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FACULTAS THEOLOGICA

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THE EXPLANATION OF THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY
BASED ON THE ATTRIBUTE OF GOD AS SUPREME LOVE

A Study on the «De Trinitate» of Richard of St. Victor

Dissertatio ad Doctoratum
in Facultate S. Theologiae



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Praise and glory be to God, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

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ABBREVIATIONS

art.	:	articulus.
BGPTMA	:	Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie. Münster.
BLE	:	Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique. Toulouse.
BTAM	:	Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale. Louvain.
CCCM	:	Corpus christianorum continuatio mediaevalis. Turnholti.
Cfr.	:	Confer
ChH	:	Church history. American society of church history. Chicago.
diss.	:	dissertatio
DS	:	DENZINGER-SCHÖNMETZER, Enchiridion symbolorum definitionem et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, editio xxxvi, Roma 1976.
DSp	:	Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique. Paris 1932 ff.
DT	:	Divus Thomas. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie. Fribourg. Schweiz.
DThC	:	Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. Paris 1903 ff.
EPhM	:	Études de philosophie médiévale. Paris.
ER	:	Études et Recherches. Ottawa.
EstTrin	:	Estudios Trinitarios. Publicación del Secretariado Trinitario. Salamanca.
ETHL	:	Ephemerides theologicae Louvanienses. Louvain.
ETR	:	Études théologiques et religieuses. Montpellier.
FS	:	Franziskanische Studien. Münster.
HeyJ	:	Heytroph Journal. A quarterly review of philosophy and theology. Oxford.
JThS	:	Journal of Theological Studies. Oxford.
Lat	:	Lateranum. Facultas theologica Pontifici Athenaei Lateranensis. Roma.



PERPUSTAKAAN
YOGYAKARTA

MANSI	:	Sacrorum consiliorum nova et amplissima collection. Ed. Johannes Dominicum Mansi. Firenze 1,1759-53,1827.
MBM	:	Münchener Beiträge zur Mediävistik und Renaissance Forschung. München.
NCE	:	New Catholic Encyclopedia. Washington, 1981.
NS	:	New Scholasticism. Washington, D.C.
p.(pp.)	:	page(s)
PG	:	P.MIGNE, Patrologia cursus completus series graeca.
PL	:	P.MIGNE, Patrologia cursus completus series latina.
q.	:	quaestio.
RAM	:	Revue d'ascétique et de mystique. Toulouse.
RB	:	Revue Biblique. Paris.
RevSR	:	Revue des sciences religieuses. Faculté catholique de théologie. Strasbourg.
RMAL	:	Revue du moyen-âge latin. Paris.
RSPT	:	Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologiques. Paris.
RSR	:	Recherches de science religieuse. Paris
RT	:	Revue Thomiste. Toulouse.
RTAM	:	Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale. Louvain
SC	:	Source chrétiennes. Paris.
Schol	:	Scholastik. Freiburg-Eupen.
SJTh	:	Scottish Journal of Theology. Edinburg.
Spec	:	Speculum. A journal of mediaeval studies. Cambridge.
ThP	:	Theologie und Philosophie. Vierteljahresschrift für Theologie und Philosophie. Freiburg.
ThZ	:	Theologische Zeitschrift. Theologische Facultät die Universität Basel. Basel.
Tr	:	Traditio. Studies in ancient and medieval history, thought and religion. New York.
Vol(s)	:	Volume(s)
VS	:	La Vie Spirituelle. Paris.



INTRODUCTION



"My righteous lived from faith, is the apostolic and at the same time prophetic sentence. As the Apostle said what the prophet had proclaimed, that the righteous lived from faith: if thus it be, yes indeed thus it is, certainly we have to reflect diligently, to reconsider frequently the mystery of our faith"¹. With such sentences, Richard of Saint Victor² introduces his treatise on the Trinity. He invites the readers to search the understanding of the mystery of faith, in order that they can live from the faith.

In concordance with the invitation of Richard, this thesis proposes to reflect the mystery of faith, that is the mystery of the Trinity. From the beginning of Christianity the mystery of the Trinity is the most difficult to be explained. It is the source of many controversies which sometimes resulted heresy. The study of the history of the Christian doctrines proves that the explanation of the mystery of Divine Trinity is always an interesting object to be observed. The purpose of our study is to search the explanation of the mystery of the Trinity, by analyzing the explanation which Richard of S.Victor treats in his *De Trinitate*.

The title of the thesis, "The explanation of the mystery of Trinity based on the attribute of God as Supreme Love. A Study on the *De Trinitate* of Richard of St.Victor", expresses the limits of our study. Indeed our thesis is limited in the Trinitarian doctrine of Richard of St.Victor, which he explains in the *De Trinitate*. The central point of the reflection is his reflection based on the concept of the perfection of love. This doctrine is the central point of Richard's explanation of the Trinity, by which Richard builds his Trinitarian system. Indeed, in studying the Trinitarian system of Richard, we cannot exclude his conception of person which is very interesting. Based on his conception of divine person, some medieval authors continue his doctrine of the divine Trinity.

The primary method of our thesis is expository, in the sense that our purpose is to expose the Trinitarian doctrine of Richard as fully as possible towards the comprehension of the mystery of faith as much as we can. In

¹ RICHARDUS A S. VICTORE, *De Trinitate*, Prologus; In the edition of G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor. La Trinité*, SC 63, Paris 1959, p.50. The text of G.Salet reports in margins the column of *Patrologia Latina* edited by Migne, that is, 887C. For further citations of Richard's *De Trinitate*, we use: *De Trin.*, Prologus: SC 63,50,887C. For another Richard's writings, we cite directly to the title of the work, and the column of Migne's *Patrologia Latina*.

² About him we will speak in the second part of the first chapter.

accordance with this expository method, we try to follow the scheme which Richard uses in his treatise. Nevertheless, the expository aspect needs the analytical study of the doctrine which Richard presents, in order that in the end we can arrive at a synthesis of the doctrine. Such analysis is helped by a historical evaluation of Richard's doctrine, in order that we can put the doctrine of Richard in the development of the Trinitarian doctrine.

The work is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is an introductory chapter. The first part of the chapter exposes the development of the theological method of the twelfth century and the foundation of the School of St. Victor. The purpose of this part is to give the background of the theory and method of Richard, who was one of the masters of the School of St. Victor. The second part of the first chapter treats Richard himself. We present the life and writings of Richard in order to have a general idea of the theological approach of Richard. The presentation of the division of the *De Trinitate* concludes the first chapter.

In the second chapter we enter into Richard's speculation. As we mentioned above, we follow Richard's scheme of *De Trinitate*. In fact, the second chapter treats Richard's doctrine of the first two books of *De Trinitate*. Indeed, in the chapter two of our work, we present the speculation of Richard on the only one God. The first part treats on Richard's method in understanding the mystery of faith and his proofs of the existence of the Supreme Being, which is God, the only one God. The second part of the chapter treats the various divine attributes. The various divine attributes are identical with God, because God is the perfection of all, he is *Summum Bonum*.

The third chapter treats the speculation on the trinity of God, based on the perfection of love. The first part of the chapter presents the two ways in understanding the conception of love and Richard's conception of love which is in the line of ecstatic conception. Based on the ecstatic conception of love, the second part of the chapter presents the speculation of Richard on the necessity of the Trinity of God; the fact that God is the perfection of love needs the existence of the second and third person of the Trinity. Love is the unity of the persons, and the persons are different from each other because of their possession of love. This is the object of the third part of the second chapter.

The fourth chapter treats the divine person. In fact, this chapter treats the last three books of *De Trinitate*, that are the fourth, fifth and the sixth

books. In the first part of the chapter, we present the conception of Richard on the divine person. He criticizes Boethius' definition and proposes his own. The second part of the chapter treats on the processions and names of the divine persons. Based on the analogy of the procession of the human beings, Richard deduces the name of the divine persons. In the third part of the chapter we present the characteristics of each person of the Trinity, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

In the fifth chapter we present our evaluation on Richard's doctrine on the Trinity. We noted above that our concern is historical exposition. Indeed, in this chapter we evaluate the doctrine of Richard, the method and sources of his speculation in order to expose his original thinking. In the end of the chapter, we try to put Richard in the context of the Trinitarian tradition. We search his relation with the two lines of Trinitarian systems, namely the Greek and Latin theology, and his influence on the development of Trinitarian theology after him.

Finally, we give the conclusion of our work in order to give a synthesis of the doctrine, with a proposal for further study.



CHAPTER I:
AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO
THE "DE TRINITATE"



I. THE REVIVAL OF THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE SCHOOL OF ST.VICTOR

1. The Revival of Theological Schools

In the theological movement of the medieval time, the twelfth century was an important point, as some scholars treat the so-called "renaissance of the twelfth century"¹. Indeed, the twelfth century saw the revival of the science, not only in one country, as in the Italian renaissance, but in many countries in Europe. France was important in the revival of philosophy and theology with the beginning of the University of Paris², which had its root on some "schools"³ of theology spreading in the whole of France.

Throughout the medieval period, the intellectual life did not diffuse amongst the common people. Relatively, most of the people could not read and write, because usually, the monks and ecclesiastics were the educated people⁴, as the centres of education were usually in the monasteries and in the cathedral schools. Both were centres of study in the medieval time,

¹ For example: CH.HASKINS, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, Cambridge 1927; G.PARÉ-A.BRUNET-P.TREMBLAY, *La renaissance du XII^e siècle. Les écoles et l'enseignement*, Paris-Ottawa 1933. Nevertheless there are discussions on the claim of the twelfth century as the "renaissance" era, see: E.M.SANFORD, *The Twelfth Century: Renaissance or Proto Renaissance*, in: *Spec* 26(1951), 635-642; V.T.HOLMES, *The Idea of a Twelfth Century Renaissance* in: *Spec* 26(1951), 643-651.

² CH.HASKINS, *The Renaissance*, p. 11.

³ On the meaning of "school" in the medieval time, J.CHATILLON, *De Guillaume de Champæaux à Thomas Gallus: chronique d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale de l'école de Saint-Victor*, in *RMAL* 8(1952), 139-140. notes: "On a souvent tenté de définir le sens du mot école dans la langue médiévale. Ce terme ambigu, employé généralement au pluriel, sert sans doute parfois, comme de nos jours, à désigner l'établissement, l'institution ou même le local à l'intérieur duquel un enseignement est proposé; c'est ainsi que nous parlons volontiers de certaines écoles monastiques, collégiales ou cathédrales, définies avant tout par leur situation géographique sans que nous ne sachions rien que de très général des maîtres qui y professaient ou des matières qu'on y enseignait. Mais le plus souvent, ce mot désigne moins le cadre extérieur que l'enseignement lui-même, ou mieux encore les maîtres qui le proposaient, ainsi que l'esprit, les traditions, les programmes ou les méthodes intellectuelles dont ceux-ci s'inspiraient".

⁴ CH.HASKINS, *The Renaissance*, p. 32.

although there was a difference between the two⁵.

The famous centre of study in the end of the eleventh century was Bec, founded in 1034, with the famous Lanfranc and Anselm who would be famous as the Bishop of Canterbury later. Lanfranc dedicated himself especially to the interpretation of the Bible and transmission of the patristic tradition. Anselm made a theological controversy by attacking the doctrine of Roscellinus. In the beginning of the twelfth century the school of Bec was famous throughout Europe⁶.

In the early of the twelfth century, it was the School of Laon⁷ which dominated the intellectual activities, with its masters Anselm who died in 1117, and his brother Ralph who died in 1134 or 1136. Many contemporary theologians attended their lectures, and it was in Laon that the beginning of the systematization of theology, in which the compilation of the sentences and had its fruit later in the formation of the *Summa Theologica*⁸. The master Anselm was famous as the author of the *Glossa interlinearis*⁹, which was the completion of the *Glossa ordinaria* written by Walafrid of Strabon the abbey of Reichenue who died in 849¹⁰.

The school of Chartres in the eleventh century was famous with the master Fulbert, but its glory was in the twelfth century with Bernard of Chartres and his students such as Thierry of Chartres, Gilbert de la Porrée, William of Conches and the bishop Richard. Bernard was a Grammarian and Philosopher, and his teaching in Chartres was especially in the *trivium* and

⁵ G.PARÉ, *La renaissance*, p. 18.

⁶ CH.H.HASKINS, *The Renaissance*, p.38-39.

⁷ On the beginning of the school of Laon, see: J.J.CONTRENI, *The Cathedral School of Laon from 850 to 930, its Manuscripts and Masters*, in: MBM 29, München 1978.

⁸ B.SMALLEY, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, Oxford 1984³, p.49; Cfr. G.ROBERT, *Les Écoles et l'Enseignement de la Théologie pendant la première moitié du XII^e siècle*, Paris 1909, pp.12-13; L.J.BATAILLON, *Bulletin d'histoire des doctrine médiévales: V. Douzième siècle*, in RSPT 43(1959), 683.

⁹ F.VIGOUROUX, *Glose*, in *Dict.de la Bible*, Paris 1903, t.III, 257.

¹⁰ F.VIGOUROUX, *Glose*, 256. The text of *Glossa ordinaria* is reported in PL CXIII-CXIV. In fact there is a discussion on the author-ship of Walafrid of Strabon as the author of "*Glossa ordinaria*"; Cfr. E.BERTOLA, *La "Glossa ordinaria" biblica ed i suoi problemi*, in: RTAM 45(1978), pp.33-78.

*quadrivium*¹.

In the end of the eleventh century William of Champaeux taught theology at the school of Notre Dame of Paris. His teaching was based on the authorities of the Fathers, and he got many students until the arrival of Abelard who became his successor^{1 2}. William of Champeaux was the founder of the abbey and school of St.Victor – about which we will speak later. The other famous master of the school of Paris was Peter Lombard^{1 3}, the Bishop of Paris who is famous for his compilation of the sentences.

2. William of Champeaux and the Foundation of the School of St.Victor

We have noted that in the end of the eleventh century William of Champaux was the master of theology in the school of Notre Dame of Paris. In fact he was born in 1070 at Champaeux, near Melun. He had his first theological education at the school of Paris under the master Manegold^{1 4}, who stayed in Paris with his family to teach philosophy and theology. In 1095, William began to teach dialectic at the cathedral school of Paris, but only for a few years as he went to Laon and became a disciple of Anselm. In 1103 he returned to Paris. His Bishop gave him the responsibility of being general director of all the schools of Paris, and later he was nominated as Archdeacon^{1 5}.

The master William drew many students of logic to Paris. Among his disciples was Abelard, who was born at Pallet near Nantes in 1079 and died at Saint-Marcel near Chalon in 1142. Nevertheless, Abelard, who had been the disciple of Roscelin, did not agree with the master William in some items of

^{1 1} A.CLERVAL, *Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge*, Paris 1895, p.272.

^{1 2} L.MAITRE, *Les Écoles épiscopales et monastiques de l'Occident depuis Charlemagne jusqu'à Philippe-Auguste*, Paris 1924², p.66.

^{1 3} About his life see: PL 191,9-30.

^{1 4} About him see: PL 155,147-148.

^{1 5} F.BONNARD, *Histoire de l'abbaye royale et de l'Ordre des chanoines réguliers de Saint-Victor de Paris*, Paris 1904-1907, I, pp.2-4; On William of Champeaux in the school of Paris, see: E.MICHAUD, *Guillaume de Champeaux et les écoles de Paris au XII^e siècle*, Paris 1867.

his teaching, above all in his doctrine of universals¹⁶, and forced him to change his opinion. The disagreement was great, and Abelard retired from the school of "Notre Dame", withdrawing many of his disciples, and went and taught in the school of Melun. In 1108, William with some of his beloved disciples left the school of "Notre Dame" to live as regular canons who dedicated their lives to silence, ecclesiastical study and fraternal charity in the hermitage near the chapel of St.Victor¹⁷. William and his disciples began to reconstruct the old chapel and build the monastery of St.Victor. The official consecration of the monastery happened at the 1 December 1114 by the bull of the Pope Paschal II, when the abbey of St.Victor was under the prior Gilduin¹⁸ and William was the Bishop of Chalon¹⁹.

The role of William in the school of St.Victor, was not only as founder of the abbey, although later in his life he did not belong to the monastery, but he also prepared the theological system of the School. The basis of the theological system of the school of St.Victor was the theology of St.Augustine, and so Hugh²⁰ their greatest master was called "The Second Augustine"²¹. Hugh was both a religious and a scholar. As a contemplative religious, his supreme object was to unite himself with God through prayer and meditation on God's work, especially the Scriptures. He tried to achieve the highest kind of wisdom

¹⁶ See: PETRUS ABAELARDUS, *Epistola prima, quae est Historia Calamitatum, Abaelardi, ad amicum scripta*, c.II, PL 178, 115-123.

¹⁷ Cfr. ROBERTUS DE TORINNEIO, *De immutatione ordinis monachorum*, cap. V, in: PL 202, 1313. A short resume of the rule of the community of St.Victor is reported in: F.F.HUGONIN, *Essai sur la fondation de l'école de Saint Victor*, c.II, in: PL 176,xxiv-xl.

¹⁸ *Notitia in Gilduinum*, PL 196, 1365A: "Gilduinus Parisiis natus sese Guillelmo Campellensi magistro canonicos regulares instituenti socium adjunxit, eidemque assumpto ad infulas Catalaunenses in regimine domus Victorinae sub eodem prioris titulo subrogatus fuit, ut constat ex inscripta huic priori bulla Paschalis II papae Kal. Dec., indict. VIII, Incarnationis Dominicae anno 1114, pontificatus XVI, qua monasterii possessiones confirmantur, et libera Victorinis canonicis conceditur eligendi abbatis facultas".

¹⁹ Three times he refused the election as the Bishop of Chalon, but in the fourth time, after the death of the Bishop Hugh, 20 May 1113, he accepted the election as a Bishop. Cfr. F.BONNARD, *Histoire de l'abbaye*, I, p.12.

²⁰ Death at Paris, 11 February 1141. See: F.VERNET, *Hugues de Saint-Victor*, in: *DThC*, VII, 240-308, Paris 1922.

²¹ E.MICHAUD, *Guillaume de Champaeux*, p.253.

through mystical exposition. As a scholar he regarded the development of the liberal arts in the context of his dialectic as an aide to the study of the Bible²². R. Baron²³ notes that despite his mystical character Hugh did not undervalue reason, but he put reason in the right place, subordinated to the rule of faith conforming to the Christian tradition. In fact, this was the significance of the Victorine's program. The arts and sciences were to serve the study of the Christian doctrine, especially the Bible. The ideal exegete of Hugh was the "combination of Paris master and contemplative religious", which could be realized only in certain circumstances²⁴. The two disciples of Hugh who each concentrated on one aspect of their master's exegesis were Andrew²⁵, whose critical and scholarly exposition of the literal sense of the Old Testament was responsible for sending later exegetes to the original Hebrew, and Richard who developed more the spiritual aspect²⁶.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEOLOGICAL METHOD

1. Hugh of St. Victor and the Biblical Teaching

In fact, the teaching of theology in the twelfth century was the teaching of the Scriptures²⁷. As we noted above, Hugh of St. Victor had a special role in the development of the method of the interpretation of the Scriptures in the middle ages. Indeed, his method had its roots in the preceding method,

²² B. SMALLEY, *The Study of the Bible*, p.86.

²³ R. BARON, *Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor*, Paris 1957.

²⁴ B. SMALLEY, *The Study of the Bible*, p.105.

²⁵ Born of England in 1110, entered in the monastery of St. Victor in 1130, and died as the abbot of Wigmore, England at 19 October 1175.

²⁶ Cfr. B. SMALLEY, *The Study of the Bible*, p.106.

²⁷ G. PARÉ, *La renaissance*, p.213. Cfr. B. SMALLEY, *The study of the Bible*, p.xxxi.

especially the *De doctrina christiana* of St. Augustine²⁸. St. Augustine regarded the double aims of the Scriptures, to guide to truth and to expose how could man do for others with the truth. These were the main purposes of studying the Scriptures, to know the divine Law and the magnificence of the Scriptures and finally to love God and others²⁹. Therefore, the interpretation of the Scriptures served charity, as G. Paré concludes³⁰, the function of the interpretation was to know exactly how the text had to be understood, according to the letter or according to the figure, in order to expose the exact doctrine. In the case of difficulty the interpreter had to refer to the rule of faith³¹.

After St. Augustine, the use of the commentaries of the Fathers was introduced on the interpretation of the Scriptures. B. Smalley³² concludes that until the early part of the twelfth century the production of the text books or the compilation of the "select extracts" of the opinion of the Fathers proceeded together with exegesis itself. The role of the School of Laon and Paris was important in the compilation of the opinion of the Fathers. The *glossa* was the product of such a method. We do not know exactly when the beginning of the compilation of *glossa* was, but we can underline the importance of such a compilation in medieval theology. In medieval theology

²⁸ PL 34,15-42. In the era from St. Augustin to Hugh of St. Victor there were many authors who wrote a method of the interpretation of the Scriptures, for example: CASSIODORUS, *De Institutione divinarum ad saecularium litterarum*, c.10, in: PL 70,1105-1150; ADRIANUS, *Isagoge ad sacras scripturas*, in: PG 98,1273-1312; EUCHERIUS, *Formularium spiritualis intelligentiae*, in: PL 50, 727-822; JULINIUS, *De partibus divinae legis*, in: PL 68,15-42.

