then proving his own is, as we indicated earlier, a traditional pattern of argument, but the organization of this essay is only part of Thurber's total strategy. He is also careful to project an image of himself as a sensible man and at the same time imply that his opponents are eccentric and confused. The devices he uses are often hard to isolate, but we can point out a few. For one thing, Thurber's parenthetical comments like "I am sorry to say" (paragraph 4), "if I am any judge" (paragraph 5) suggest that he is a reasonable person who is not inclined to argue hastily. Similarly, phrases like "you know as well as I do" (paragraph 6) and "we have Freudians here" (paragraph 6) suggest that the reader shares Thurber's common sense and cooperates with him in refuting the Freudians position.

Thurber also uses several devices to make his opponent look unreasonable. For instance, designating the squirrel "Mr. S" parodies the pseudo-scientific nomenclature of Mr. A, Mr. B, and Mr. C, and in effect reduces these hypothetical cases to absurdity. Another subtle touch is Thurber's statement that Mr. B is one of his favourite heroes in "modern belles-letters". Belles-letters are aesthetic writing rather than informational or utilitarian one; consequently the implication that Dr. Bisch's book is belletristic suggests that it is of doubtful scientific worth. The verbs Thurber uses in his report of

the various psychological interpretations of Mr. C's behaviour (paragraph 2) are also worth commenting on. He begins with say, then uses retort, and ends with shout. This sequence of verbs suggests a degeneration from simple statement to ill-tempered argument to screaming confusion and thus questions the scientific detachment of the rival schools of psychology. We might also note that Thurber stacks the cards against the machine in his very first phrase, "with the disappearance of the gas mantle and the advent of the short circuit." Short circuit is, after all, a malfunction of a machine, and the use of this term to characterize the machine age suggests that machines are not always as perfect as they are supposed to be.

Thus, it is now obvious that a discourse may have various meanings. E. M. Foster's "My Wood", for example, may mean one thing to one reader and another thing to another reader. There are two significant factors which play a dominant role in the success of the message decoding: one is the reader's analysing capacity and the other is the reader's paying attention to the contexts. The above explications, I believe, are near to what the authors intended the essays to mean, simply because I had studied the contexts before I explicated them, for example, I know that James Thurber, according to some literary critics, are the best American humourist since Mark Twain. His writings reveal a sensitive literary style and skill in many form. That is why I am very conscious of the 'humour' in his "Sex ex Machina." Again, E. M. Foster, for example, is a British author who sympathized with the Indians just like Multatuli did with Indonesians. That is why I can easily pin-point the theme of "My Wood". It is needless to say, then, that the contexts do facilitate the decoding process.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

As it was mentioned before in the introduction of this paper, these concluding pages would not present something new. And an attempt is made here to draw the reader's attention back to the central ideas of this thesis. To provide an overall view of the content of the paper, I will briefly say the main points once again. Here they are:

1. The aim of this paper is to show that linguistic forms: words, sentences, discourses, may have various meanings, and that the intended meanings can usually be detected from the contexts.
2. Graphically, the context of a word is a sentence, and the context of a sentence is other sentences in a discourse, and the context of a discourse is, of course, other discourses. The so called speech components are, in fact, the 'real' contexts of the linguistic forms because they constitute the conditioning factors of the encoding process by which the linguistic forms are generated.
3. Language is systematic as well as symbolic. Systems, which reflect language rules, can clearly be seen in all the language units. And the significant symbols, as have been pointed out by Mead, make proper communication possible.
4. Speaking and writing are, in fact, the encoding process, as opposed to listening and reading which are the decoding process. As we know, what the author encodes is not always what the reader de-

codes because of the imperfection of our sense perception, and because of the complicated conditioning factors, speech components.

5. The speech components necessitate the existence of speech variety. That is why when we talk about a 'language', in our case the 'English language', we must not be misled into thinking that the label should in some way refer to a readily identifiable object in reality, but it, in fact, refers to many different varieties of English in use in all kinds of situation in many parts of the world. The determinants of speech variety among others are: geographical area, social status, sex, ethnic group, and social context.
6. The larger the language unit is the more difficult it is for us to understand its intended meaning because the larger the linguistic form is the more varied its meaning will be. To detect the intended meaning of 'horn' used in the context 'He plays the horn in the Halle' is quite easy. To pin-point the intended meaning of 'God created man in His image' is certainly more difficult, though it is true that the 'context' is clear enough. And to understand the old testament is nearly an impossibility without perusing, for example, the history of Hebrew people as one of its 'contexts', because the Old Testament is predominantly an expression of the religious life of the ancient Hebrew people.

Now that this thesis has been accomplished and the aim has so far been reached, I, as a graduate student of the English Department of IKIP Sanata-Dhar-

ma, am in the position to make the following suggestions:

1. When military commanders talk about "strategy," they mean the overall planning and direction of a campaign aimed at accomplishing a particular major objective. This idea involves arranging matters in the most advantageous way prior to the action and then committing the men and material to the plan. Changing conditions during the engagement may, of course, force continual readjustments in the tactics by which the strategy is being carried out, but the basic plan provides a starting point and a major design within which such readjustment takes place.

The English teacher who hopes to succeed probably will not think of himself as a military force, nor of his pupils as the enemies. But from the military analogy he may use the concept of careful advance planning, accompanied by flexibility to alter his plans as the situation changes. The strategy of English teaching as "oral communication" will probably include at least the following major aspects:

- a. The teacher will identify his pupils or respondents whom he believes can act in the way he wants.
- b. The teacher will inventory information about the attitudes, knowledge, beliefs, and actions of each pupil or respondent relative to his objectives.
- c. The teacher will review his own knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs about the teaching materials.
- d. The teacher will formulate teaching plans

designed to facilitate the desired response.

- e. The teacher will employ an evaluation system to determine how well his immediate and long-range objectives are being achieved.

2. In every teaching situation, the teacher should provide "clear contexts" as best as he can. In reading for example, blurred contexts may result in the pupils' failures to understand: the writer's intention, what attitude the writer is adopting towards his topic and is seeking to pass on them, the motive which leads the writer to present his material in a certain way, the moral or conclusion he seeks to draw, etc., etc. In setting examinations or conducting experiments, the teacher must, of course, be careful not to multiply errors of this type through unskilfully tearing a passage from its contexts.

3. We, English teachers, should pay attention to the speech variety. The foreign learner of English is one of those most at a loss in this matter. He needs to be made aware of the difference between common and rare types of language behaviour, and of the alternatives available in particular situations; he too needs to react appropriately to language, if he wants to be accepted -and the same applies to the native speaker of English when he learns Indonesian for instance. The extra difficulties for the foreigner, however, is that he has no intuitive sense of linguistic appropriateness in English at all: he has no awareness of conventions of conformity, be-

cause he has not grown up in the relevant linguistic climate. He knows only what he has been taught in language lessons. Hence it is important that the syllabus for foreign language teaching should be so ordered that it includes instruction in those varieties of English that he will be likely to meet and need most frequently.

This preliminary work ends here with my hope that it may be of value for those who happen to read it.

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