²⁹ S.AUGUSTINUS, *De Doctrina christiana* I, c. 35,39: PL 34,34 : "Omnium igitur quae dicta sunt, ex quo de rebus tractamus, haec summa est, ut intelligatur Legis et omnium divinarum Scripturarum plenitudo et finis esse dilectio (Rom. XIII,10 et I Tim. I,5) rei qua fruendum est et rei quae nobiscum ea re frui potest".

³⁰ G. PARÉ, *La renaissance*, p.215.

³¹ S.AUGUSTINUS, *De doctrina christiana*, III, c.2,2 : PL 34,65: "Cum ergo adhibita intentio incertum esse perviderit quomodo distinguendum aut quomodo pronuntiandum sit, consulat regulam fidei quam de Scripturarum planioribus locis et Ecclesiae auctoritate percepit: de qua satis egimus, cum de rebus in primo libro loqueremur".

³² B.SMALLEY, *The Study of the Bible*, p.51.

glossa was an instrument, a "school book"³³, which was used by the scholars to interpret the Bible.

Hugh's method of interpretation was exposed in his *Didascalion*³⁴, which treats the teaching of science. According to Hugh, there are two paths to science, namely, *lectio* and *meditatio*³⁵, and that *lectio* preceded *meditatio*, because *lectio* guided one to the doctrine and *meditatio* guided one to the consummation of the doctrine³⁶. The object of *lectio* was the Scriptures, that is the text of the Old Testament and the New Testament in which included the text of the Fathers³⁷.

Regarding the interpretation of the Scriptures, Hugh proposed the three ways to understand the Scriptures, that is, according to the literal or historical meaning of the text (*historia*), according to the allegorical meaning of the text (*allegoria*), and according to the moral sense of the text (*tropologia*), however not all the three senses are found together in a text³⁸. Indeed the idea of

³³ B.SMALLEY, *The Study of the Bible*, p.66.

³⁴ HUGO DE S.VICTORE, *Eruditionis Didascalicae libri septem*, in: *PL* 176,739-838.

³⁵ HUGO DE S.VICTORE, *Didascalion*, I,c.I, in *PL* 176,741A: "Duae praecipuae res sunt, quibus quisque ad scientiam instruitur: videlicet lectio et meditatio, e quibus lectio priorem in doctrina obtinet locum: et de hac tractat liber iste dando praecepta legendi". The same idea we can read in John of Salisbury's *Metalogicus*, I, c.xxiii, in: *PL* 199,853B: "At lectio, doctrina et meditatio scientiam pariunt".

³⁶ HUGO DE S.VICTORE, *Didascalion*, III, c.XI, in: *PL* 176,772.BC: "Meditatio principium sumit a lectione; nullis tamen regulis stringitur aut praeceptis lectionis. ... Principium ergo doctrinae est in lectione, consummatio in meditatione".

³⁷ HUGO DE S.VICTORE, *Didascalion*, IV,2, in: *PL* 176,778D: "Omnis divina Scriptura in duobus Testamentis continetur, in Veteri videlicet et Novo. ... Vetus Testamentum continet legem, prophetas, agiographos. Novum autem Evangelium, apostolos, Patres"; IV,2: *PL* 176,779C: "In tertio ordine primum habent locum Decretalia, quos canones, id est regulas appellamus; deinde sanctorum Patrum et doctorum scripta; Hieronymi, Augustini, Gregorii, Ambrosii, Isidori, Origenis, Bedae, et aliorum multorum orthodoxorum, quae tam infinita sunt, ut numerari non possint".

³⁸ HUGO DE S.VICTORE, *Didascalion*, V,II : *PL* 176,789 C: "Primo omnium intelligendum est, quod divina Scriptura triplicem habet modum intelligendi, id est historiam, allegoriam, tropologiam. Sane non omnia quae in divino reperiuntur eloquio, ad hanc triplicem intorquenda sunt interpretatorem, ut singula historiam, allegoriam, et tropologiam simul continere credantur".

Hugh was to search for the meaning of the text, not only according to the letter but the reality which was exposed by the symbol, using the seven rules of the interpretation of the Scriptures of Tichonius which was a common method of the *De doctrina christiana* of St. Augustine³⁹. It seems that Hugh's method was the traditional method, but, as Chenu⁴⁰ observed, the authenticity of Hugh was in giving the allegorical interpretation its basis in the literal meaning of the text. Against the premature allegory, he underlined the value of *historia*, as another foundation of the interpretation of the Scriptures, as he said that the interpretation of the Scriptures was as a building with two foundations, with *historia* as the basic foundation, *allegoria* as the composition of the walls which made the building, and *tropologia* as the crown of the building⁴¹. Therefore, in the Hugh's system, the last goal of studying the Scriptures, like in St. Augustine, was to draw the moral law in order to practice it in life. In arriving at moral conclusion, Hugh proposed the study of the text to know the literal meaning and basing on the meaning of the text we can arrive at the allegorical and finally moral sense of the text. Hugh used the traditional method, but he based the traditional method on reason, so that the *Didascalion* was not only the way to read the Scriptures, but a construction of a theological method as a sacred science⁴². Hugh introduced the use of *trivium* and *quadrivium* in the interpretation of the Scriptures; *trivium*, that is, grammatic, dialectic and rhetoric, which guided one to know the reality of the object from its literal meaning, served to form *historia*, and *quadrivium*, that is, arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy, which guided one to the mystical fact from the significance of the object, served to arrive at the allegorical and tropological interpretation⁴³.

³⁹ G.PARÉ, *La renaissance*, p.222. Cfr. HUGO DE S.VICTORE, *Didascalion*, V,II: PL 176, 790C; SAUGUSTINUS, *De doctrina christiana*, III,c.30-37,42-56: PL 34,81-90.

⁴⁰ M.D.CHENU, *La théologie au XX^e siècle*, Paris 1957, p.200.

⁴¹ HUGO DE S.VICTORE, *Didascalion*, VI,IV: PL 176,802BC.: "Memini-sti, ut autumo, supra me divinam Scripturam aedificio similem dixisse, ut primum fundamento posito structura in altum levetur, plane aedificio similem; nam et ipsa structuram habet".

⁴² M.D.CHENU, *La théologie*, p.202.

⁴³ HUGO DE S.VICTORE, *De Sacramentis*, Prologus, VI: PL 176,185C-D: "Ex quo constat quod omnes artes naturales divinae scientiae famulantur; et inferior sapientia recte ordinata ad superiorem conducit. Sub eo igitur sensu qui est in significatione vocum ad res, continetur historia; cui famulantur tres

2. The Method of St. Anselm of Canterbury

The revival of the sciences had a great influence in the theological system. The use of reason was introduced in the theological system. It was Anselm of Bec, "last of the Fathers and first of the scholastics"⁴⁴ who proposed the use of reason in understanding the mystery of faith. He tried to seek the understanding of the mystery of God by philosophical thought. His method *fides quaerens intellectum*⁴⁵ invited the student to enlighten faith by reason, and his books *Monologium*⁴⁶, *Proslogion*⁴⁷ and *Cur Deus homo*⁴⁸ exposed his basic method *credo ut intellegam*⁴⁹. The application of reasoning to the dogmas of faith, is not in order to strip them of mystery but to penetrate them, develop them and discern their implications, in so far as this is possible for the human being to understand⁵⁰. Here, as in Augustinian

scientiae sicut dictum est, id est grammatica, dialectica, rhetorica. Sub eo autem sensu qui est in significatione rerum ad facta mystica, continetur allegoria. Et sub eo sensu qui est in significatione rerum ad facienda mystica, continetur tropologia; et his duobus famulantur arithmetica, musica, geometria, astronomia et physica. Super haec ante omnia divinum illud est ad quod ducit divina Scriptura sive in allegoria, sive in tropologia: quorum alterum (quod in allegoria est) rectam fidem, alterum (quod in tropologia est) informat bonam operationem: in quibus constat cognitio veritatis et amor virtutis: et haec est vera reparatio hominis".

G. PARÉ, notes that the use of grammar in the interpretation of the Scriptures can be seen in the works of St. Augustine, Cassiodore, Isidore of Seville, Bede, Rabanus Maurus, Gratian; Cfr. *La renaissance*, p.234, footnote no.1.

⁴⁴ CH.H.HASKINS, *The Renaissance*, p.250.

⁴⁵ S.ANSELMI CANTUARIENSIS, *Proslogion seu Alloquium de Dei existentia*, Proemium: PL 158,225A.

⁴⁶ S.ANSELMI CANTUARIENSIS, *De divinitatis essentia Monologium*, in: PL 158,141-224.

⁴⁷ S.ANSELMI CANTUARIENSIS, *Proslogion seu Alloquium de Dei existentia*, in: PL 158,223-248.

⁴⁸ S.ANSELMI CANTUARIENSIS, *Libri duo Cur Deus homo*, in: PL 158,359-432.

⁴⁹ M.GRABMANN, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 2 vols, Freiburg im Br. 1909.1911, I, p.275: "Anselm hat dieses sein methodisches Grundprinzip 'credo ut intelligam' praktisch in seinen Schriften, besonders seinem 'Monologium', 'Proslogium' und 'Cur Deus homo' verwirklicht".

⁵⁰ H.COPELSTON, *A History of Philosophy*, London 1950, vol. II, p.156.

thinking, St. Anselm put faith before reason. R. Roques⁵¹ notes, that in St. Anselm faith, as an axiom a priori to the reason, was presupposed in the reasoning of theology, as said by St. Anselm that we could not understand the mystery of faith, unless we believe in it⁵².

Nevertheless, the method of St. Anselm was not merely Augustinian. M. J. Charlesworth⁵³ notes the ambiguity of the Anselm's thought about faith and reason. On the one hand he put reason independent to faith, even prior of faith, so that man can arrive at the conversion after understanding the mystery of faith – his *Proslogion* is a treatise to prove the existence of God by reason alone – and on the other hand he stressed that faith is possible without any rational preparation. In fact, in doing theology, Anselm put faith prior to reason, and the Scriptures remained the entire authority in doing theology. Grabmann⁵⁴ concludes that in St. Anselm's method, authority and reason are two important points which build theology.

The method of Anselm did not have a direct influence in the theology of his era, because on the one hand at his time the traditional method that is *lectio* had its great fruit in the production of *sententiae*. The dialectician had been very active and the dialectic became a common method in doing theology. Meanwhile on other hand, he did not enter in the discussion to propose his method in searching for the mystery of faith, which was superior to dialectic⁵⁵.

⁵¹ R. ROQUES, *Structures*, p.246; É. GILSON, *La philosophie au moyen âge. Des origines patristiques à la fin du XIV^e siècle*, Paris 1952², p.242: "L'ordre à observer dans la recherche de la vérité est donc le suivant: croire d'abord les mystères de la foi avant de discuter par la raison; s'efforcer ensuite le comprendre ce que l'on croit".

⁵² Cfr. S. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Proslogion*, I: PL 158,227 C: "Nam et hoc credo quia nisi credidero, non intellegam".

⁵³ M. J. Charlesworth, *St. Anselm's Proslogion with A Reply on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo and The Author's Reply to Gaunilo*, translated with an introduction and philosophical commentary by, Oxford 1965, p.34.

⁵⁴ M. GRABMANN, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen*, I, p.32: "Auctoritas und ratio sind die Angelpunkte der wissenschaftlichen Methode Anselms von Canterbury".

⁵⁵ G. PARÉ, *La renaissance*, p.255.

3. The Dialectic Method of Abelard

After St. Anselm, the use of reason in understanding the mystery of faith was developed by the dialecticians. Before the arrival of Abelard, William of Champaeaux was a famous master in dialectic in the school of Paris. Hugh of St. Victor introduced reasoning in the interpretation of Scriptures, but reason had its important role in doing theology with Abelard. PARÉ⁵⁶ notes that Anselm and Abelard were the creators of the scholastic method. Nevertheless we cannot identify the one with the other. Anselm, a great master of the monastic school of Bec, was a genius in rationalist faith; Abelard, the master of the school of Paris, a real innovator who liked to discuss his opinion with everyone, even with his master William of Champaeux, developed the use of the dialectic in understanding the mystery of faith. Nevertheless, they gave a new spirit to the theological reflection of their time.

In the beginning of his activity Abelard was non other than a master who interpreted the Scriptures with an aide of *glossa*. His curiosity as an innovator made him search for a new method in doing theology. Meanwhile, the dialectic method had not been accepted by many scholars⁵⁷, he wrote his treatise *Tractatus de unitate et trinitate divina*, where he explained the mystery of the Trinity using the speculation of the reason; the treatise was condemned in the Council of Soisson (1121) and later was destroyed with the other works in the Council of Sens (1140)⁵⁸.

The important contribution of Abelard in the formation of theological method of the scholasticism was his work *Sic et Non*⁵⁹, or "Yes or No", where he made a compilation of the opinion of the Fathers in the opposition *Sic et Non*, "pro and con". It is true that the collection and arrangement of

⁵⁶ G. PARÉ, *La renaissance*, p.275.

⁵⁷ M. GRABMANN, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen*, I, p.216: "Die Wissenschaft des 11. Jahrhunderts ist von dem Gegensatz zwischen Dialektikern und Antidialektikern beherrscht, einem Gegensatz, der viel einschneidender und beachtenswerter ist als der Widerstreit zwischen Nominalismus und Realismus in der voranselmischen Zeit".

⁵⁸ GHELLINCK, *Le mouvement theologique au XI^e siècle*, 157-158. Cfr. PETRUS ABAELARDUS, *Historia Calamitatum* IX: PL 178,140A-146A. Notices on the Councils of Soisson and Sens, see: MANSI, 21,265-270; 559-570. The errors of Abelard are reported also in: DS 721-739.

⁵⁹ PETRUS ABAELARDUS, *Sic et Non*, in: PL 178,1329-1610.

the opinion of the Fathers on some specific topics had been used before in the collection of sentences, for example in the school of Laon, but his method gave a pungency in selecting the reading of the opinion of the Fathers⁶⁰. He wanted to use the work of the Fathers critically⁶¹. In the selection of the opinion of the Fathers, Abelard used four steps, firstly, he grouped the series of opinions according the variable of significance; secondly, he eliminated the non authentic work and made a correction of the corrupted text; thirdly, the comparison between the parallel writing, and fourthly, the discernment of the opinion which conserved the strict rule and which did not conserve the strict rule, in order to make a hierarchy of the text⁶². This was the Abelardian method. He collected the opinions of the Fathers and sought the disagreements between them, and through the disagreement he tried to exposed the truth using reason. Doubting was a principal attitude of his method, because "by doubting we come to inquiry, and by inquiry we perceive the truth"⁶³.

The fruit of the *Sic et Non* method of Abelard can be seen in medieval theology, for example in the compilation of the sentences by Peter Lombard, and in the theological work of the so-called *Quaestiones Disputate*.

⁶⁰ CH.H.HASKINS, *The renaissance*, p.353. G.PARÉ notes that in the elaboration of canon law after the eleventh century had been introduced the method namely, *concordia discordantium*, in order to reconcile the decision of hierarchy with the opinion of the Fathers: *La renaissance*, p.286. Cfr. J.DE GHELINCK, *Le mouvement théologique*, p. 163-166.

⁶¹ E.GILSON, *La philosophie au moyen âge*, p.280: "Abélard pose en principe que l'on ne doit pas utiliser arbitrairement les autorités en matière de théologie".

⁶² G.PARÉ, *L'enseignement*, p.291; Cfr. *Sic et Non*, Prolog : PL 178,1339-1348.

⁶³ PETRUS ABAELARDUS, *Sic et Non*, Prolog: PL 178,1349B: "Dubitando enim ad inquisitionem veniamus; inquirendo veritatem percepimus".

III. RICHARD OF ST.VICTOR

1. His Life

Although many scholars occupied themselves with a study of his writings, actually we have not much information about his life. Richard was born in Scotland but there is no notice about the place and date of his birth⁶⁴. On the fact that his life was not long, and he died in 1173, it is possible that he was born on 1123, nevertheless the information we have on the date was around 1114 to 1160⁶⁵. At the age of 16 he went to France in order to get more education in philosophy and theology. He entered as a canon regular of St.Victor in the era of prior Gilduin and became the disciple of Hugh. As Hugh died on 11 February 1141, it is possible that the arrival of Richard in the school of St.Victor was about 1139, and he became a disciple of Hugh for only two years⁶⁶.

About his life in the abbey of St.Victor, the *Analles* of the Abbey written by Simon Gourdan, as cited by Hugonin⁶⁷, only noted about his piety and his discipline. John of Toulouse⁶⁸ noticed that Richard was elected as a viceprior in the era of the abbot Achard⁶⁹ and the prior Nanter. After the death of Achard and Nanter, in 1162, Ervisius was elected abbot⁷⁰ and Richard as prior. The reputation of Ervisius as abbot was not good. Two years after his election, the property of the abbey and above all discipline was

⁶⁴ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*, c.XIII: PL 196.; J.EBNER, *Die Erkenntnislehre Richards von St.Victor*, BGPTMA 19.4, Münster 1917,p.1; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S.Vittore. Saggio di studi sulla filosofia mistica del secolo XII*, Alatri 1898, pp.21-22; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S.Vittore, la vita, le opere, il pensiero*, in: *Memorie della R.Academia Nazionale dei Lincei*, Serie VI, vol.IV, fasc.V, Roma 1933,p.412; My opinion is that the work of OTTAVIANO is the best and rigorous study on the life of Richard of St.Victor.

⁶⁵ C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, 413-414.

⁶⁶ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*, : PL 196,xiii; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.414; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.22.

⁶⁷ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*, : PL 196,xiv A.

⁶⁸ Cited by C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.415.

⁶⁹ About Achard, see: PL 196,1371-1374;1381-1382..

⁷⁰ About Ervisius see: PL 190,1373-1376;1381-1388.

diminished. The situation of the abbey invited the intervention of the Pope Alexander III⁷¹ who was in Paris in April and May 1164. The Pope visited the abbey and insisted that the abbot observed the rule of the abbey. Richard and a few of his canonical brothers tried to maintain discipline, but Ervisius on the other hand sought to change the constitution of the abbey. The controversy between Richard and Ervisius lasted for a long time, and by intervention of the Pope Alexander III, the abbot Ervisius resigned, about 16 April 1172. Guarino was elected abbot and Gualter was viceprior⁷². Richard continued to keep the discipline of the abbey. Hugonin⁷³ noted that during the priory of Richard, Peter Lombard and Thomas Becket, the Archbishop of Canterbury, visited the abbey of St.Victor. After 1170 Richard was no longer prior, and he died on 10 March 1173⁷⁴.

2. His Writings

Notwithstanding his short life, Richard wrote a great number of works, and letters, excluding some spurious writings and some manuscripts. His works were amongst those which was more read in the medieval period⁷⁵. His works are divided into three groups, that is, exegetical-exhortative writings, philosophical-theological writings, and letters, although we can say that all Richard's works in a certain sense are exegetical⁷⁶. We expose here the

⁷¹ see: *PL* 200,11-60.

⁷² F.HUGONIN, *Notice*: *PL* 196,xiv A - xvi B; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, pp.417-421; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.23.

⁷³ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*: *PL* 196,xv-xvi.

⁷⁴ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*: *PL* 196,xvi D; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.421; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.25.

⁷⁵ G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.59; The complete edition of the works of Richard are eight: Venezia 1506, Paris 1518, Lyon 1534, Paris 1550, Venezia 1592, Köln 1621, Rouen 1650 edited by John of Toulouse, and Paris 1880, edited by Hugonin-Migne: C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.446.

⁷⁶ C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.422. F.HUGONIN, *Notice*: *PL* 196,xvii B-C and MIGNE divided in three groups: exegetical writings, theological writings and miscellaneous. G.BUONAMICI divided in six groups: the theological writings, the moral theological-writings, the allegorical-moral

characteristic of his works.

The exegetical-exhortative writings are: 1. *In Cantica Canticorum explicatio*⁷⁷, a commentary of the books of Song of Songs, although it did not comment the entire book. It seems that the most parts of the works report the opinion of St. Gregory the Great and each chapter seems to be a singular sermon⁷⁸. 2. *In apocalypsim Ioannis libri septem*⁷⁹, in six books the work comments the book of Apocalypse in order to guide one to piety and faith⁸⁰. 3. *Explicatio aliquorum passuum difficilium Apostoli*⁸¹, treats "Law, faith, and justification", in the opinion of St. Paul⁸². 4. *Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos*⁸³, the commentary of some Psalms. It seems that it is a compilation of sermons on each Psalm commented⁸⁴. 5. *In visionem Ezechielis*⁸⁵, the allegorical interpretation of the animal in the vision of Ezekiel⁸⁶. 6. *Expositio difficultatum suborientium in expositione Tabernaculi foederis (De Tabernaculo)*⁸⁷, the work is pure Biblical exegesis, divided in three treatises, the first part treats the construction of the tabernacle and its various parts, the second treatise treats the temple of Salomon, and the third part treats the chronological story of the kings of Juda and Israel⁸⁸. 7. *Expositio cantici Habacuc*⁸⁹,

writings, the ascetical or mystical writings, the exegetical writings and some writings in the certain occasion, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.35.

⁷⁷ PL 196,405-504.

⁷⁸ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xx D; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.431; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.47.

⁷⁹ PL 196,683-888.

⁸⁰ cfr. F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xxi D; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.431-432; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 48-49.

⁸¹ PL 196,665-684.

⁸² F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xxi D; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.432; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.47.

⁸³ PL 196,265-402.

⁸⁴ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xx C-D; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.432; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.48.

⁸⁵ PL 196,527-300.

⁸⁶ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xxi A; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 432-433; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.47.

⁸⁷ PL 196,211-256.

⁸⁸ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xx AC; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.433-434; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.46-47.

a brief literary commentary⁹⁰. 8. *Declarationes nonnullarum difficultatum Scripturae ad B. Bernardum Claraevallensem Abbatem*⁹¹, treats some problems of the Biblical commentary as the division between the pure and impure animals in the Old Testament⁹². 9. *Quomodo Christus ponitur in signum populorum*⁹³ a brief commentary on the passage of Isaiah XI,10⁹⁴. 10. *Tractatus de meditandis plagis quae circa finem mundi evenient (De mundi fine)*⁹⁵, on the sign which preceded the destruction of the universe, a commentary of the passage of Ecclesiastes XII,1⁹⁶. 11. *De comparatione Christi ad florem et Mariae ad virgam*⁹⁷. 12. *De sacrificio David Prophetarum, et quid distet inter ipsum et sacrificium Abrahae Patriarchae*⁹⁸, a commentary on the passage of Genesis XV,8-9 and Psalm LXV,14 on the sacrifice⁹⁹. 13. *De differentia sacrificii Abrahae a sacrificio Beatae Mariae Virginis*¹⁰⁰, a mystical-allegorical exposition of the difference between the sacrifice of Abraham and the sacrifice of Mary¹⁰¹. 14. *De super-excellentissimo baptismo Christi*¹⁰², the explanation of the transformation of the Holy Spirit in the figure of a dove in the baptism of Jesus¹⁰³. 15. *Tractatus de potestate ligandi*

⁸⁹ PL 196, 401-404.

⁹⁰ C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 434.

⁹¹ PL 196,255-266.

⁹² C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.434; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.46.

⁹³ PL 196, 523-528.

⁹⁴ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xxD-xxiA; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.434; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.45.

⁹⁵ PL 194,201-212.

⁹⁶ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xix D - xx A; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.4345; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.45.

⁹⁷ PL 196, 1031-1032.

⁹⁸ PL 196,1032-1042.

⁹⁹ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xxv C; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.435; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.46.

¹⁰⁰ PL 196,1043-1060.

¹⁰¹ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xxvCD; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.435; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.45.

¹⁰² PL 196,1011-1018.

¹⁰³ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xxv B; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.435; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.45.

*et solvendi*¹⁰⁴ a moral exposition on the question about the power of the remission of the sin given by Jesus to Peter and to the other Apostles and their successors¹⁰⁵. 16. *Tractatus de iudiciaria potestate in finali et universali iudicio (De iudicio universalis)*¹⁰⁶, a sermon on the passage of Matthew XIX,28¹⁰⁷. 17. *Tractatus de spiritu blasphemiae*¹⁰⁸, treats the blasphemy against the holy Spirit. Richard proposed with St. Augustin and Hugh that there is no sin which is not forgiven by God¹⁰⁹. 18. *De differentia peccati mortalis et venialis*¹¹⁰, the work is divided in two parts, the first treats the problem whether the venial sins augment in the punishment of the damned, and the second part exposed the interpretation of the passage of Ecclesiastes III,15¹¹¹. 19. *De Emmanuele libri duo*¹¹², based on the interpretation of Isaiah VII,14: "*Ecce Virgo concipiet*", the work treats on the incarnation of Christ¹¹³. 20. *De missione Spiritus sancti, sermo*¹¹⁴, an exposition of some passages of the Scriptures, that is, Genesis II,5; John III,8; Psalm XXIV,10 etc¹¹⁵. 21. *Tractatus de gemino Paschate (In ramis Palmarum; In die Paschae)*¹¹⁶, treats the interpretation of the passage of St. Paul: "*Pascha*

¹⁰⁴ PL 196,1159-1178.

¹⁰⁵ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196, xxvi C - xxvii A; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.435; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.43-44.

¹⁰⁶ PL 196,1177-1186.

¹⁰⁷ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xxvii A-B; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.436; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.44.

¹⁰⁸ PL 196, 1185-1192.

¹⁰⁹ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xxvii B; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.436; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.44.

¹¹⁰ PL 196,1191-1194.

¹¹¹ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xxvii B-C; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.436; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.45.

¹¹² PL 196,601-606.

¹¹³ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196,xxi B-C; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.436-437; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.37-39.

¹¹⁴ PL 196, 1017-1032.

¹¹⁵ C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.437; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.45. Buonamici proposes that the writing was a prayer.

¹¹⁶ PL 196, 1059-1067;1067-1074.

nostrum immolatus est Christus" (I Cor. V, 7)¹¹⁷. C. Ottaviano adds to these exegetical-exhortative writings some writings which are not in the edition of Migne, but were discovered by Haureau who also published some of the manuscripts¹¹⁸.

The philosophical-theological writings are divided in two groups, that is, the mystical writings and the philosophical-theological writings. The mystical writings are: 1. *De exterminatione mali et promotione boni*¹¹⁹ a fundamental teaching of moral with special relation with mysticism¹²⁰. 2. *De statu interioris hominis*¹²¹, an anthropological treatise which treats the human being and his relation with the sins, liberty, and grace¹²². 3. *De eruditione hominis interioris libri tres, occasione accepta ex somnio Nabuchodonosor apud Daniele*¹²³, exposes the moral sense of the prophecies of Daniel¹²⁴. 4. *Tractatus de gradibus charitatis*¹²⁵, a mystical exposition of the doctrine of love¹²⁶. 5. *Tractatus de quatuor gradibus violentae charitatis*¹²⁷, elaborates the four degrees of love¹²⁸. 6. *De preparatione animi ad*

¹¹⁷ F. HUGONIN, *Notice*: PL 196, xxv D; C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 437; G. BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 44.

¹¹⁸ HAUREAU, *Notices et extraits des manuscrits*, 1890, reported by C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 424-425. The writings are: *Allegoria "Post sex annos"*, *Allegoria "Tolle puerum"*, *Allegoria "Proles de Virgine"*, *Allegoria "Aprehendet messis"*, *Allegoria "Quid eis dabis"*, *Allegoria "Sex sunt dies"*, *Fragmentum "Sanctificamini hodie"*, and *Opusculum "Carbonum et cinerum"*.

¹¹⁹ PL 196, 1073-1116.

¹²⁰ F. HUGONIN, *Notice*: PL 196, xxv D - xxvi A; C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 437-438, G. BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 39.

¹²¹ PL 196, 1117-1160.

¹²² F. HUGONIN, *Notice*: PL 196, xxvi A-C; C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 438-439; G. BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 39-40.

¹²³ PL 196, 1229-1366.

¹²⁴ F. HUGONIN, *Notice*: PL 196, xxviii C-D; C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 439; G. BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 40.

¹²⁵ PL 196, 1195-1208.

¹²⁶ F. HUGONIN, *Notice*: PL 196, xxvii; C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 439-440; G. BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 43.

¹²⁷ PL 196, 1207-1224.

¹²⁸ F. HUGONIN, *Notice*: PL 196, xxvii C-D; C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo*

*contemplationem, liber dictus Benjamin minor*¹²⁹, with an allegorical commentary on the story of the family of Isaac, the work treats the preparation of the soul toward an ecstasy¹³⁰. 7. *De gratia contemplationis libri quinque, occasione accepta ab arca Moysis et ab eam rem hactenus dictum Benjamin maior*¹³¹, based on the commentary of the Ark of Moses, the work treats the degrees of contemplation. The work is divided in two parts, the first part (*liber I*) considers the general term and the divisions of contemplation, and the second part (*liber II-V*), particularly each degree of contemplation¹³². 8. *Nonnullae allegoriae Tabernaculi foederis*¹³³, a short resume of the *Beniamin maior*. In the second part of the work, Richard explains the various senses of the Scriptures, allegorical, anagogical, historical, tropological¹³⁴.

The philosophical-theological writings are: 1. *De Trinitate libri sex*¹³⁵, the description of this book we will treat in the next part. 2. *De tribus appropriatis Personis in Trinitate, ad divum Bernardum abbatem Clarevalentem*¹³⁶, a short work treating the different attributes of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit¹³⁷. 3. *Liber de Verbo incarnato, ad divum Bernar-*

di S. Vittore, p.440; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.43.

¹²⁹ PL 196,1-64.

¹³⁰ F.HUGONIN, *Notice*, PL 196,xvii C - xviii C; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.440; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.40-42.

¹³¹ PL 196,63-192.

¹³² F.HUGONIN, *Notice*, PL 196,xviii C - xix B; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.441-442; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.42-43.

¹³³ PL 196,191-202.

¹³⁴ F.HUGONIN, c. XIX; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.442; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.43.

¹³⁵ PL 196, 887-991. The modern edition of the *De Trinitate*. J.RIBAILLIER(ed.), *Richard de S.Victor. "De Trinitate"*, Texte philosophique du moyen âge 6, Paris 1958; G.SALET(ed.), *Richard de Saint-Victor, "La Trinité"*, texte Latin, introduction et notes, SC 63, Paris 1959. Our studies is based on the edition of G.Salet.

¹³⁶ PL 196, 991-994.

¹³⁷ C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.443, G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.36; F.HUGONIN, *Notice*, PL 196 xxiv C - xxv A. Hugonin considers the book as the appendix of *De Trinitate*.

*dum Clarevallentem abbatem*¹³⁸ based on the interpretation of Isaiah XXI,11-12, treats the incarnation¹³⁹. 4. *Quomodo Spiritus sanctus est amor Patris et Filii*¹⁴⁰.

The letters of Richard which are reported in the edition of Migne are: 1. *Ernisii Abbatis et R. prioris S. Victoris Paris, ad Robertum Herefordiensem*¹⁴¹. 2. *Prioris S. Victoris Paris, et R. Abbatis S. Augustini ad Alexandrum Papam*¹⁴². 3. *Willelmi prioris Ursicampi ad Richardum priorem S. Victoris*¹⁴³. 4. *G. presbyteri Anilcurtensis ad R. priorem S. Victoris*¹⁴⁴. 5. *G. ad Rich. priorem S. Victoris*¹⁴⁵. 6. *G. prioris Ecclesiae S. Albani ad Rich. de S. Victore*¹⁴⁶. 7. *Ejusdem ad eundem*¹⁴⁷. 8. *Ejusdem ad eundem*¹⁴⁸. 9. *M. ad Richardum*¹⁴⁹. 10. *Ejusdem ad eundem*¹⁵⁰. 11. *G. prioris S. Albani ad Richardum*¹⁵¹. It seems that the letters which are reported by Migne are not all the letters of Richard, some of them are the letters addressed to Richard.

Studying the writings of Richard of St. Victor, C. Ottaviano¹⁵² concludes that there are some writings of Richard which are attributed to another person. The writings are: *Liber excerptionum*, edited by Migne as the writing

¹³⁸ PL 196,995-1010.

¹³⁹ F. HUGONIN, *Notice*; PL 196, xxv A-B; C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.443-444; G. BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.37.

¹⁴⁰ PL 196,1011-1012.

¹⁴¹ PL 196, 1225-1226.

¹⁴² PL 196,1225-1226.

¹⁴³ PL 196, 1226-1227.

¹⁴⁴ PL 196,1227A-B.

¹⁴⁵ PL 196,1227 C.

¹⁴⁶ PL 196,1227 D-1228 A.

¹⁴⁷ PL 196,1228 A-C.

¹⁴⁸ PL 196,1228 C - 1229 A.

¹⁴⁹ PL 196,1229 A-C.

¹⁵⁰ PL 196,1229C-1230B.

¹⁵¹ PL 196,1230 B-C.

¹⁵² C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.427-429.

of Hugh¹⁵³; *Super Nahum* attributed to Julianus of Toledo¹⁵⁴. Besides the spurious writings, Ottaviano¹⁵⁵ notes that some authors noticed the existence of some manuscripts of Richard which have not been recognized.

3. His Theological Approach

Regarding the writings of Richard, it seems that he is "a typical representative of the school of St. Victor"¹⁵⁶, who writes on the basis of the Scriptures and tradition, especially Latin Fathers, and has a great interest of contemporary problems. His writings are well arranged, and he always maintains the structure and the theme which he would like to expose; such order we can not find in the writing of Hugh who sometimes wants to expose some problem but ends with the other problem¹⁵⁷. A.M.Éthier¹⁵⁸ notes that in his writings Richard as a master of contemplation recounted his experience of contemplation and the way to arrive to the higher level¹⁵⁹. Therefore, he used a simple method, that is, the information of the Scriptures and experience.

His thinking is profoundly Biblical. He interprets the Scriptures and uses the Biblical text in the spiritual sense. His theology is focused on a living contemplation of God, out of his personal preoccupation to unify himself with God. The act of contemplation is a function of faith, in order to ascend

¹⁵³ PL 196 177,191-284. See also J.CHATILLON, *Le contenu, l'authenticité et la date du "Liber excerptionum" et des "Sermones centum" de Richard de Saint-Victor*, in: *RMAL*, 4(1948),23-52,343-366.

¹⁵⁴ PL 96,703-758; R.BARON, *Richard de Saint-Victor a-t-il l'auteur des commentaires de Nahum, Joël, Abdias?*, in: *RB*, 68(1958), 118-122.

¹⁵⁵ C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.429-431.

¹⁵⁶ H.C.van ELSWIJK, *Richard of St. Victor*, in: *NCE*, XII 482-483.

¹⁵⁷ G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.54.

¹⁵⁸ A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate" de Richard de Saint Victor*, Paris-Ottawa 1939, pp.8-9.

¹⁵⁹ His books, *Benjamin Minor* and *Benjamin Major* treat on the degree of contemplation, departing from the allegorical interpretation of the passage of the Scriptures.

to the mystery of God¹⁶⁰. In the *Prologus* of the *De Trinitate*, Richard affirms his position, his contemplation and his theology are based on his love of God¹⁶¹. Indeed, faith is the basis of all his activity, and his theology.

Richard defines faith as "a certain certitude constituted above opinion and below knowledge"¹⁶², a definition which he accepted from his master Hugh¹⁶³. The truth of faith is certain, and no other truth is more certain than that which it certitudes¹⁶⁴. In his *Benjamin Major*, Richard affirms that the sources of faith are not in the human intelligence but in revelation or through the distribution of the authority. There are two categories of divine truth, namely, the truths which are "above reason" (*supra rationem*) and the truths which are above and counter to it (*supra et praeter rationem*). To the first category belong the truths that cannot be investigated or proved by human reason but which reason can accept easily once they have been accepted on faith. Such truths are the object of experiential proof. To the second category belong the truths which seem above reason although they are rational from the point of view of divine reason. Regarding these truths, reason can do nothing unless it is penetrated with faith, because such truths seem to run counter to human argumentation. To this category belong the mystery of divine Trinity¹⁶⁵.

It seems here that the position of Richard regarding the relation between faith and reason affirms the position of St. Augustin and St. Anselm,

¹⁶⁰ H.C.van ELSWIJK, *Richard, cit.*, in: *NCE*, XII,483; Cfr. *Benjamin Minor* LXXIV: PL 196,53C: "Aliter siquidem Deus videtur per fidem, aliter cognoscitur per rationem, atque aliter cernitur per contemplationem".

¹⁶¹ *De Trin.*, Prologus: SC 63,50,888C: "Ex dilectione itaque manifestatio et ex manifestatione contemplatio et ex contemplatione cognitio".

¹⁶² *Declarationes nonnularum difficultatem*, III,5: PL, 196,266B: "Sed constat quia fides est certitudo quaedam supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta".

¹⁶³ HUGO DE S.VICTORE, *De Sacramentis*, I,10,2: PL 176,330; Cfr. J.EBNER, *Die Erkenntnislehre Richards*, p.81.

¹⁶⁴ *De Trin.*, I,2: SC 63,66,891C: "Sed hoc in supra modum mirabile, quia quotquot veraciter fideles sumus, nihil certius, nihil constantius tenemus quam quod fide apprehendimus".

¹⁶⁵ *Benjamin Major*, I,6-7: PL 196,72B-73C; IV,2-3: 196,136B-137B; Cfr. H.B.FEISS, *Learning and Ascent to God in Richard of St. Victor*, Excerpts Diss.St. Anselmi, Oregon 1979, p. 121-122; J.EBNER, *Die Erkenntnislehre Richards*, p.82.

namely, the unity of faith and reason. In the *Prologus* of *De Trinitate* he underlines this method. Faith is the basis of all the reasonings, and without faith it is impossible to understand the mystery of God¹⁶⁶. We observe the development of the Anselmian method in Richard's theology. He does not only defend the use of necessary reason, but he is convinced that there is no truth whatsoever, no matter how profound and mysterious for which the necessary reasons cannot be advanced¹⁶⁷. His great evaluation of experience expresses his advance compared to St. Anselm. Indeed, faith remains his starting point of his reflection, and all his writings are caused by his great love in the mystery of faith.

4. The Structural Analysis of *De Trinitate*

Amongst the writings of Richard, it seems that the *De Trinitate* is the most important¹⁶⁸. The fact of the existence of 54 manuscripts which contain the writing, among them 31 manuscripts report the complete text of *De Trinitate*¹⁶⁹, indicates the popularity of the treatise in the medieval time as we have the manuscripts from the twelfth century to the fifteenth century, preceded the edition which begun in the sixteenth century both in the particular edition or in the general edition of the works of Richard. The authenticity of the authorship of Richard is without doubt, but the date of the writing remains obscure, but it is possible that it was the product of his maturity¹⁷⁰.

¹⁶⁶ Cfr. J.EBNER, *Die Erkenntnislehre Richards*, pp.84-85; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, pp.147-148; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.502.

¹⁶⁷ Cfr. R.J.MASIELO, *Reason and Faith in Richard of St. Victor and St. Thomas*, in: *NS* 48(1974), p.233. Masielo affirms that Richard retracted this position.

¹⁶⁸ C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.442.

¹⁶⁹ J.RIBAILLIER, *Richard de Saint Victor*, pp.34-76. Besides giving the description of each manuscript, J.Ribailier examines the families of the manuscripts which are divided in three groups: the family of Victorines, the family of Foucarmont, and the family of Flamande and exposed the history of the text of *De Trinitate*.

¹⁷⁰ J.RIBAILLIER, *Richard de Saint-Victor*, pp.3-13.

Let us examine the structure of the treatise, as it is clear from the division of the book itself. The resume of G.Salet¹⁷¹ helps us to understand the scheme which Richard proposed in his treatise.

The external structure of the treatise is very clear and harmonious; the treatise is divided into a Prologue and six books; each book has twenty-five chapters. The Prologue treats the proposal of the treatise, from faith towards the intelligence of faith ascending to spiritual reality to Eternity itself.

The first book treats the divine substance. The first chapters of the first book propose the subject and the method of the treatise. As he proposed the three ways towards the knowledge, that is, experience, reasoning and faith, Richard began with a reflection on the existence of being, concluded with the existence of the eternal Supreme Being, who is the source of all power, wisdom and essence. He is the supreme Power, Wisdom and Essence who is divine, unique and absolutely perfect.

The second book treats the divine attributes. By elaborating the divine attributes of God, which can be understood by reason and by faith, and the characteristic of the attributes, Richard arrives at an exposition of God, as the Unique Supreme Good and the Absolute Perfection. All divine attributes affirm the existence of the eternal being which is God himself.

The third book treats the plurality and Trinity of God. Based on the divine attributes, above all the reality of God as the supreme Love, Richard proposes the "necessity" of the Trinity in God. By reason, one can know the equality and the unity in the plurality.

The fourth book treats the persons of God. Richard analyses the meaning of person and its application to the reality of God. In this book Richard analyzes the formulation of the faith, one substance three persons. He exposes the singularity of each person.

The fifth book treats the procession of the persons. After demonstrating the unity and plurality of God, Richard exposes the reasoning of the origins of the persons. He analyzes the characteristic of the procession of the persons in the Trinity. Here he adds that the analyses of love will arrive at the same affirmation.

The sixth book treats the name of the persons of God. Richard analyzes the difference between the procession of the second person and the third

¹⁷¹ G.SALET (ed.), *Richard de Saint Victor*, pp. 13-24.

person, the second is properly Son, but the third cannot be a Son. In this context Richard notes the appropriation of each person of God, Father, Son and Spirit.



CHAPTER II:

THE ONLY ONE GOD AND HIS DIVINE ATTRIBUTES



I. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

1. The Understanding of the Mystery of Faith

As mentioned above, Richard's intention in writing all his treatises was to expose the mystery of faith, in order to give an instruction to his students in understanding the mystery of faith. Although the *De Trinitate* is the most speculative of Richard's writings, in this treatise – noted A.M.Éthier – Richard appeared as a spiritual father guiding a group of canon regular in order to reform the life of the clergy¹. The treatise *De Trinitate* begins with the exclamation of the prophet and the apostle praising the righteous who lived from the faith, and invites the readers to make a reflection on their faith². Faith is the basis of Christian life, because "without faith it is impossible to please God"³, and through faith we can arrive at hope and finally to charity⁴. Therefore, faith is also the basis of all the good works⁵. Nevertheless Richard affirms that in the Christian life, it is necessary to deepen knowledge because faith guides to the internal life, and knowledge guides to the eternal life; through faith to knowledge and through knowledge the eternal life, but faith remains the basis of Christian life⁶.

Regarding knowledge, Richard affirms that there are three sources of

¹ A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.8. Cfr. F.BONNARD, *Histoire de l'abbaye*, p. XIV-XXI.

² *De Trin.*: Prologus : SC 63,50,887C: "*Justus meus ex fide vivit, apostolica sententia est simul et prophetica. Nam Apostolus dicit quod propheta praedicit, quia justus ex fide vivit: si sic est, imo quia sic est, debemus utique studiose cogitare, frequenter retractare sacramenta fidei nostrae*". Cfr. G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.63-64.

³ *De Trin.*, Prologus: SC 63,50,887C: "*Sine fide namque impossibile est placere Deo*".

⁴ Cfr. *De Trin.*, Prologus: SC 63,50,888C: "*Per fidem igitur promovemur ad spem et per spem proficimus ad caritatem*".

⁵ *De Trin.*, Prologus: SC 63,52,889A: "*Ex fide vita illa qua interim vivimus bene*".

⁶ *De Trin.*, Prologus: SC 63,52,889A: "*Vita itaque ex fide et vita ex cognitione. Ex fide vita interna; ex cognitione vita aeterna. Ex fide vita illa qua interim vivimus bene; ex cognitione vita illa qua in futuro vivemus beate: fides itaque totius boni initium est atque fundamentum*".

the knowledge, namely, "experience, faith and reason". Experience guides to the temporal information and faith and reason guide to the supernatural information⁷. Experience guides to the knowledge of the temporal reality, but through experience the human being can arrive at the deeper science of reality. When reason cannot understand the reality of the divine mystery, the experience teaches the reality which is above the human intelligence⁸. In his treatise about the divine Trinity, Richard put experience in the beginning of the process of reasoning⁹. With the faith as the basis, through the daily experience which teaches the temporal reality but can affirm the existence of the divine reality, we can enter into reasoning in order to understand the mystery of God, and by understanding we arrive at eternal life.

The trinity of experience, faith and reason is the centre of Richard's theological method. Faith has its own certitude, because it has revelation and authority as sources. Based on the certitude of faith Richard begins his reflection. The famous sentence of the prophet, *nisi credideritis non intelligetis* becomes the starting point in his reflection. Indeed, reflection begins with faith, but we cannot stop here, we must enter to the more intimate and more profound knowledge, day by day, step by step toward the understanding of the truth of faith. In this fullness of knowledge and intelligence we arrive at eternal life. Its acquisition is a supreme usefulness and its contemplation is the

⁷ *De Trin.*, I,1: SC 63,64,891A: "Rerum itaque notitiam, ni fallor, modo triplici apprehendimus. Nam alia experiendo probamus, alia ratiocinando colligimus, aliorum certitudinem credendo tenemus. Et temporalium quidem notitiam per ipsam experientiam apprehendimus; ad aeternorum vero notitiam, modo ratiocinando, modo credendo, assurgimus".

Cfr. J.EBNER, *Die Erkenntnislehre Richards*, p.15.

⁸ *De Trin.*, III,10: SC 63,188,922A: "Non, inquis, capio, non comprehendo; sed quod non capit intelligentia, persuadet mihi tamen ipsa experientia. Bene utique et recte: sed si experientia te docet aliquid esse supra intelligentiam tuam in natura humana, nonne eo ipso te docuisse deberet aliquid esse supra intelligentiam tuam in natura divina?". Such an idea we can see in GREGORIUS NAZIANSENUS: *Orationes* XX,11:PG 35,1077-1079; S.AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, V,1,2: PL 42,911; XV,7,13: PL 42,1067.

⁹ *De Trin.*, I,7: SC 63,76,894B: "Ab illo itaque rerum genere incipere debemus, de quibus nullo modo dubitare possumus; et per illa quae per experientiam novimus ratiocinando colligere quid de his quae supra experientiam sunt oportet sentire".

supreme joy¹⁰. Here after receiving the definition of faith from Hugh, "a certain certitude constituted above opinion and below knowledge", Richard added the necessity of exploring the mystery of faith, of entering into an understanding of the mystery of faith¹¹. The joyful searching to understand the mystery of God made Richard explore the mystery of Trinity, search the necessary reason for understanding the mystery of Trinity. Indeed, the truth of faith is above reason (*supra rationem*) and sometimes also against reason (*contra rationem*)¹², but Richard was convinced that it is not against the will of God to search the necessary reason of the mystery of faith. With his treatise he tried to expose not only the possible reason but the necessary reason regarding the truth of faith¹³. He was convinced that with the necessary reason we can illumine the truth of faith, strengthen the conviction on the truth of faith¹⁴. Based on this method Richard tried to get the necessary reason on the mystery of the Trinity.

2. The Proofs of the Existence of God

The first book of *De Trinitate* speaks of the substance of God. Before treating the attributes of the divine Substance, Richard explains the necessary reason for the existence of God. Richard maintains that demonstrations should

¹⁰ *De Trin.*, III,1: SC 63,68,892A; Cfr. M.GRABMANN, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen*, II p.312.

¹¹ Cfr. *Declarationes nonnullarum difficultatem*, : PL 196, 266: "Non nobis debet sufficere fidei nostrae sacramenta veraciter et firmiter credere, nisi satagamus in quantum possumus etiam per intelligentiam capere".

¹² *De Trin.* I,1: SC 63,64,891A: "Nam quaedam ex his quae credere jubemur, non modo supra rationem, verum etiam contra humanam rationem esse videntur, nisi profunda et subtilissima indagatione discutiantur vel potius divina revelatione manifestentur".

¹³ *De Trin.* I,4: SC 63,70,892C: "Erit itaque intentionis nostrae in hoc opere ad ea quae credimus, in quantum Dominus dederit, non modo probabiles, verum etiam necessarias rationes adducere et fidei nostrae documenta veritatis enodatione et explanatione condire. Credo namque sine dubio ad quorumlibet explanationem quae necesse est esse, non modo probabilia, imo etiam, necessaria argumenta non deesse, quamvis illa interim contingat nostram industriam latere". On the existence of the necessary reason St.Thomas affirms the position of Richard; Cfr. *De Veritate*, q.14, art. 9, ad 1.

¹⁴ Cfr. *De Trin.* III,3: SC 63,170,917C

begin with that which is below reason to those things which transcend reason, with the daily experience that is under the human knowledge to that which is above the reason. Only by departing from experience we can arrive at the knowledge of the existence of that which is above reason¹⁵. He offers three demonstrations to prove the existence of God.

In the first demonstration he began with the experience of the different existence of "being". All "beings", whether eternal or non-eternal, can be distinguished in three categories, namely, the "being which is from itself and indeed from eternity", the "being which is neither from itself nor from eternity" and the "being which is not from itself but from eternity"¹⁶. We must begin with the "being" which is under our experience, that is, the "being which neither from itself nor from eternity". In created nature we have to know how we must think about uncreated nature¹⁷. In the *In Cantica Canticorum Expositio* Richard points out three kinds of being which can be explored and known, namely, the world and all the creatures which are its ornaments, the human being and the angel. The angel is an object of ecstasy. The exploration of the soul of human being, as created in the image of God, can arrive at the knowledge about the divine attributes and to the mystery of the Trinity. The exploration of the world serves as the basis of the demonstration of the existence of the Supreme Being¹⁸.

Regarding all which exist and can exist, which is from itself or from

¹⁵ Cfr. R.J.MASIELLO, *Reason and Faith*, p.239.

¹⁶ *De Trin.* I,6: SC 63,74,893D: "Omne quod est vel esse potest, aut ab aeterno habet esse, aut esse coepit ex tempore. Item omne quod est vel esse potest, aut habet esse a semetipso, aut habet esse ab alio quam a semetipso. Universaliter itaque omne esse triplici distinguitur ratione. Erit enim esse cuique existenti, aut ab aeterno, nec a semetipso; aut e contrario, nec ab aeterno nec a semetipso; aut mediate inter haec duo, ab aeterno quidem nec tamen a semetipso". Cfr: V,5: SC 63,310,952B.

¹⁷ *De Trin.*, I,9: SC 63,80,895B. also: I,10: SC 63,82,895D: "Quoties igitur per visibilia speculationem ad invisibilia contemplationem assurgimus, quid aliud quam velut quamdam scalam erigimus, per quam ad ea quae supra nos sunt mente ascendamus? Inde est quod in hoc tractatu, omnis ratiocinationis nostrae processus initium sumit ex his quae per experientiam novimus"; I,11: SC 63,84,896B; I,8: SC 63,78,894D-895A; Cfr.: VI,1: SC 63,374,967D; VI,2: SC 63,376,968D.

¹⁸ *In Cantica Canticorum Explicatio*: PL 196,419 AC. Cfr. *Adnotationes in Psalmos*, :PL 196,341B-342A; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.506.

another, which is eternal or temporal, Richard proposes four possibilities of being: a. "eternal and from itself" (*ab aeterno et a semetipso*), b. "neither eternal nor from itself" (*nec ab aeterno nec a semetipso*), "eternal but not from itself" (*ab aeterno, non a semetipso*), and d. "not eternal but from itself" (*non ab aeterno, a semetipso*)¹⁹. The last position is impossible because a being which is not eternal has its beginning in the time, therefore it has not existed before his existence, so, it cannot have his existence from itself²⁰. Beings which are eternal but are not from themselves are the persons of God which derive from the Supreme Being like rays from the sun²¹. In other words, the other persons of God are eternal, although they derive from the Supreme Being, their derivation does not indicate the chronology of their existence²². Before treating the persons of God we must demonstrate first the existence of the Supreme Being.

The basis of the demonstration of existence of the Supreme Being must be examined from the first two categories of being, that is, that which is eternal and from itself, and that which is neither eternal nor from itself. Our experience teaches us the existence of being which previously did not exist coming forth into actuality, in human being, animals, plants and others. This happens not only in natural operations but also in industrial operations. All these beings are neither eternal nor from eternity²³. Regarding the existence

¹⁹ Cfr. C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S.Vittore*, p.506; J.EBNER, *Die Erkenntnislehre Richards*, pp.71-75.

²⁰ *De Trin.*, I,6: SC 63,74.76,893D-894A: "Nam illud quantum, quod huic tertio membro videtur e contrario respondere, nullo modo ipsa natura patitur esse. Nihil enim omnino potest esse a semetipso, quod non sit ab aeterno. Quidquid enim ex tempore esse coepit, fuit quando nihil fuit; sed quamdiu nihil fuit, omnino nihil habuit et omnino nihil potuit; nec sibi ergo nec alteri dedit ut esset vel aliquid posset. Alioquin dedit quod non habuit et fecit quod non potuit. Hinc ergo collige quam sit impossibile ut aliquid omnino sit a semetipso, quod non sit ab aeterno. Ecce ergo quod superius jam diximus manifesta ratione colligimus, quia omne esse triplici distinguitur ratione".

²¹ *De Trin.*, I,9: SC 63, 80,895AB. The same comparison was used in the Symbol of Nicea (325): "*lumen ex lumine*": DS 125; and the Fathers as: GREGORIUS NYSSENUS: *Contra Eunomius*, I,8: PG 45,788; S.AUGUSTINUS: *Sermones* 117: PL 38,667-669; *De Trinitate* IV,20,27: PL 42,906; *Contra sermone Ariani* 3: PL 42,685-686. Such comparison was criticized by Abelard: *Introductio ad Theologiam* II,13 : PL 178,1070-1071.

²² Cfr. C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 507.

²³ *De Trin.*, I,7: SC 63,76.78,894BC.

of beings, Richard searches for the sources of their existence. If a being exists which is neither eternal nor from itself, a being to exist which gives existence to all which is neither eternal nor from itself, because the being which is neither eternal nor from itself cannot exist from itself²⁴. This demonstration is based on the experience. On this demonstration, some authors are convinced that Richard was the first author who demonstrates the existence of God with the empirical argument²⁵, but it seems that Richard's position underlined the demonstration of his predecessors like St. Anselm²⁶. Nevertheless we must say that the position of Richard is not purely Anselmian, as he stresses experience as the starting point of the reasoning. Therefore, it seems that the name which J. Ebner gave to this demonstration, *apriorisch-aposteriorischer Natur*²⁷, exactly expresses the position of Richard.

The second demonstration treats the difference of degree of perfection within creation²⁸. Such an argument was developed by St. Augustine²⁹ and St. Anselm³⁰. In created nature, there are many different degrees of creation,

²⁴ *De Trin.*, I,8: SC 63,78,894D: "Sed ex illo esse quod non est ab aeterno nec a semetipso ratiocinando colligitur et illud esse quod est a semetipso, et eo ipso quidem etiam ab aeterno: nam, si nihil a semetipso fuisset, non esset omnino unde ea exsistere potuissent quae suum esse a semetipsis non habent nec habere valent. Convincitur itaque aliquid esse a semetipso et eo ipso, uti jam dictum est, etiam ab aeterno. Alioquin fuit quando nihil fuit; et tunc quidem futurorum nihil futurum fuit, quia qui sibi vel aliis initium existendi daret vel potuisset dare tunc omnino non fuit. Quod quam falsum sit ipsa evidentia ostendit et rerum existentium experientia convincit".

²⁵ for example: C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.505: "La grande importanza che nella storia del pensiero medioevale hanno gli argomenti addotti da Riccardo per la dimostrazione dell'esistenza di Dio deriva dalla base empirica su cui egli per primo pensò di poggiarli: ...".

Cfr. C. HENRY, *Histoire des preuves de l'existence de Dieu au moyen-âge*, in: RT 19(1911), p.24: "Cette démonstration est fondée sur l'expérience, et la conviction de Richard que la preuve de Dieu doit être faite *a posteriori* et non *a priori* est un fait capital dans l'histoire des preuves: elle constitue une opposition radicale entre lui et saint Anselme".

²⁶ É. GILSON, *La Philosophie au moyen âge*, p.306.

²⁷ J. EBNER, *Die Erkenntnislehre Richards*, p.73.

²⁸ Cfr. J. EBNER, *Die Erkenntnislehre Richards*, p.74; C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.507.

²⁹ Cfr. S. AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate* VIII,3,4-5: PL 42,949-950.

³⁰ S. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologium*, 1-4: PL 158,144-150.

and thus there is necessary the existence of a supreme being, than which nothing is greater and nothing is better. As rational nature is better than irrational nature, the Supreme Being must be rational. And as mentioned, since nothing of created nature exists from itself, it is necessary that there exist a Supreme Being which is eternal and had no beginning³¹.

The third demonstration is based on the meaning of possibility³². Every being that exists can exist, because every thing which cannot exist doesn't exist. Therefore, every being receives the power of being from one which is the Supreme power (*summa potentia*) who does not receive his existing power from another. He is the Supreme Being (*summa essentia*), the Supreme Power (*summa potentia*), and the Supreme Wisdom (*summa sapientia*), because all things come from him³³.

³¹ *De Trin.*, I,11: SC 63,82.84,896AB: "Illud autem certissimum est et unde, ut credo, nemo dubitare potest, quia in tanta multitudine rerum exsistentium et tam multiplici differentia graduum, esse oporteat aliquid summum. Summum vero omnium dicimus, quo nihil est majus, nihil melius. Absque dubio autem melior est natura rationalis quam natura irrationalis. Oportet itaque ut aliqua rationalis substantia sit omnium summa. Quam autem constat in hac rerum universitate summum locum tenere non potest hoc ipsum quod est a suo inferiori accipere. Oportet ergo ut aliqua substantia exsistat quae utrumque habeat et summum videlicet locum tenere et a semetipsa esse. Nam, sicut superius jam diximus atque probavimus, si nihil esset a semetipso, nihil esset ab aeterno; et tunc quidem nulla rerum origo, nulla esset rerum successio. Convincit itaque rerum expertarum evidentia aliquam substantiam esse oportere a semetipsa. Nam, si nulla a semetipsa esset, nullum omnino eorum foret, quae aliunde originem trahunt et a semetipsis esse non possunt. Pertinet itaque substantia illa quae non est nisi a semetipsa, pertinet, inquam, ad illud esse, quod est ab aeterno et sine omni initio"

³² J.EBNER, *Die Erkenntnislehre Richards*, p. 75.

³³ *De Trin.*, I,12: SC 63,84.86,896BC: "Sed illud quod de summa substantia dictum est adhuc ampliori ratione probari potest. Illud autem certissimum est quod in tota rerum universitate nihil esse potest, nisi possibilitatem essendi vel de seipso habuerit vel aliunde acceperit. Quod enim esse non potest, omnino non est. Ut igitur aliquid exsistat, oportet ut ab essendi potentia posse esse accipiat. Ex essendi itaque potentia esse accipit omne quod in rerum universitate subsistit. Sed si ex ipsa sunt omnia, nec ipsa quidem est nisi a semetipsa, nec aliquid habet nisi a semetipsa. Si ex ipsa sunt omnia, ergo omnis essentia, omnis potentia, omnis sapientia. Si omne esse ab illa est, ipsa summa essentia est; si ab illa omne posse, summe potens; si omne sapere, summe sapiens est".

3. The Only One God

After demonstrating the existence of the Supreme Being, Richard tries to demonstrate the uniqueness of the Supreme Being and the identification of the Supreme Being with God. If the Supreme Substance is identical with the Supreme Power, it must be unique³⁴. The existence of another Supreme Substance which has the same power as he has, makes their power to be not supreme but partial. Participating in the power does not have the fullness of the power but only the participation. We agree that having the fullness of power is superior and more excellent than having a partial power³⁵. Therefore, there is no other primordial substance beside the Supreme Being, as his superiority can not have another superiority³⁶. On the other hand, it is also impossible a substance which is inferior to him to associate in his nature, because association in the nature means to have the same nature. In this case, the one will be superior and the other will be inferior³⁷. Therefore it is impossible that there exists another substance which associates with the proper nature of the Supreme Being³⁸. Consequently, the Supreme Being must be unique.

The identification of the Supreme Being with God begins with the argument that the Supreme Being is the source of all which exists and to him belongs all that exists, including divinity. If he gives divinity to another, he himself must have divinity, otherwise he will be inferior to the divinity³⁹. Only God has his divinity from himself. If the Supreme Substance has the divinity from himself, he must be identical with God. It is impossible that he gives the power of being God from himself to another. Therefore, the Supreme Substance, who is unique, is identical with God himself. There is no other God

³⁴ *De Trin.*, I,14: SC 63,88,897C: "Hoc autem in loco nunc illud summopere attendendum est quia, si substantia hoc ipsum quod summa potentia est, diversa aliqua substantia idipsum esse non potest".

³⁵ *De Trin.*, I,14: SC 63,88,897CD.

³⁶ *De Trin.*, I,14: SC 63,88,897D: "Ex his igitur aperte colligitur quod primordialis substantia non potest habere parem, sicuti ex superioribus patet non posse habere superiorem".

³⁷ *De Trin.*, I,15: SC 63,90,897D-898A.

³⁸ *De Trin.*, I,15: SC 63,90,898A: "Est ergo impossibile primordiale substantiam propriae naturae consortem habere".

³⁹ *De Trin.*, I,16: SC 63,90,898B.

except substantially one⁴⁰. Divinity is incommunicable; otherwise there would be another God, and consequently, he is not the only one God. Divinity can not be common to others, otherwise there would be a plurality of substances in one substance, that is impossible⁴¹. Regarding the meaning of substance, Richard reports that every substance has his own substantiality, the propriety of subsistence, by which he exists, for example the human being has his humanity as his substantiality. Substantiality can be generic, special or individual. Generic substantiality indicates what is common to various species, as corporeity is common to the human beings and to the animals. Special substantiality indicates what belongs to all entities in the same class, for example all human beings have humanity. Individual substantiality indicates the specific identity which is only in one entity and cannot exist in any other entity. For this variety of substantiality Richard proposes the example of "danielity" for the substantiality of Daniel. This danielity is absolutely incommunicable, and indicates precisely the person Daniel⁴². Divinity can indicate what is common to all the divine substances, but in the case of God, who is singular and exists from himself it indicates his singularity. Consequently, divinity is incommunicable, because it is impossible that "various substances are one, and one is various"⁴³.

The Supreme Being is superior to all others which exist. Consequently, he must be absolutely perfect, in order that his power and wisdom be absolutely unique and the same reality. There is no other thing that can be defined by the intelligence as greater and more perfect than he⁴⁴. He is

⁴⁰ *De Trin.*, I,16: SC 63,92,898C: "Hinc ergo colligitur quod vera divinitas est in unitate substantiae et vera substantiae unitas in ipsa divinitate. Non est itaque Deus nisi substantialiter unus".

⁴¹ *De Trin.*, I,17: SC 63,92,898D.

⁴² *De Trin.*, II,12: SC 63,128.130,907C-908B.

⁴³ *De Trin.*, II,12: SC 63,132,908BC: "Divinitas autem ipsa est idem ipsum per omnia quod divina substantia; idem, inquam, quod singularis illa substantia quae sola est et a semetipsa et a qua sola sunt cetera omnia. Tam igitur non potest ipsa divinitas communicabilis esse, quam non possunt diversae substantiae esse una et una diversae". Cfr. G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.132, footnote no 1.

⁴⁴ *De Trin.* I,18: SC 63,94.96,899BC: "Nihil itaque majus, nihil utique melius est in ejus nosse quam in ejus posse et eo ipso in ejus esse, quia non est aliud aliquid ejus posse quam ejus esse. ... Nihil ergo Deo majus, nihil utique melius vel ab ipso Deo potest definiri, vel per intelligentiam attingi".

absolutely perfect in his power⁴⁵ and consequently also perfect in his wisdom⁴⁶. This is the affirmation of faith, true divinity stays in the unity of substance and the unity of substance in true divinity⁴⁷. Now we will treat the attributes of God.

II. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

1. The Various Propriety of God

In demonstrating the existence of God as the Supreme Being, Richard emphasizes the excellent superiority of the Supreme Being to everything else which exists⁴⁸, because all beings receive the power of being (*posse esse*), all power, all essence and all wisdom from God. Therefore God is the Supreme

The same idea we can see in: S.ANSELMIUS CANTURIENSIS, *Monologium*, 16: PL 158,164-165; *Proslogion* 2-3: PL 158,227-228. St.Anselm called this idea as the basis of the ontological argument.

⁴⁵ *De Trin.*, I,21: SC 98.100,900C: "Hinc ergo absque dubio colligitur quod omnia potest quaecumque posse potentia est. Nam multa dicuntur posse, quae multo melius esset non potuisse quam posse: posse decrescere, posse deficere, posse destrui et in nihilum redigi, et quaelibet hujus modi, majus est omnino non posse quam posse. Magis enim sunt ista infirmitatis indicia quam majestatis insignia. Omnia itaque illa et sola utique illa potest, quae, uti jam diximus, posse potentia aliqua est. Et eo rectius atque verius eum omnipotentem esse dicimus, quo ejus potentiae omnia infirmitatis argumenta detrahimus". Such an argument we can see in: S.ANSELMIUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Proslogion*, 7: PL 158,230; HUGO DE S.VICTORE, *De Sacramentis*, I,2,22: PL 176,214,216; PETRUS ABAELARDUS, *Introductio ad theologiam* III,4: PL 178,1091-1093.

⁴⁶ *De Trin.*, I,22: SC 63,100,901A: "Notandum quod ex consideratione divinae sapientiae, plenitudo potentiae ipsius deprehenditur. Et rursus ex omnipotentiae consideratione, sapientiae plenitudo manifestatur atque convincitur".

⁴⁷ *De Trin.*, I,25: SC 63,104,902B: "Constat itaque quod credimus et quod superius jam diximus, quia vera divinitas manet in unitate substantiae, et substantiae unitas in vera divinitate".

⁴⁸ Cfr. C:OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S.Vittore*, p.508.

Essence (*summa essentia*) who has the supreme power and supreme wisdom⁴⁹, and he is the Supreme rational essence. He is the Supreme Substance who has power from himself and is the source of all existence. Nothing is superior to him and nothing that is inferior to him can associate with him. Therefore he is the unique Supreme Being. The Supreme Being as the only Supreme Power and Supreme essence must be a simple substance, because a composite substance needs another substance to be associated with him. It is clear that it is impossible for a being which is from himself. Therefore, he must be a simple substance⁵⁰.

Further, Richard elaborates the various divine attributes of God. God is uncreated (*increated*), because if he were created, his creator must exist, and consequently, he is not the Supreme Being, whereas he exists from himself and is eternal⁵¹.

God has no beginning and has no end, he is everlasting (*sempiternus*). Richard uses the same argument that God is truth. Because he is truth, and truth has no beginning and has no end, he is everlasting⁵². Richard also

⁴⁹ *De Trin.*, I,12: SC 63,84.86,896CD.

⁵⁰ *De Trin.* V,4: SC 63,308,951BC: "Videamus ergo si illud, quod veraciter deprehenditur a semetipso esse, possit habere compositum esse. Constat autem quia omnis compositio compositore eget. Et quod sine beneficio compositoris esse non valet procul dubio idipsum quod est a semetipso non habet. Patet ergo quia quod a semetipso est compositum esse habere non potest. Quod ergo omni origine et auctore caret summe simplex esse habere oportet."

⁵¹ *De Trin.* II,1: SC 63,110,901D-902C: "Qod autem Deus increatus sit, satis ex superioribus patet et nova expositione non indiget. Si enim creatus esset, creatorem haberet. Sed qui nonnisi a semetipso est creatorem habere non potest. Quid enim dicimus creatum, nisi de nihilo factum? De nihilo vero fieri non potuit qui nunquam nihil fuit, qui a semetipso et ab aeterno esse habuit".

⁵² *De Trin.* II,2: SC 63,112,902D-903A: "Ab aeterno verum fuit et in aeternum verum erit quod haec universitas esse potuit. Nam si esse non posset, omnino non esset. Veritas itaque ab aeterno fuit, ex qua verum fuit quod ab aeterno verum fuit; et veritas in aeternum erit, ex qua verum erit quod in aeternum verum erit. Si ergo ex veritate quae Deus est verum esse habuit quod semper verum fuit, quod semper verum erit, profecto veritas Deus sicut initio sic et fine carebit. Sempiternus itaque est Deus, sempiternum esse habens, utpote initio et fine carens".

The idea that verity is immutable and independent to time, present and transcendent to the human being, was preferred argument in the demonstration of the existence and the eternity of God in: S.AUGUSTINUS, *Confessio-*

affirms that God is eternal (*aeternus*)⁵³, and he explains that eternity is connected with the other attributes, namely unchangeable (*incommutabilis*), while everlasting indicates his independence from time⁵⁴. God is unchangeable, because every change makes the state better or inferior or the same state. It is impossible to add or to diminish anything to the Supreme Being, because an addition will increase him, but there is no other source from whom he can receive the addition if not from himself. If he has not had, he can not give. Consequently God can neither increase nor diminish. Instead, God cannot be changed from one state to another, because the change will give to the other what he has and receives from the other what he does not have. As mentioned above, both addition and decrease are impossible⁵⁵. Consequently, he is incorruptible and unchangeable⁵⁶. The incorruptibility, the unchangeability and the state of being uncreated and without beginning and end, affirm his eternity⁵⁷.

God has no beginning and no end, he is "infinite in time". At the same time, he is also infinite in his greatness (*magnitudo*), because his greatness, like the other attributes, is identical with his essence, which is infinite. In the same way he is immense (*immensus*), because whatever is infinite cannot be measured⁵⁸. Richard remarks that measurable greatness can be multiplied, two

nes, VII,10,16: PL 32,742; *De libero arbitrio*, I,2,12-13: PL 32,1259-1261; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, 134,6: PL 37,1743: "Est enim et vere et eo ipso quod vere est, sine initio et sine termino est"; *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum*, I,2,3: PL 42,604. S.ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologium*, 18: PL 158,168A: "Impossibile est vel cogitare quod veritas principium aut finem habeat"; *Dialogus de veritate*. I: PL 158,468C-469A; 10: PL 158,479AC; Cfr. G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.472; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.510.

⁵³ *De Trin.*, II,4: SC 63,114.116,903D; II,7: SC 63,120,904D-905A; II,9: SC 63,124,906C; II,11: SC 63,128,907AB.

⁵⁴ *De Trin.*, II,4: SC 63,116,903D: "Nam aliud videtur sonare aeternum, aliud autem sempiternum. Sempiternum namque esse videtur quod caret initio et fine; aeternum quod caret utroque et omni mutabilitate".

⁵⁵ *De Trin.*, I,4: SC 63, 112.114,903AC.

⁵⁶ *De Trin.* II,3: SC 63,114,903C: "Qui igitur deteriorari non potest est incorruptibilis; qui meliorari vel alio quolibet modo variari non potest omnino est incommutabilis. Vere itaque et absque ulla ambiguitate habet incommutabile esse".

⁵⁷ *De Trin.* II,5: SC 63,114.116,903D.

⁵⁸ *De Trin.*, II,5: SC 116.118,904AB.

times, three times, or even million times, consequently it will be greater. A being which has a measured greatness, has his greatness from participation and is not greatness itself. But, we have seen that God is the greatness itself, so he cannot have the measured greatness, so we proclaim "God is immense"⁵⁹.

If God is mighty, he is almighty, because if we can imagine the existence of a being which is greater than he, it is impossible also that there exists a being which is more powerful than he⁶⁰. He is almighty, not only in the sense that no other being has more power than he, but also in the sense that he has the fullness of power. His wisdom is supreme because he has the fullness of wisdom, the perfection of wisdom⁶¹. The omnipotence of God is also in relation to location. He is above, under and beyond all beings. As he is simple, he is everywhere; everywhere he presents eternally, he was in the past, he is now and he will be in the future, and cannot be excluded from any location⁶².

⁵⁹ *De Trin.*, II,10: SC 63,124.126,906CD. Richard cited the symbolum *Quicumque*. DS 75-76.

⁶⁰ *De Trin.*, I,21: SC 63, 98.100,900B-D.

⁶¹ *De Trin.*, I,22: SC 63,100,900D-901A.

⁶² *De Trin.*, II,23: SC 63,152,913D-914A: "Tenemus ex ante jam dictis quod Deus omnipotens sit et absque dubio omnia possit. Si ergo vere omnipotens est, consequenter et ubique potest. Si ubique potest, potentialiter et ubique est. Si ubique potentialiter, et ubique essentialiter. Neque enim est aliud ejus potentia atque aliud ejus essentia. Si autem essentialiter ubique est, ergo et ubi locus est, et ubi locus non est. Erit itaque et intra omnem locum, erit et extra omnem locum; erit supra omnia, erit infra omnia; intra omnia, extra omnia. Sed quoniam simplicis naturae est Deus, non erit hic et ibi per partes divisus, sed ubique totus. Erit itaque in quantulacumque cujuslibet parte totius totus et in toto totus et extra totum totus. Si igitur extra omnem locum est totus, in nullo loco concluditur. Si in omni loco est totus, a nullo loco secluditur; localiter igitur nusquam est, qui a nullo loco concludi, a nullo loco secludi potest". Cfr. *Adnotationes in Psalmos*, II : PL 196,270D; *De missione Spiritus sancti* : PL 196, 1019BD.

On the same argument, cfr: S.AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, V,1,2: PL 49,912; S.GREGORIUS MAGNUS, *Moralia*, IV,33,67: PL 75,674; II,12,20: PL 75,565; S.ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologium* 20-24: PL 158,169-178; *Proslogion* 19-21: PL 158, 237-238. About the immense of God, we can see in a writing attributed to Richard, but it is the writing of GAUTHIER OF ST.VICTOR, *De superexcellenti baptismo Christi*: PL 196,1013.

2. The Divine Attributes and the Uniqueness of God

Reporting the various attributes of God, Richard insists on his affirmation of the uniqueness of God⁶³. Here on the one hand Richard analyses the various attributes in order to arrive at a certain conclusion, on the other hand he searches for a conclusion considering the relation with the other attributes⁶⁴. Richard confirms that it is easy to be convinced that God is immense, uncreated, eternal etc., but it is difficult to be convinced that the existence of another immense, uncreated and eternal, except by faith, is impossible. But, all the divine attributes justify the existence of the unique God. Speaking of the omnipotence of God, Richard attests the uniqueness of Omnipotence, because if there were many Gods, all of them must be omnipotent. But he who is really omnipotent is capable to destroy the others, otherwise, he would not be really omnipotent, and this is impossible. Consequently, it is easy to think the existence of the unique God, the omnipotent⁶⁵. In the same way, we can understand the fact that God is immense. If there exist many beings which are immense, they will be immeasurable and incomprehensible to each other, and consequently they will be greater or inferior to each other. This is impossible, so the existence of many immenses beings is impossible⁶⁶. Further Richard proposes the identification between the immensity and the eternity of God. And as there is only one who is

⁶³ Cfr. C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.511-512.

⁶⁴ *De Trin.*, II,7: SC 120,905A: "Inter haec autem illud est maxime notandum et diligenti consideratione dignum, quod in his quae ratiocinando colligimus, quaedam ex inspecta illius rei de qua agitur proprietate elicimus, quaedam ex alterius rei considerata proprietate et mutua utriusque habitudine convincimus".

⁶⁵ *De Trin.*, I,25: SC 63,102.104,902B.

⁶⁶ *De Trin.*, II,6: SC 63,118,904CD: "Si ergo plures dicimus immensos, erit quilibet eorum cuilibet alteri incommensurabilis, erit quilibet eorum cuilibet alteri incomprehensibilis. Nullius itaque mensura ab altera cujuslibet alterius comprehenditur et consequenter unaquaeque quamlibet alteram supergreditur; erit ergo unaquaeque quavis altera major, erit et unaquaeque quavis altera minor. Quod si est impossibile, imo quia est impossibile, impossibile et erit plures immensos esse".

immense, Richard affirms that there is only one who is eternal⁶⁷. Richard relates eternity to the other attributes, which we will examine later.

God is uncreated and he is the only being which is uncreated, as he is the only one who is from himself⁶⁸. Another uncreated being, if it exists, is derived from God, because all the beings are originated from God, through participation to nature, or through gratuitous distribution⁶⁹. God is a substance, which is incorruptible, so participation in his nature is impossible, because participation in nature provokes the corruption of the divine nature. The existence of being through gratuitous distribution depends on God's will. If they exist, they cannot have the same matter as God, because God is incorruptible, consequently they have a created matter. So it is only God who is uncreated⁷⁰.

An uncreated being has no beginning and no end, he preceded all time. Consequently he is also unchangeable, as change begins and terminates in a certain time. If he is unchangeable, he has no beginning and no end, consequently, he is eternal. As we noticed, there is only one who is uncreated, consequently there is only one who is eternal⁷¹. There is only one who is uncreated, only one who is eternal, only one who is immense, and consequent-

⁶⁷ *De Trin.*, II,7: SC 63,120,904D-905A: "Jam ex superioribus agnovimus et pro certo habemus quod substantia divina non sit aliquid aliud quam immensitas sua, quam aeternitas ipsa. Unde et de immensitate et de aeternitate constat quod quaevis earum sit idem quod altera. Constat itaque quia qui aeternitatem habet, immensitatem utique non habere non valet. Sed si immensitate carere non potest qui est aeternus, erit procul dubio simul utrumque aeternus et immensus. Sicut ergo non possunt esse plures immensi, sic esse non poterunt plures aeterni". Cfr. II,10: SC 63,126,907A.

⁶⁸ *De Trin.*, II,8: SC 63,122,905D: "Constat itaque quod veraciter credimus, quod solus Deus sit increatus. Sicut ergo solus a semetipso, sic absque dubio et solus ab aeterno".

⁶⁹ *De Trin.*, II,8: SC 63, 120,905B: "Sed quidquid ab ipsa est seu etiam esse potest, aut est secundum operationem naturae, aut est secundum impartitionem gratiae".

⁷⁰ *De Trin.*, II,8: SC 63,122,905CD. Cfr. S.ANSELMI CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologium*, 7: PL 158,153-155. The identification of the "created nature" and the "nature which has a commencement", which Richard affirms here, is against the position of some authors, who influenced by platonism confirm the existence of an eternal matter. Cfr. G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.473; M.D.CHENU, *La théologie*, pp.108-135.

⁷¹ *De Trin.*, II,9: SC 63,122.124,906AC.

ly, there is only one God⁷².

As mentioned above, divinity is incommunicable. With the same argument, Richard confirms the incommunicability of the divine attributes, because if his substantiality cannot be communicated, his immensity and his eternity also are incommunicable; there is only one who is immense, uncreated, eternal, that is the only one God⁷³.

It is easy to understand the incommunicability of the divine attributes, as uncreated, immense, and eternal. But for simple people it remains a problem how the power and the wisdom of God can be incommunicable, if they are other substances who have power and wisdom⁷⁴. Richard proposes the Aristotelian argument on the equivocal meaning⁷⁵ of the term "power" and "wisdom", related to God and to the human being. Concerning God we say, "He is Wisdom", and about a human being we say "he has wisdom". So, it is only God who is wisdom, and this is incommunicable. The same way we can say about "power", God is Power, and the human being has power, therefore, the powerfulness of God is incommunicable⁷⁶.

⁷² *De Trin.*, II,14: SC 63,136,909C: "Unus increatus, unus aeternus, unus immensus, quorum singula probant atque convincunt quod non sit Deus nisi unus".

⁷³ *De Trin.* II,11: SC 126,128,907AB.

⁷⁴ *De Trin.* II,11: SC 63,128,907BC.

⁷⁵ Cfr. G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.134-135, footnote no. 2.

⁷⁶ *De Trin.*, II,13: SC 63, 132,134,908D-909B. On the equivocal meaning of the term applied to God and to human being, Cfr: S.ANSELMI CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologium*, 16: PL 158,165A: "Quoniam enim homo non potest esse justitia, justitiam autem habere potest, non intelligitur justus, homo existens justitia, sed habens justitiam".

Régnon notes that the use of the equivocal word is the defect of Richard, and makes a confusion in understanding the opinion of Richard. His disciple, Alexander Hales indicates: "*Ens ab alio non dicitur univoce de homine et Filio Dei. Quia in quantum dicitur de de Filio Dei, haec praepositio ab non dicit causalitatem, sed naturae ordine; in quantum de homine dicitur, causalitatem notat*": *Summa Theologica*, I, part q.60, membr. 3 art. 1; TH DE RÉGNON, *Etudes de Théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité*, Paris 1892, II, p.279.

3. *Summum Bonum*

After reporting that the divine attributes confirm the uniqueness of God, Richard proposes to examine the profession of faith which says that there is only one Lord⁷⁷. Only the being, whose liberty is not under any power, whose power is limitless, and whose will is not under any will, is worthy to be called "Lord". If many Lords exist it will happen that the one will serve or attack the other. It is clear that a being which serves another being cannot be called "Lord". Consequently, if we say that there exist many Lords which have the same power, some of them will not be a real Lord. Referring to his reflection of the omnipotence, one must be convinced that there is only one Lord⁷⁸.

The reflection on God's omnipotence arrives at a conclusion of the perfection of God. The being which is omnipotent cannot have any imperfection. He must have all perfection. Consequently he must be the Supreme Good (*Summum bonum*), who cannot have anyone who is superior to him in goodness, and receive any goodness from the being who is inferior to him. All goodness is his own, because all is in him and he is the goodness from himself. Consequently he must have his own happiness, and all happiness is his own. In other words, he is Supreme Happiness (*Summa felicitas*). As happiness is the fullness and the perfection of all goods, the Supreme Being is fully perfect without any defect⁷⁹.

⁷⁷ *De Trin.*, II,15: SC 63, 136,909D: "Nunc illud quaeramus utrum, juxta quotidianam confessionem, non possit esse Dominus nisi unus solus". Richard refers the symbol of *Quicumque*. DS 75-76. The use of "Lord" for God, Cfr: S.AUGUSTINUS, *De Genesi ad litteram*, VIII,11,24: PL 34,382.

⁷⁸ *De Trin.*, II,15: SC 63,136.138,909D-910A.

⁷⁹ *De Trin.*, II,16: SC 63,138.140,910BC: "Constat itaque de omnipotente quod ipse sit summum bonum et, quod consequens est, quod ipse sit sibi suum bonum. Sicut enim superiorem habere non valet qui supremum locum tenet, sic omnium summus de suo inferiori bonus fieri vel beari non valet. Quomodo autem aliunde bonus vel beatus fieri posset, qui a semetipso habet totum quod habet? Est itaque de semetipso bonus, est et de semetipso beatus. Ipse ergo sua, ipse summa bonitas; ipse sua, ipse summa felicitas. Constat itaque quod dictum est, quod ipse sit summum bonum et quod ipsum sit universaliter perfectum. Quid enim est beatitudo, nisi bonorum omnium plenitudo atque perfectio? Constat itaque quia bono illi summo universaliterque perfecto nihil omnino desit cujus adjectione meliorari possit". It seems that on the concept of happiness, Richard was influenced by Boethius; Cfr. BOETHIUS, *De Consolatione philosophiae*, 1.3, prosa 2: PL 63,724; G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.140, footnote no 1.

The nature of the Supreme Good must be simple. A composite nature is divisible and changeable, indeed can be neither eternal nor truly happy. As the Supreme Good is absolutely perfect, he cannot have any defect. Therefore, his happiness must be eternal and unchangeable, and consequently he is Supreme Simplicity⁸⁰.

Referring to the fact that the divine substance is identical with power and wisdom, Richard concludes that power and wisdom are identical with each other. In the same way in the divine substance, immensity and eternity are identical. Consequently, as in the case of the other divine proprieties, goodness and happiness must be united with each other. Consequently all which exists in the Supreme Good and true divinity are substantially and sovereignly united⁸¹. The unity of the goods which are in God is superior to the conformity of many proprieties in one created nature and to the simplicity of a created nature composed of many forms. The simplicity of God is infinite and unchangeable, consequently it is incomprehensible and incomparable⁸². Because of his superiority, we can call him not substance, but supersubstantial

⁸⁰ *De Trin.*, II,17: SC 63,140,910D: "Sed quod ex pluribus compositum est naturaliter et divisibile est; et quod naturaliter est divisibile naturaliter est et commutabile; et ubi est commutabilitas, non potest esse aeternitas et sic nec vera felicitas. Sed in bono quod universaliter perfectum est, nihil horum deesse potest. Nam, ut de ceteris taceam, ex solius omnipotentiae consideratione convincitur nihil perfectionis, et, quod consequens est, nihil horum ibi deesse potuisse. Constat itaque quia in illa aeterna felicitate et vere felici aeternitate sit vera incommutabilitas et consequenter vera et summa simplicitas".

The same argument we can see also in St. Anselm. After referring all the divine attributes which indicate the perfection of God, St. Anselm concludes: "Cum igitur illa natura nullo modo composita sit et tamen omni modo tot illa bona sit, necesse est ut illa omnia non plura sed unum sint. Idem igitur est quodlibet unum illorum quod omnia, sive simul, sive singula": *Monologium*, 16-17: PL 158,165-166. Cfr. *Proslogion*, 22: PL 158,238; G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, pp.140-141, footnote no 2.

⁸¹ *De Trin.*, II, 18: SC 63,142,911AC.

⁸² *De Trin.*, II,20: SC 146,912B: "Nihilominus et longe est supra unitatem illam quae est ex collectione multarum proprietatum in unam formam. Incomparabiliter autem et incomprehensibiliter supra huiusmodi omnes constat hanc fore, quae in infinitatis identitate habet summe simplex et incommutabile esse". Cfr. C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.513.

Essence⁸³.

As He has absolute perfection, it excludes the existence of another Supreme Good. If another Supreme Good exists, it must have the same perfection and fullness as God himself and both must have no difference. If there is no difference, that means that there is no plurality. The Supreme perfection must be sufficient for all, otherwise he is not absolutely perfect. If one Supreme Good is sufficient, the other will be superfluous. The being which is superfluous is useless, and cannot be said that he is good⁸⁴. Consequently, the Supreme good, who has all the perfection is not only supreme one, but supremely unique. Because God is the Supreme Good, he must be unique⁸⁵.

⁸³ *De Trin.*, II,22: SC 63,150,913C: "Sed quia contra substantiarum naturam nihil ei velut in subjecto inhaerere deprehenditur, non tam substantia quam supersubstantialis essentia esse convincitur". Cfr. S.AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 7,4,9; 7,5,10: PL 42,941-943; BOETHIUS, *Quomodo Trinitas*, 4: PL 64,1252; S.ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologium*, 26,27: PL 158,179-180; G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.150-151, footnote no.2.

⁸⁴ *De Trin.*, II,19: SC 63,144.146,911CD.912A: "Esse itaque oportet summe bonum, summe unum; et non solum summe unum, sed et unice summum. Non enim possunt esse duo summa bona, sicut nec duo universaliter perfecta. Nam, si duo aequae perfecta esse concedimus, oportet ut et consequenter concedamus quoniam quidquid plenitudinis, quidquid perfectionis est in uno, totum juxta eundem modum atque mensuram erit et in altero. ... Nam si Deus veraciter est summum bonum, quam non potest esse summum bonum nisi unum, tam veraciter constat quod credimus, non posse esse nisi unum Deum.

Est itaque in illa vera et summa felicitate et vere et summe felici divinitate, est, inquam, summa et substantialis unitas et in ipsa unitate vera et summa simplicitas, ubi, ut superius probatum est, idem ipsum est totum quod est".

St.Anselm uses the same argument in his controversy against the tritheistic idea of Roscelin; See: S.ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *De fide Trinitate*, 3: PL 158,271. But it seems that Richard makes an allusion to Abaelard; Cfr. PETRUS ABAELARDUS, *Theologia christiana* 5: PL 178,1319. G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.144-145, footnote no 1.

⁸⁵ *De Trin.*, II,19: SC 144.146,911D-912A: "Bonum igitur illud universaliter perfectum erit, ut dictum est, non solum summe unum sed et unice summum. ... Nam si Deus veraciter est summum bonum, quam non potest esse summum bonum nisi unum, tam veraciter constat quod credimus, non posse esse nisi unum Deum".

CHAPTER III:

GOD AS SUPREME LOVE AND THE TRINITY



I. THE DOCTRINE OF LOVE

1. Two Ways to Understand the Concept of Love

The conviction that the human being was created in the image of God makes Richard, like St. Augustine, seek to understand the mystery of God, especially the mystery of Trinity, by exploring the mystery of the human being. Indeed, there is a difference between the development of the psychological theory in St. Augustine and in Richard. While St. Augustine, seeks to understand the mystery of Trinity in many different faculties of the human being, Richard searches for the explanation in the perfection of love. His speculation on the trinity is based on his speculation on divine love, whose image is the human love¹. Therefore, before entering into speculation on the mystery of the Trinity, let us examine Richard's understanding on the concept of love.

Studying the understanding of love in medieval thought, Rousselot² distinguishes two different ways to understand love, namely, the physical concept and the ecstatic concept. Here "physical" is not meant as corporal but natural, so the physical concept regards love in its natures, as a desire of a human being. In other hand, the term "ecstatic", must be understood in the sense of "out of himself", so that the ecstatic concept of love regards love as an action towards another person. It is clear that this distinction is not an absolute division, because sometimes in the same author we can see both concepts as in Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bernard, but this division helps us to understand better the tendency of the author.

The physical concept of love was developed by Hugh of St. Victor in his *De Sacramentis*, St. Bernard in his *De Diligendo Deo*, which has its basis in the Neoplatonic theory of Pseudo-Dionysius, and was systematized by St. Tho-

¹ Cfr. TH. DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, pp.201-201. Th. de Régnon divides the speculation of Richard on two parts, namely the *théorie psychologique* in which Richard treats on the plurality of God based on the concept of love; and *théorie métaphysique*, in which Richard treats to explain the mystery using the speculation of reason. Nevertheless, in my opinion, it seems that it is better to regard Richard's speculation as an integral work, therefore, his theory on love is more a speculation on the concept of love.

² P. ROUSSELOT, *Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour au Moyen-Âge*, in: *BGPTMA*, VI, 6, 1908, p.3-4.

mas with the influence of the Aristotelian philosophy. In this concept of love, a real or possible love is based on the necessary tendency of the being to search for his proper goodness³. St.Thomas says that the human being can love God more than himself because the human being sees in God a goodness which is more excellent than himself, as his being is an imitation of God's being, and a gift from the kindness of God, consequently, the human being loves the more excellent goodness for the goodness of himself⁴. Indeed love of God and love of himself have an identical basis, as a double expression of the same nature, and the unity is the reason of being, measure and the ideal of love. There is a perfect continuity between love of concupiscence and love of friendship. Love of friendship is a love of benevolence, something held in command and based on the mutual regard of its participants; love of concupiscence seeks pleasure and self gratification. Nevertheless, both have the same root, in searching its proper goodness, although they are different in their perfection⁵.

The ecstatic concept of love has a tendency to liberate love of others from egoistic attachment, and regards the perfection of love as being outside oneself. Perfect love is extremely violent and free. It is free because it has its reason in itself, and is independent from natural desire, but it is violent because it counters and tyrannizes natural desire, toward an absorption of the subject in the object of love. Such an idea was common in the school of St.Victor and the school of Abelard. Further, Rousselot names four characteristics of love according to this concept, namely: duality, violence, irrationality and love as the final aim⁶. In opposition to the physical concept, the ecstatic concept affirms that the nature and the perfection of love are its duality, between the loving (*amans*) and the loved (*amatus*). The nature of love needs that it happens at least in two persons, and love of self cannot be a perfect

³ Cfr. The definition of love according St. Thomas: "Ex hoc ... aliquid dicitur amari quod appetitus amantis se habet ad illud sicut ad suum bonum. Ipsa igitur habitudo vel coaptatio appetitus ad aliquid velut ad suum bonum amor vocatur ... Unumquodque amamus inquantum est bonum nostrum"; In *Div.Nom*, c.4.1.9: in : FRETTE, t.xxix, pp.451-452. P.ROUSSELOT, *Pour l'histoire*, cit., p.4.

⁴ S.THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones quodlibetales*, 5, q.3, a.2.

⁵ Cfr. S.THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa Theologiae*, I^a II^ae q. 31, art.3; q.27, art.2; q.26, art.4; II^a II^ae q. 26, art.4.

⁶ P.ROUSSELOT, *Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour*, pp.56-87.

love⁷. Love is violent, because it acts in a person and changes him⁸. Love is irrational because it is unreasonable, imprudent, precipitous and disorderly in choosing the medium of love. It does not regard nature and difference between beings⁹. And finally, as love has a reason in itself, it has its goal in itself; "I love because I love, I love in order that I love"¹⁰. Regarding this conception of love, Th.de Régnon affirms that in this conception love is personal, that is, the object of love is a person. In paternal love, for example, the father loves his son in spite of his defects. Like in fraternal love, the subject and the object of paternal love are persons¹¹.

2. Richard's Concept of Love

Richard dedicates two treatises to reflection upon the mystery of love, namely, *De gradibus charitatis* and *De quatuor gradibus violentae charitatis*. Richard names four characteristics of love, namely: insuperability (*insuperabilitas*), because nothing can beat true love, neither the hatred nor the death,

⁷ Cfr: S.GREGORIUS MAGNUS, *XL homiliarum in Evangelium libri duo*, XVII,1: PL 76,1139: "Minus quam inter duos caritas haberi non potest. Nemo enim proprie ad semetipsum habere caritatem dicitur, sed dilectio in alterum tendit ut caritas esse possit"; S.HILDEFONSE, *De itinere deserti*, c.90: PL 96,192.

⁸ Cfr.S.AUGUSTINUS, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, 121: PL 37,1628: "Et quia ipsa caritas occidit quod fuimus, ut simus quod non eramus, facit in nobis quandam mortem dilectio"; S.BERNARDUS, *Sermones in Cantica*, 24: PL 184,127; 30,2: PL 184,155-156;

⁹ Cfr. S.BERNARDUS, *Sermones in Cantica canticorum*, 79,1: PL 183,1163: "Confundis ordines dissimulas usum, modum ignoras: totum quod opportunitatis, quod rationis, quod pudoris, quod consilii iudiciive esse videtur, triumphas in temet ipso et redigis captivitatem"; 9,2: PL 183, 815; *De Gradibus humilitatis et superbia*, 14: PL 182: "Amor vero, sicut nec odium veritatis iudicium nescit".

¹⁰ S.BERNARDUS, *Sermones in Cantica canticorum*, 83,4: PL 183,1183:" Is per se sufficit, is per se placet, et propter se. Ipse meritum, ipse praemium est sibi: Amor praeter se non requirit causam, non fructum. Fructus eius, usus eius. Amo, quia amo; amo, ut amem"; *De Diligendo Deo*, 7,17: PL 182,984; HUGO DE S.VICTORE, *De Laude caritatis*, : PL 176,973.

¹¹ TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.297.

and has made God humiliate himself by becoming a human being¹²; insatiability (*insatiabilitas*), in the sense that the joy of love can not be restrained¹³; incessantness (*incessabilitas*) in the sense that love always searches a relation with the loved¹⁴; and inseparability (*inseparabilitas*) in the sense that the loving (*amans*) and the loved (*amatus*) subsists in unity¹⁵.

Further, in Richard's concept, love has different degrees as has contemplation¹⁶. In his *De Quatuor Gradibus violentae Charitatis*, departing from the duality of persons he demonstrates the degree of love, which each degree marks, the absorption and transformation of both persons, the subject and the object of love¹⁷. Richard names four degrees of love, that are: love which injures (*vulnerans*); binds (*ligans*); languishes (*languens*); and conducts to defect (*in defectum adducens*). In the first degree love injures (*vulnerans*), when the fire of love penetrates from the very marrow the human spirit and pierces through his will so that he cannot repress or conceal his desire¹⁸.

¹² *De Gradibus charitatis*, I: PL 196,1196AB: "O insuperabilis virtus charitas, quae ipsum quoque insuperabilem superasti, et cui omnia subjecta sunt omnibus quodammodo subiecisti, dum victus amore Deus humiliavit semetipsum formam servi accipiens, factus non modo homo, sed approbrium hominem et objectio plebis".

¹³ *De Gradibus charitatis*, II: PL 196,1199C: "Amoris tamen violentia nulla impossibilitate frenatur. Nam etsi animam terrena inhabitatione pressam et immersam luto, illa felicitate ex integro frui omnino omni homini constet impossibile, nullum tamen sic amanti haec impossibilitas praebet solatium, ...".

¹⁴ *De Gradibus charitatis*, III: PL 196,1203A: "Amor enim vehemens, ut ait beatus Augustinus, non potest non videre quem amat, quia amor oculus est, et amare videre est".

¹⁵ *De Gradibus charitatis*, IV: PL 196,1205C: "Validum profecto vinculum cui nulla praevalet violentia, inseparabiliter continens amantem pariter cum amato".

¹⁶ A.M.ETHIER, *Le De "Trinitate"*, p.88. On the topic see the study of J.CHATILLON, *Les degres de la contemplation de l'amour dans l'oeuvre de Richard de Saint-Victor*, Unpublished doctoral diss., Faculté de théologie de Institut Catholique de Toulouse 1939; The parts of the dissertation are published in the following: *Les quatre degrés de la charité d'après Richard de Saint Victor*, in: RAM, 20(1939), 237-264; *Les trois modes de la contemplation selon Richard de Saint Victor*, in: BLE, 41(1940), 3-26.

¹⁷ Cfr. J.CHATILLON, *Les quatre degrés de la charité d'après Richard de Saint-Victor*, in: RAM, 20(1939), p.239-240.

¹⁸ *De IV Gradibus*. PL 196,1209 BC: "Sed ecce ad illum amoris gradum redimus quem primo loco posuimus et vulnerantem jam diximus. Nonne tibi corde percussus videtur, quando igneus ille amoris aculeus mentem hominis

Here Richard affirms the invincibility of love; nothing can resist love¹⁹. In the second degree, love binds (*ligans*) when in every moment of life the loved object is always present in the thinking of the lover²⁰. Here, the absorption of the subject to the object of love is more complete. Love is not only invincible, but inseparable and eternal²¹. Nevertheless, in this degree, love is not exclusive, because love does not tyrannize the soul, there is a possibility of the existence of another affection²². In the third degree, love languishes (*languens*) when it comes to be exclusive and does not allow any other affection; only one being is loved, desired, sought²³. Indeed, here, love is not only invincible and inseparable, but becomes singular²⁴. In the last degree, love cannot be satiated, the fervour of love becomes greater and greater, and

medullitus penetrat, affectumque transverberat interim, ut desiderii sui aestus cohibere vel dissimulare omnino non valeat?"

¹⁹ *De IV Gradibus*, : PL 196,1213: "Primus ergo violentiae gradus est quando mens desiderio suo resistere non potest"; Cfr: 1213D: "In primo itaque gradu amor est insuperabilis".

²⁰ *De IV Gradibus*, : PL 196,1209: "Animus ligatus est, quando hoc unum oblivisci, aut aliud meditari non potest: Quidquid agat, quidquid dicat hoc semper mente revolvitur perennique memoria retinetur hoc; dormiens somniat, hoc vigilans omni hora retractat".

²¹ *De IV Gradibus*, : PL 196,1214D: "Multo prestiosior ille secundus, quando ardens affectus incipit esse inseparabilis".

²² *De IV Gradibus*, : PL 196,1210D: "Sed aliud est esse summum, atque aliud est esse solum; sicut et aliud est semper praesentem esse, et aliud consortem omnino non admittere. Possumus enim et praesentes esse et multos socios habere, et prae omnibus quidem superiorem locum tenere".

²³ *De IV Gradibus*, : PL 196,1211AB: "Ad tertium itaque jam violentiae gradum amor ascendit, quando omnem alium affectum excludit, quando nihil praeter unum vel propter unum diligit. In hoc itaque tertio violentiae charitatis gradu nil omnino satisfacere potest praeter unum, sicut et nihil sapere nisi propter unum. Unum amat, unum diligit, unum concupiscit. Ad ipsum anhelat, in ipsum suspirat, ex ipso inardescit, in ipso requiescit. Solum est in quo reficitur, solum ex quo satiatur. Nil dulcescit, nihil sapit nisi hoc uno condiatur. Quidquid ultro se offerat, quidquid sponte occurrat, cito rejicitur, subito conculcatur quod suo affectui non militat, vel ejusmodi desiderio non deserviat".

²⁴ J.CHATILLON notes that here there is a difference conception between Richard and St.Bernard. In St.Bernard, in the degree of *languens*, love has not been exclusive, and the soul who loves remains separated from the object of his love; *Les Quatres degrees*, p.249.

On St.Bernard, cfr: É.GILSON, *La Théologie mystique de S.Bernard*, p.127, n.3.

nothing can satisfy it²⁵.

Richard affirms that this degree of love is valid both for human love and for divine love. Nevertheless, the value of each degree differs from one to the other. In human love, the first degree is good and the last is worse, but in the divine love, the fourth degree is the most perfect degree when the human being who cannot be satiated by his love of God, always searches for the perfection of his love of God, absorbing himself in unity with God. It is clear, that the idea of Richard which connects love of God with contemplation, the perfect love of God affirms also perfect contemplation²⁶.

Situated in the two traditions of the concept of love, Richard affirms that the spiritual life cannot be found in the natural love which will become charity, but there is no continuation between the natural love, that is, the egoistic love, and charity²⁷. Indeed, Richard's concept of love tends to the ecstatic concept. For him, the essential element of true charity is not only to love the other as oneself and to be loved as one loves another, but also in the desire that the other will be loved totally and the person who is loved will share in the joy of the lovers. Without sharing in delight, there is no perfect charity²⁸.

²⁵ *De IV Gradibus*, : PL 196,1212C: "Quartus itaque violentae charitatis gradus est, quando aestuantis animi desiderio jam omnino nihil satisfacere potest. Hic gradus, quia humanae possibilitatis metas semel excessit, crescendo, ut caeteri, terminum nescit, quia semper invenit quod adhuc concupiscere possit".

²⁶ Cfr. *De IV Gradibus*, :PL 196,1214D; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.501.

²⁷ *De Trin.*, III,2: SC 63,168.170,917A: "Quamdiu autem quis nullum alium quantum seipsum diligit, ille quem erga se habet privatus amor convincit quod summum caritatis gradum necdum apprehendit". Cfr. A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le De Trinitate*, pp.88-89; M.J.GÉLOT, *Les doctrines psychologique de Richard de Saint-Victor sur la procession du Saint-Esprit et leur influence sur Saint Bonaventure dans son Commentaire sur le Livre des Sentences*, Pars Diss. Angelicum, Tunis 1938, p.20; P.ROUSSELOT, *Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour*, p.63.

²⁸ Cfr. G.DUMEIGE, *Richard de Saint Victor et l'idée chrétienne de l'amour*, Paris 1952, p.88.

II. LOVE IN THE TRINITY

1. The Attribute of God as Supreme Love Affirms the Plurality in God

In the end of the second book, Richard affirms that God is the Supreme Good (*Summum Bonum*), even the unique Supreme Good, who has all perfection. Referring to this attribute, Richard concludes that God must have a perfection of all goodness, indeed he must have a perfection of charity, the perfection of love; in other word, he must be the supreme Love²⁹. As he affirms the inferiority of egoistic love to love of friendship, he affirms the impossibility of egoistic love in God. Certainly, love of God must be a fraternal love. Consequently, the fact that God is a supreme love demands plurality in God, otherwise he would not have the perfection of love, because the perfection of love can only happen in at least two persons³⁰.

Mentioning the plurality of the persons of God based on the fact that he has the supreme charity, Richard proposes the analysis of three arguments which confirms his thesis, that is the perfection of goodness, the perfection of happiness and the perfection of glory³¹. The analyses of these three perfections demand plurality in God.

Referring to the perfection of goodness, Richard affirms the fullness of charity in God, that is the fullness of a fraternal love, because there is nothing better and more perfect than charity. The problem is to whom the love of God must be directed, if the love to himself is not a perfection of love. Abelard, who defends also the ecstatic concept of love, proposes the idea of the necessity of creation in order that God can express his love to his

²⁹ *De Trin.* III,2: SC 63,168,916CD: "Didicimus ex superioribus quod in illo summo bono univeraliterque perfecto sit totius bonitatis plenitudo atque perfectio. Ubi autem totius bonitatis plenitudo est, vera et summa caritas deesse non potest. Nihil enim caritate melius, nihil caritate perfectius".

³⁰ *De Trin.* III,2: SC 63,168,916D: "Nullus autem pro privato et proprio sui ipsius amore dicitur proprie caritatem habere. Oportet itaque ut amor in alterum tendat, ut caritas esse queat. Ubi ergo pluralitas personarum deest, caritas omnino esse non potest".

³¹ Cfr. C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, pp.514-515; TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, pp.315-317; G.DUMEIGE, *Richard de Saint Victor*, pp.82-85.

creation³². Richard refuses this argument by introducing the idea of the well-ordered love (*caritas ordinata*) or the righteous love (*amor discretus*)³³. In Richard's doctrine *discretio* is an important point in the moral and spiritual life of the human being, that is, the faculty of discerning and arbitrating, ordaining and moderating, which is in the interior of all virtues and illuminates love, indeed has an important role in the mysticism³⁴. The doctrine of well-ordered love and its equivalent, righteous love, affirms the necessity of supreme charity to love the other supreme lovable. Richard affirms that love toward someone who is not of the same dignity is not well-ordered, indeed, love of God toward his creation is not well-ordered. Consequently, it is impossible that the perfection of divine love is in his love toward his creation, because it is impossible that supreme love be not well-ordered love. A divine person cannot have a supreme love toward a person who is not worthy of supreme love³⁵.

Richard confirms his position by presenting the argument of the intensity of love. Supreme charity, in order to be supreme, must have an intensity of which nothing can be more intense, with the quality which nothing can be better³⁶. F.Guimet³⁷ notes that Richard uses the traditional metaphor, in God the ardour of love is as the ardour of fire. In God, love arrives at the

³² Cfr. P.ABELARDUS, *Introductio ad Theologiam*, I,II,17: PL 178,1084; *Theologia Christiana*, IV: PL 178,1129-1131.

³³ On this topic see: F.GUIMET, *Notes en marge d'un texte de Richard de Saint-Victor*, in: AHLDMA, XIV, 361-394; "*Caritas ordinata et amor discretus*" dans la théologie trinitaire de Richard de Saint-Victor, in: RMAL, 4(1948), pp.225-236; G.DUMEIGE, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.83.

³⁴ Cfr. *Benjamin Minor*, 56-70: PL 196,47-51; G.DUMEIGE, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.62 sq; G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.481.

³⁵ *De Trin.* III,2: SC 63,168,916D-917A: "Sed summam certe caritatem erga creatam personam habere non posset. Inordinata enim caritas esset si summe diligeret qui summe diligendus non esset. Est autem impossibile in illa summe sapienti bonitate caritatem inordinatam esse. Persona igitur divina summam caritatem habere non potuit erga personam quae summa dilectione digna non fuit".

³⁶ *De Trin.*, III,2: SC 63,168,917A: "Ut autem caritas summa et summe perfecta sit, oportet ut sit tanta qua non possit esse major, oportet ut sit talis qua non possit esse melior"; III,11: SC 63,190,922C.

³⁷ F.GUIMET, *Caritas ordinata*, p.230.

infinite degree because of its nature. Indeed, in God, the intensity of love is supreme as the burning fire. The expression of this burning love must be in the rule of discernment and wisdom in order that the supreme being can express his supreme love. Richard proposes the concept of righteous love (*amor discretus*). In this concept, the expression of love must be in the discernment, and in God, the object of his supreme love must be a supremely lovable being³⁸. Indeed, in this conception, the perfection of love is measured by the perfection of the object of love. Consequently, supreme love must have an other person who has the same dignity as the lover. The perfection of supreme love is only if he expresses his love toward a person who has the possibility of responding to his love with the same intensity. The consequence for the reflection on the mystery of God is that there must be a plurality in God, in order that he, the Supreme Love, can express his love totally to the other person, and he can be loved totally. Indeed, the fullness of charity in God can be understood only in the plurality of the persons of God³⁹.

The analysis of the attribute of God as perfection happiness (*summa felicitas*) affirms the same position. If God has the perfection of goodness, he must have the perfection of happiness. Experience reveals that there is no happiness if there is no delight, indeed supreme happiness includes in himself the supreme love⁴⁰. Here Richard returns to the argument of the perfection of love in mutual love. The perfection of love, as noted by G.Dumeige⁴¹, does

³⁸ *De Trin.*, III,7: SC 63,180,919D: "Discretus vero amor non est ubi summe diligitur, qui summe diligendus non est".

³⁹ *De Trin.* III,2: SC 63,170,917B: "Vide ergo quam de facili ratio convincit quod in vera divinitate pluralitas personarum deesse non possit. Certe solus Deus summe bonus est. Solus ergo Deus summe diligendus est. Summam ergo dilectionem divina persona exhibere non posset personae quae divinitate careret. Plenitudo autem divinitatis non potuit esse sine plenitudine bonitatis. Bonitatis vero plenitudo non potuit esse sine caritatis plenitudine; nec caritatis plenitudo sine divinarum personarum pluralitate".

⁴⁰ *De Trin.*, III,3: SC 63,170.172,917C: "Conscientiam suam unusquisque interroget et procul dubio et absque contradictione inveniet quia, sicut nihil caritate melius, sic nihil caritate jucundius. Hoc nos docet ipsa natura, idem ipsum multiplex experientia. Sicut igitur in plenitudine verae bonitatis non potest id deesse quo nihil est melius, sic in plenitudine summae felicitatis deesse non potest id quod nihil est jucundius. Necesse est itaque in summa felicitate caritatem non deesse".

⁴¹ G.DUMEIGE, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.84.

not exclude the subjectivity of love, that the measure of love is the joy which the lover receives from loving. Love is a source of happiness because of its reciprocal character, the lover wants to be loved by the being loved; indeed love is reciprocal, giving and receiving; one gives gratuitously, the other receives with the obligation to respond with the same love. This must be present in the supreme divine happiness. Indeed, in divinity there must be a plurality, in order that he have a supreme happiness⁴².

The third argument is based on the fullness of glory (*plenitudo gloriae*)⁴³. In this argumentation, it seems that Richard opposes ecstatic love to egoistic love, with the affirmation of the superiority of the ecstatic love⁴⁴. He proposes the question of the famous dilemma of the communication of the glory of God; if another God does not exist, to whom he can communicate his riches and fullness of glory? There are two possible answers, he wants to communicate his fullness but he cannot, or he can but he does not want to. Richard excludes both possibilities. If God wants to communicate his fullness but he cannot, consequently, he would not be omnipotent. If he can communicate his fullness, but he does not want to, consequently he would not be charitable⁴⁵. Mentioning the perfection of joy in love, Richard affirms that

⁴² *De Trin.*, III,3: SC 63,172,917D-918A: "Non potest ergo esse amor jucundus si non sit et mutuus. In illa igitur vera et summa felicitate, sicut nec amor jucundus, sic nec amor mutuus potest deesse. In amore autem mutuo oportet omnino ut sit et qui amorem impendat et qui amorem rependat. Alter itaque erit amorem impendens et alter amorem rependens. Ubi autem unus et alter esse convincitur, vera pluralitas deprehenditur. In illa itaque verae felicitatis plenitudine pluralitas personarum non potest deesse. Constat autem quia nihil aliud est summa felicitas quam ipsa divinitas. Gratuiti ergo amoris exhibitio et debiti amoris recompensatio indubitanter convincit quod in vera divinitate personarum pluralitas deesse non possit".

⁴³ On the meaning of "glory", G.Salet notes: "Cette notion de 'gloire' est éminemment religieuse. La récitation de l'office aux différentes heures du jour la rendait familière aux auditeurs de Richard. A se borner aux termes qu'il emploie, il faut voir en elle la bienveillance divine communiquant sa plénitude, la libéralité dont l'effusion donne sa perfection dernière à l'amour, en même temps qu'elle provoque la louange"; *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.176, footnote no.1; Cfr. G.DUMEIGE, *Richard de Saint Victor*, pp.84-85.

⁴⁴ M.J.GELOT, *Les Doctrines psychologiques*, pp.21-22.

⁴⁵ *De Trin.*, III,4: SC 63,174,918AB: "Certe, si dixerimus in illa vera divinitate esse solam personam unam, quemadmodum solam unam substantiam, juxta hoc procul dubio non habebit cui communicare possit infinitam illam plenitudinis suae abundantiam. Sed, quaeso, ut quid hoc? An quia communicantem habere non possit cum velit? An quia habere nolit cum

the communication of the fullness of glory is essential, consequently, it is necessary that there exists another person to whom God can communicate his fullness of glory. Referring the possibility of the communication of God's fullness of glory to the angels and to creatures, it seems that Richard uses the same argument as when he treats the perfection of charity, namely, discernment. The communication of the glory to the angels and to creatures is not well-ordered. Consequently, refusing the possibility of communicating his fullness of glory to himself and to the angels and to creatures, Richard suggests the necessity of the existence of an associate of glory in God⁴⁶.

Richard concludes that the analysis of the perfection of God's goodness, happiness and glory, which are expressions of the fact that God is supreme love, demonstrates the necessity of the plurality of the persons of God. Richard affirms that only from the attribute of God as supreme love can be deduced the plurality of God. Refusing the theory of Abaelard which claims that it is possible to explain the mystery of Trinity from the power, wisdom and love of God⁴⁷, Richard excludes the possibility of deducing the plurality of persons from the omnipotence and wisdom of God. Richard holds the difference between the pleasure of love and the pleasure of wisdom. While the pleasure of love is in the heart of the other, the pleasure of wisdom is in one's own heart. Indeed, from the supreme wisdom we cannot deduce the

possit? Sed qui absque dubio omnipotens est per impossibilitatem excusari non potest. Sed quod constat non esse ex defectu potentiae, numquidnam erit ex solo defectu benevolentiae? Sed si communicantem habere omnino nollet, cum veraciter habere posset si vellet, iste in divina persona benevolentiae defectus attende, quaeso, qualis esset vel quantus".

Cfr. S.AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Maximinum* II,7: PL 42,762: "Prorsus ad hunc articulum res colligitur, ut Deus Pater aequalem sibi gignere Filium aut non potuerit aut noluerit. Si non potuit, infirmus; si noluit, invidus invenitur. Sed utrumque hoc falsum est".

⁴⁶ *De Trin.*, III,4: SC 63,176,918CD: "Constat itaque quod in illo indeficienti bono summeque sapienti consilio, tam non potest esse avara reservatio quam non potest esse inordinata effusio.

Ecce palam habes, sicut videre potes, quod in illa summa et suprema celsitudine ipsa plenitudo gloriae compellit gloriae consortem non deesse".

⁴⁷ P.ABAELARDUS, *Commentaria in epistolam Pauli ad Romanos*, I : CCCM XI,68.

plurality of persons⁴⁸.

The fullness of wisdom cannot exist without the fullness of power, as the fullness of power without the fullness of wisdom. Both are inseparable. If it is possible to have the fullness of wisdom without a plurality of person, it would be possible also to have the fullness of power without being plural⁴⁹. Hence, only from supreme love we can deduce the plurality of God.

2. The *Condignus*

The reflection on the love applies to the necessity of the plurality of the persons of God, because the perfection of love cannot be understood without the plurality of the persons. According to the rule of discernment, the perfection of love is possible if the object of love has the same dignity with the lover, in order that he can love the lover with the same love and intensity. In other words, there must be a plurality in God, as we believe that there is only one God. There must exist in God a "suitable person" (*Condignus*) in order that his love be perfect. The *condignus* must be a divine person⁵⁰. His existence is necessary for the development and perfection of love⁵¹, and in order that God can communicate his highness to a suitable person⁵². It seems that the existence of *condignus* depends on the will of God. As he wants his

⁴⁸ *De Trin.*, III,16: SC 63,204,925D: "Sapientiae vero deliciae tunc magis delectant, quando de corde proprio hauriuntur.

Nihil ergo definitur contrarium naturae, si plenitudo sapientiae dicatur posse subsistere in singularitate personae".

⁴⁹ Cfr. *De Trin.*, III,16: SC 63,204,926A: "Quod igitur de sapientia diximus, consequens est ut idem de potentia intelligamus".

⁵⁰ *De Trin.*, III,2: SC 63,170,917AB: "Sed persona divina profecto non haberet quem ut seipsam digne diligeret, si condignam personam omnino non haberet. Divinae autem personae condigna non esset persona quae Deus non esset. Ut ergo in illa vera divinitate plenitudo caritatis possit locum habere, oportuit aliquam divinam personam personae condignae et, eo ipso, divinae consortio non carere".

⁵¹ *De Trin.*, V,7: SC 63,316,318,954A: "Plenitudo autem caritatis exigit ut unus alterum sicut seipsum diligit; alioquin illius amor adhuc habet quo crescere valeat. Oportet vero condignum habere, ut sit quem possit et merito debeat ut seipsum diligere".

⁵² *De Trin.*, VI,6: SC 63,388,971D: "Condignum itaque habere voluit ut esset cui communicaret magnitudinis suae divitias".

love to be perfect and his highness to be communicated to another person in order that his glory be perfect, he needs a *condignus*, and the *condignus* exists. In fact, Richard affirms that the existence of the *condignus* is realized by the omnipotence of God, as person from person, existence from existence⁵³. It seems here that in the procession of *condignus*, the second person in the mystery of God, Richard confirms the Greek theory of immediate procession; on this topic we will speak on the next chapter.

Thus, the reflection of supreme love deduces the existence of the second person, the *condignus*, who has the same nature with God.

3. The Requirement of a Trinity of Persons

Reflecting on the sovereignty of love, we arrive at the proposal of the plurality in God, at least the duality of persons in God, He himself with his *condignus*. Nevertheless, the reflection of the mystery of God demands that we determine the number of the persons of God, which are necessary to make his love sovereign. Can perfection of love happen in two persons, or does it need the existence of other persons in order that love become more perfect and fruitful?

Indeed it is possible for love between two persons to be a perfect love. But Richard proposes to search for the greater, better and higher love of friendship; that is not only to love the other as himself, but the more perfect is in the desire that the other loves the other person with the same love. The proof of a real love is the wish to share his joy of loving with his object of love. Without this sharing in delight, love is not yet perfect⁵⁴. Indeed, in

⁵³ *De Trin.*, V,7: SC 63,318,954AB: "Et si veraciter constat eam omnipotentem esse, quidquid esse voluerit non poterit non esse. Exigente itaque caritate, condignum habere volet; et exhibente potestate, habebit quem habere placet. Ecce quod diximus, quod perfectio personae unius est causa existentiae alterius. A quo autem est ei existentiae causa, ab ipso et existentia. Nec enim potuit ab illa non esse a qua, ut jam diximus, est omne posse".

⁵⁴ *De Trin.*, III,11: SC 63,190,922C: "Praecipuum vero videtur in vera caritate alterum velle diligere ut se: in mutuo siquidem amore multumque fervente nihil rarius, nihil praeclarius quam ut ab eo, quem summe diligis et a quo summe diligaris, alium aequae diligere velis. Probatio itaque consummatae caritatis est votiva communio exhibitae sibi dilectionis". Cfr: G.DUMEIGE, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.88.

Richard's thinking, the existence of a third person in mutual love is a sign of great perfection, because love is more perfect when the lover can communicate the delight of love to the person whom he loves. Refusal of a communion of love is a sign of a weakness in love. Perfection of love is not only in allowing or receiving communion of love but in desiring communion⁵⁵.

In order to understand the idea of Richard, Th.de Régnon⁵⁶ proposes to analyze the idea of a "particular friendship". Love between two persons which cannot share affection with another person is imperfect because it is influenced by egoistic love⁵⁷. The perfection of love, although rare, but the most pure, the most sincere and most liberal friendship, is loving with the desire that the person who is loved, loves the other person and is loved by the other person as he loves him. In the case of God, we must give to the Supreme Being the maximum possibility which is possible. Consequently, the perfection of love in God needs the existence of a third person who associates in the mutual love⁵⁸. The three persons manifest a communion of love, in which each person communicates the riches and the joy of loving and being loved. This is possible only at least in the communion of three persons⁵⁹.

Richard continues by demonstrating that the analysis of the supreme goodness, happiness and glory which sustain his thesis on the plurality of persons, also requires the existence of a third person. It seems that Richard uses the same argument as he proposes for the plurality of the persons, that is, the perfection of goodness, happiness, and glory cannot exclude charity.

⁵⁵ *De Trin.*, III,11: SC 63,192,922D: "Est itaque indicium magnae infirmitatis, non posse pati consortium amoris. Posse vero pati, signum magnae perfectionis. Si magnum est pati posse, majus erit gratanter suscipere. Maximum autem, ex desiderio requirere. Bonum magnum illud primum, melius secundum, sed tertium optimum. Demus ergo summo, quod praecipuum est; optimo, quod optimum est".

⁵⁶ TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.321.

⁵⁷ Cfr. S.BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, I, dist. 10, art.1, q.1, *Fundamenta*: "Perfectior est dilectio mutua quam reflexa, et perfectior adhuc mutua communicata quam non communicata, quia talis, scilicet non communicata videtur sapere amorem libidinosum".

⁵⁸ *De Trin.*, III,11: SC 63,194,923AB: "Vides ergo quomodo caritatis consummatio personarum Trinitatem requirit, sine qua omnino in plenitudinis suae integritate subsistere nequit. Ubi ergo totum quod universaliter perfectum est, sicut nec integra caritas, sic nec vera Trinitas abesse potest".

⁵⁹ *De Trin.*, III,14: SC 63,200,925A: "Communicatio itaque amoris non potest esse omnino minus quam in tribus personis".

Consequently, the perfection of goodness, happiness and glory requires also the trinity of persons⁶⁰.

4. The *Condilectus*

The perfection of supreme love requires the existence of the other person, "the common friend" (*condilectus*)⁶¹. As the third person, the *condilectus* associates in the love, in the joy of being loved by the other person who is loved by yet another⁶². Indeed, the *condilectus* is different with *condignus*. A.M.Éthier⁶³ notes that the difference between them is that the *condignus* is an expansion of an active love, the *condilectus* is a blazing of the passive love⁶⁴. The existence of *condignus* is in order that God can communicate his richness to the other person, the existence of *condilectus* is in order that God can share the delight of love⁶⁵. Indeed, Th.De Régnon notes⁶⁶, the characteristic of *condilectus* is not precisely the reciprocal love between the

⁶⁰ *De Trin.*, III,13: SC 63,198,924B: "Ecce quomodo plenitudo divinae bonitatis, plenitudo felicitatis et gloriae in una veritatis attestazione invicem sibi occurrunt et quid de divinae caritatis plenitudine in illa personarum pluralitate sentiendum sit evidenter ostendunt. Totius defectus suspicionem in illa summa caritate pariter damnant, totius in illa consummationis plenitudinem concorder clamant. Caritas autem, ut esse vera possit, personarum pluralitatem exigit; ut vero consummata sit, personarum Trinitatem requirit".

⁶¹ G.Salet notes that the word *condilectus* may be a creation of Richard. It is very difficult to translate to the other language, but the sense is very clear and complex; *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.192, footnote no.2. Infact, in his translation G.Salet uses different expressions as: "ami commun" (pp.193;389); "associé à son amour" (p.203); "un ami à tous deux" (p.389); "l'autre qu'avec lui on aime" (p.391).

⁶² Cfr. *De Trin.*, III,11: SC 63,192,923A; III,15:202,925C.

⁶³ A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.110.

⁶⁴ Cfr. *De Trin.*, VI,7: SC 63,388,972B: "Quid est autem velle habere condignum nisi velle habere quem intime diligit et coaequalitatis merito digne diligere debeat?"

Quid est vero velle habere condilectum, nisi velle habere qui secum a suo dilectore pariter diligitur et exhibiti sibi amoris deliciis secum fruatur".

⁶⁵ *De Trin.*, VI,6: SC 63,388,971D-972A: "Condignum itaque habere voluit ut esset cui communicaret magnitudinis suae divitias; condilectum vero ut haberet cui communicaret caritatis delicias".

⁶⁶ TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.425.

God and his *condignus*, but he is the bond, the term, the consummation of love between the two persons, when the two persons love each other and their love, their affections are united in the fire of the third love⁶⁷. The Father loves the Son, but his love is very strong that he wants to communicate to the other. His paternal love is also very pure so that it excludes to egoisticism, indeed he desires that his Son is loved by the other person with the same love as he loves him. In the same way, the Son loves the Father. His filial love is so ardent so that he needs a companion to love. He desires that his Father be loved by the other person. The third person who associates in the love between the Father and the Son is the *condilectus*.

On the production of the *condilectus*, Richard affirms that it is the second in the relation with the production of *condignus*, as number three comes after number two, the *condilectus* is after *dilectus*⁶⁸. And as he affirms that the *condignus* has the same dignity with God, and consequently, he has the same power, as the source of all that exists. Consequently, the production of the third person is from both, the first and the second person⁶⁹. It seems that in regarding the procession of the third person in relation with the first and the second, Richard supports the so-called *Filioque* position. In fact, in some other passages of his treatise, it is clear that the basis of Richard's reflection is the Symbolum *Quicumque* of Pseudo Athanasius, which proclaims the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.

⁶⁷ *De Trin.*, III,19: SC 63,208.210,927B.

⁶⁸ *De Trin.*, VI,7: SC 63,390,972BC.

⁶⁹ *De Trin.*, V,8: SC 63,320,954D: "Si igitur idem posse est absque dubio ambobus commune, consequens est tertiam in Trinitate personam ex ambobus et esse accepisse et existentiam habere"; Cfr. 322,955B: "Ab hac itaque gemina existentia est omnis essentia, omnis persona, omnis existentia, ergo et illa quae est tertia in Trinitate persona".

St. Anselm uses the same argument: *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, 7: PL 158,298: "Non autem magis est Pater Deus quam Filius, sed unus solus verus Deus, Pater et Filius. Quapropter si Spiritus sanctus est de Patre, quia est de Deo qui Pater est, negari nequit esse quoque de Filio, cum sit de Deo qui est Filius".



III. THE RELATION OF LOVE BETWEEN THE PERSONS

1. Love Unites the Persons

The centre point of Richard's explanation of plurality in God is the fact that God is Supreme Love, than which nothing is greater and better. The perfection of the supreme love is in the plurality of the persons, in the Trinity. The Trinity is communion of love, in which the first and second person are united in the love of the third.

A.M.Éthier⁷⁰ notes that, in Richard's thinking, the agent of the union among the three is love. It is love which makes many hearts to be one desire⁷¹. Love is substantially one, and in the Trinity, each person identifies himself with him in his being, in loving the two others as he loves himself, and shares the joy and the delight of love to the others. As the Supreme Being has the perfection of love, each person must have the same love, the same perfection. The love of each person is only possible when it is also supreme⁷². Indeed, the persons of the Trinity have the equality in love, and are united in love.

Nevertheless, notes Th.De Régnon⁷³, the unity of God is not a static unity, but a dynamic unity which has its reason in the communicability of ecstatic love. Richard does not imagine the substance of God as a calm water in three basins, but more as a wave which swells and pours out⁷⁴. Indeed, the

⁷⁰ A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.118.

⁷¹ *De Trin.*, V,23: SC 63,358,965C: "Proprium est veri et intimi amoris illud efficere, in illis etiam personis quibus est diversum esse, ut sit in eis idem velle et idem nolle".

⁷² *De Trin.*, V,16: SC 63,344,961C: "Unde et animadvertere licet quia veri amoris plenitudo haberi non potest ab aliqua persona quae Deus non est".

⁷³ TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.329.

⁷⁴ *De Trin.*, V,23: SC 63,360.362,966A: "Dicatur itaque illa divinitatis unda et summi amoris affluentia in alio tantum effluens nec infusa, in alio tam effluens quam infusa, in tertio non effluens sed solum infusa, cum sit tamen in omnibus una et eadem ipsa; et in his omnibus una veritas, etiamsi sit de ea loquendi multiformitas". The same comparison is used in the Fathers; Cfr. GREGORIUS NAZIANZENUS, *Orationes*, 31: PG 36,169; S.JOANNES DAMASCENUS, *De Haeresibus*; PG 94,780; S.ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *De fide Trinitate*, 8: PL 158,,280-281; *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, 16-

unity of love in the Trinity requires the difference in the relation of each.

2. The Different Relation of Love Between Each Person

On the affirmation on the unity of love, it seems that Richard indicates a difference in the properties of each person. The reason for the distinction of each person is their production. The second person, as we noted above, the existence of *condignus* in order that God can communicate the richness of his love, the production of *condilectus* in order that God can communicate the delight of love. Both are caused by love, in order that the Supreme Love be sovereign in love. Indeed, love which unifies each person also makes a distinction between the production of each person.

Referring to the nature of love, Richard names three kinds of love; *amor gratuitus*, that is love which gives without receiving, *amor debitus*, that is love which only receives, and this love is only a response to the *amor gratuitus*, and *amor permixtus* which gives and receives⁷⁵. All kind of love has its fullness in God, because it is impossible that these kinds of love have a perfection outside God⁷⁶. With this distinction, Richard refers also to the distinction between each person in God. The person who has *amor gratuitus* is the person who is principal, because he has the fullness and richness of love. His love is purely gratis and uniquely gratis. He communicates gratu-

17: PL 158,309-311. Abelard criticized S. Anselm as favorize the modalism: PETRUS ABAELARDUS, *Introductio ad Theologiam*, II,13: PL 178,1071; *Theologia christiana*, 4: PL 178,1287.

⁷⁵ *De Trin.*, V,16: SC 63,344,961CD: "Constat autem quia verus amor potest esse aut solum gratuitus, aut solum debitus, aut ex utroque permixtus id est ex uno debitus et ex alio gratuitus. Amor gratuitus est, quando quis ei a quo nihil muneris accipit gratanter impendit. Amor debitus est, quando quis ei a quo gratis accipit nihil nisi amorem rependit. Amor ex utroque permixtus est, qui alternatim amando et gratis accipit et gratis impendit".

⁷⁶ *De Trin.*, V,16: SC 63,344,961D: "Plenitudo autem amoris gratuiti, plenitudo amoris debiti, quemadmodum et plenitudo in utroque perfecti a persona quae Deus non est nullo modo potest haberi". Cfr. G. BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.79.



itously the richness of his love⁷⁷. The person who has *amor debitus* is the person who proceeds from the other without being principal of the other person. Indeed his love is necessary *debitus* because he can only respond to the love of other⁷⁸. The person who has *amor permixtus* is the person who is both principal and proceeds from the other person. He has both forms of *amor*. In relation with his principal, he has *amor debitus*, but with the person who proceeds from him his love is gratis. Indeed, he has the fullness of both⁷⁹. It seems here, that in Richard's thinking, the difference between each person in the Trinity is caused of his procession, and consequently they are different in the expression of love. The Father, who is the principal of the other persons has *amor gratuitus*; the Son, that is the *condignus* who proceeds from the Father but from him proceeds the *condilectus* has the *amor permixtus*, and finally, the Holy Spirit, the *condilectus*, proceeds from two other persons, but none proceeds from him has *amor debitus*. Nevertheless, Richard affirms, the three have the fullness of love. In the Trinity this distinction does not indicate the different perfection or grades of love. All the persons have the fullness and perfection of love⁸⁰.

⁷⁷ *De Trin.*, V,17: SC 63,346,962AB: "Gratuitum autem amorem se habere ostendit qui procedentibus de se plenitudinis suae abundantiam tam largiter, tam libenter et gratis impendit. ...

Habet itaque amorem gratuitum et gratuitum solum. Habet, inquam, gratuitum amorem, et, quod amplius est, gratuiti amoris plenitudinem; amoris gratuiti plenitudinem se habere demonstrat, qui ex illa plenitudine quam habet nihil sibi soli reservat sed totum communicat. Si omnem plenitudinem haberet, nec communicare vellet cum posset, plenitudinem gratuiti amoris non haberet. Convincitur ergo amoris plenitudinem habere, cui ad omnem benevolentiae effectum non deest vel velle vel posse".

⁷⁸ *De Trin.*, V,18: SC 63,348,962BC: "Illam autem personam, cujus est proprium procedere, nec tamen de se procedentem habere, quoniam aliunde accipit totum quod habet, plenitudinem debiti amoris habere oportet; alioquin, si summe diligentibus summum amorem non rependeret, summo amore digna non esset".

⁷⁹ *De Trin.*, V,19: SC 63,350,963A: "Nam, quoniam est proprie proprium ipsius tam ab alia procedere quam de se procedentem habere, oportet eam tam gratuito quam debito amore abundare et utriusque plenitudinem, utpote unius amoris uni, alterius alteri, integraliter exhibere. Debitum quippe est quod summo amore diligit a quo totum accipit et nihil impendit; gratuitum vero, quod summe diligit a quo nihil accipit sed totum impendit".

⁸⁰ *De Trin.*, V,22: SC 63,356,965A: "Nulla ibi differentia graduum, nulla diversitas dignitatum. Ecce constat quoniam proprietas unus est plenitudinem dare nec accepisse, alterius vero accepisse nec dare: numquid

Referring to the difference of the procession between the persons of the Trinity, Richard affirms the exclusion of the existence of a fourth person. Regarding the distinction of love, it is clear that each person has its role, one who gives, another who receives, and the other one who gives and receives. The question is if the existence of a fourth person who only "has" without "giving and receiving" is possible.⁸¹ On this problem, Richard refers to the various degrees of being which we have noted in the preceding chapter. As the Being who exists from himself is only one, the existence of the fourth person, which only "has" his existence without "giving and receiving" is impossible⁸². Indeed, as the distinction between each person according the propriety of love demonstrates three different properties, *amor gratuitus*, *amor debitus*, and *amor permixtus*, this number indicates also the number of persons of God. Therefore, the existence of a fourth person is impossible⁸³.

idcirco oportet unam altera meliorem, unam altera digniorem? Absit, absit omnino huiusmodi aliqua suspicio! Huiusmodi suspicio multos supplantavit et per varios errores dispersit. Nihil habet majus, nihil omnino melius qui nihil eorum quae habet ab alio accepit, quam qui nihil habet quod non accepisset. Quidquid perfectionis, quidquid bonitatis, quidquid beatitudinis habet cujus est solum dare, in ea plenitudine possidet et ille cujus proprium est totum accepisse".

⁸¹ *De Trin.*, V,15: SC 63,342,961A: "Si una proprietas constat in sola datione, altera in sola acceptione, media inter has in datione simul et acceptione, cur non sit quarta sine datione et acceptione in solo habere?".

⁸² *De Trin.*, V,15: SC 63,342,961A: "Ut enim superius monstratum est, ratio manifesta convincit quod nisi una sola in divinitate persona a semetipsa esse non possit. Quae igitur aliunde non accipit ut sit vel aliquid possit, si nulli impenderet quod habet, absque dubio, ut alias dictum est, in perpetuum sola remaneret".

⁸³ *De Trin.*, V,20: SC 63,352,963D: "Nihil aliud est ibi persona ista quam dilectio summa hac proprietate distincta. Nihil aliud persona altera quam dilectio summa alia proprietate distincta. Nec aliud aliquid est persona tertia quam dilectio summa tertia proprietate distincta. Juxta numerum itaque proprietatum erit et numerus personarum. Quoniam ergo quaelibet persona, ut diximus, est idem quod amor suus et assignata singularum discretio constat in solis jam dictis tribus, sicut quartam proprietatem sic quartam personam nullatenus sibi invenire poterimus".

CHAPTER IV:

THE PERSONS OF THE TRINITY



I. THE CONCEPT OF DIVINE PERSON

1. Richard's Critique of Boethius' Definition of Person

After treating the Trinity of God based on the analysis of the perfection of love, Richard dedicates the three last books to the persons of God; the fourth book treats the meaning of the concept of person and its application to the mystery of God, the fifth book treats the procession, and the last book, the sixth, treats the name and properties of each person of the Trinity. It seems that in understanding the concept of person, Richard proposes a new definition of person and criticizes the common and classical definition of person in the medieval era, that of Boethius¹, that is "the individual substance of a rational nature"².

In fact, Boethius' definition of person was the summit of an evolution of the meaning of person in the Latin tradition and had a great influence in the development of medieval theology until its culmination in the Thomistic synthesis³. Many authors of medieval theology used Boethius' definition of person. St. Anselm accepts the definition and in applying it to the mystery of God, concludes that in God, there is a unique essence and three persons or

¹ born of Rome about 475 and 480;

² BOETHIUS, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis*, III: PL 64,1343: "Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia".

³ A.MILANO, *Persona in teologia*, Napoli 1984, pp.320-321: "È con Boezio infatti che culmina la genesi del significato di *persona* nel cristianesimo latino antico. È grazie a Boezio che il termine *persona* si arricchisce per la prima volta di una definizione speculativa formale, rigorosa: accolta, contestata, corretta, raffinata, questa definizione attraverserà i secoli dell'età di mezzo fino alle soglie del mondo moderno. Dall'umanismo in poi il contributo di Boezio sarà emarginato dalle correnti egemoni del pensiero filosofico. Sopravviverà nelle scuole teologiche, meno apprezzato per se stesso e più come ponte verso le grandi sintesi medievali, soprattutto quella tomistica. Boezio ritorna nell'epoca contemporanea prima per curiosità erudita e in seguito per l'interesse storico-critico a ricostruire e comprendere ciò che egli davvero fu nel tempo nel quale visse e operò. Ma il seme che Boezio aveva lanciato, per quanto sepolto, ha portato frutto: l'enfasi semantica con la quale l'occidente continua a pronunciare il termine *persona* è segnata una volta per sempre dalla sua grande eredità".

substances⁴. It seems that St.Thomas accepts the definition because of its objective value. Notwithstanding its difficulty, St.Thomas sees that the definition of Boethius is more applicable to the concept of Trinity, the unity of nature in the trinity of persons⁵.

Boethius' main problem in defining the meaning of person is a Christological problem, that is, in the context of the controversy with Nestorius and Euthyches. He gives his definition in his *Liber de persona et duabus Naturis*⁶. Studying the treatment of the definition of person in this treatise, Nédoncelle⁷ proposes to consider the definition in its context, that is the elaboration of the meaning of nature which precedes the definition. In fact, in chapter I of his treatise, Boethius treats the meaning of nature. There are many possibilities of the meaning of nature: nature can indicate all the intelligible reality; material or non material substance; or only for the corporeal substance; or -and this is the definition of Boethius - "something which makes the specific difference of being"⁸. Indeed, nature indicates something which makes a being different from another being.

Person, Boethius adds, has a strict relation to nature and because of his nature person can be a reality in order of substantiality. Further, Boethius proposes that person can be applied only to man, to God and to angels, and cannot be applied to other creation as the plant and the animal. There is no general person, but a singular person, as Daniel, Plato, and so on. Indeed, person indicates something individual, not general⁹. Because it is only in a certain substance, in a rational substance, and not in general, person can be

⁴ ST.ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologium*, 78: PL 158,222B: "Potest ergo irreprehensibiliter illa suma et una Trinitas, sive trina unitas, dici una essentia et tres personae sive tres substantiae"; TH.DE RÉGNON notes that we must understand the meaning of substance in the sens of *substance première*. *Études*, II, p.244.

⁵ Cfr. M.BERGERON, *Le structure du concept latin de personne*, in: *Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du XIIF siècle*, 2^{me} Serie, Paris-Ottawa 1932, pp.131-139.

⁶ PL 64,1337D-1354D.

⁷ M.NÉDONCELLE, *Les variations de Boèce sur la personne*, in: *RSR* 29(1955), pp.201-238.

⁸ BOETHIUS, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis*, I: PL 64,1341B-1342C: "Natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia".

⁹ BOETHIUS, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis*, II: PL 64,1342C-1343C.

defined: "the individual substance of a rational nature"¹⁰.

Th. de Régnon¹¹ notes that the concept of Boethius corresponds to the concept of the human person; the word *substantia* indicates the real identity of the person and its substance, the word *individua* indicates the distinction of each person from others. Indeed, the specification of person is its being individual, and the individual being, for its definition is something which is indistinct in itself and distinct from others. The problem is how can the definition be applied to the person of God.

Richard affirms that it is difficult to apply Boethius' definition to the persons of God. In order that the definition to be general and perfect, it should correspond to all reality which is indicated in the definition. In other words, every individual substance of a rational being must be a person, and all persons must be individual substances of a rational being. In the case of God, if we take the divine substance as individual, then the divine substance would be a person since the divine substance is an individual rational substance. But the divine substance is not a person since there are three persons in the one divine nature. On the other hand, if we say that the divine substance is not an individual substance, then we have the problem of a divine person who lacks individual substance¹². Consequently, for Richard, the definition of person is not sufficient to indicate the distinction of divine persons, because the divine substance itself is an individual rational nature¹³.

¹⁰ BOETHIUS, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis*, III: PL 64,1343C: "Quocirca si persona in solis substantiis est, atque in his rationalibus, substantiaque omnis naturae est, nec in universalibus, sed in individuis constat, reperta personae est igitur definitio: Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia".

¹¹ TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, I, pp.80-81.

¹² *De Trin.*, IV,21: SC 63,278.280,945AB: "Ut itaque generalis sit atque perfecta, oportet ut rationalis naturae omnis substantia individua sit persona et e converso omnis persona sit rationalis naturae individua substantia ... Si igitur divina substantia dicenda est individua, aliqua rationalis naturae individua substantia erit aliquid quod non est persona. Nam Trinitas nec persona est nec persona recte dici potest ... Si vero illa substantia non est dicenda individua, constat pro certo quia aliqua persona est, quia divina, quae non est individua substantia ... Sive ergo non esse individua substantia divina dicatur, dicta illa definitio generalis non esse deprehenditur".

¹³ Cfr. A.MALET, *Personne et amour dans la Théologie Trinitaire de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris 1956, p.38; TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, pp.244-245.

In the era of Richard, some authors used to change the word *substantia* with the word *subsistentia*, so that the definition of person became: "an individual subsistence of a rational nature"¹⁴. For Richard this definition does not clarify the concept of person but makes it more obscure. The word subsistence cannot replace the word substance, because a subsistence cannot be understood without being a substance. On the other hand, the word person is very popular, indeed, it is difficult to explain it by an unknown word as subsistence. Consequently, the use of subsistence in understanding the meaning of the person of God, cannot help to illuminate the mystery of the Trinity, especially to the simple people¹⁵. Indeed, the definition of Boethius does not satisfy Richard, therefore, he proposes a correction of the definition of Boethius.

2. Richard's Definition of Person

The basic element of Richard's understanding of person is substantiality¹⁶. Richard's reflection begins with the affirmation that in order to understand the meaning of person, we must understand the meaning of

¹⁴ Cfr. TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.245. Infact, in chapter III of his *Liber de personae et duabus naturae*, Boethius after explaining the use of *prósopon* and *hypóstasis* in the greek theology, express that there is no corresponding word in the latin theology for *hypóstasis*, and the latin theologian are used to translate with *individua subsistentia* so that the definition of person as "*rationalis naturae individua subsistentia*". PL 64,1343C-1345B.

¹⁵ *De Trin.*, IV,4: SC 63,236.932D-933A: "Si vultis mei similibus satisfacere, oportet primum tam substantiae quam subsistentiae significationem diligenter determinare et, secundum datam determinationem, assignare quomodo possit esse plus quam una subsistentia, ubi non est nisi una substantia. Alioquin, quaeso, quid prodest mihi ignotum per ignotius ostendi? Nomen personae in ore omnium, etiam rusticorum, versatur; nomen vero subsistentiae nec ab omnibus saltem litteratis agnoscitur. Quomodo ergo, quaeso, ex ejus proprietate quam ignorant, simpliciores quique colligere poterunt quod tres subsistentiae et eo ipso tres personae possint esse in unitate substantiae?".

¹⁶ H.WIPFLER, *Die Trinitätsspekulation des Petrus von Poitiers und die Trinitätsspekulation des Richard von St.Viktor. Ein Vergleich*, in: BGPTMA 41.1, Münster-Aschendorff 1965, p.53.

substance, as the person is defined according to substance¹⁷. Indeed, the word substance can indicate many beings in the world; an animal is a sensible substance, a human being is a rational substance. The person is nothing other than a rational substance. Therefore, we can say that substance refers to the common property and person refers to the individual, incommunicable, and singular property¹⁸. It seems here that Richard uses the abstract meaning of substance. He affirms that substance is a response to the question *quid* which indicates common property, like animal, human being, horse, etc., and person is correlated with the question *quis*, that is an individual, as Matthew, Bartholomew etc¹⁹. Indeed, in Richard's concept, the substance indicates something common, something general, and person indicates something individual, or something proper to the being. As the question *quid* and *quis* are different, the answer of the one does not presume the answer to the other. *Aliquid* and *aliquis* are independent from each other because of its truth, although in their composition they need each other. Indeed, a person indicates someone who is a rational substance, and three persons indicate three "some-ones", each of which is a rational substance. If we proclaim the plurality of persons in one substance, it does not change the character and property of

¹⁷ *De Trin.*, IV,6: SC 63,240,934A: "Dicamus imprimis quod dictum est ab aliis, quod persona secundum substantiam dicitur et substantiam significare videtur".

¹⁸ *De Trin.*, IV,6: SC 63,240.242,934AC: "Multum est tamen inter significationem unius et significationem alterius ... Animal itaque significat substantiam, non qualemcumque, sed sensibilem; homo autem non omnem sensibilem, sed rationalem. Numquam autem dicitur persona, nisi de rationali substantia. Et cum nominamus personam, nunquam intelligimus nisi unam solam substantiam et singularem aliquam ... Alias ergo subintelligitur proprietas generalis, alias proprietas specialis; ad nomen autem personae, proprietas individualis, singularis, incommunicabilis".

¹⁹ *De Trin.*, IV,7: SC 63,242.244,934CD: "Si bene perpendas et diligenter advertas, nomine substantiae non tam quis quam quid significatur. E converso autem nomine personae non tam quid quam quis designatur.

Cum aliquid tam longinquum a nobis fuerit ut discerni non possit, interrogamus quid sit. Et id quidem accipere solemus responsi, quod animal est homo aut equus aut aliquid huiusmodi. Cum autem adeo appropinquaverit quod homo sit discerni possit, interrogamus jam non quid, sed quis sit. Et respondetur nobis quod sit Matthaeus, Bartholomaeus, pater vel filius illius. Videtis quia ad interrogationem quid, respondetur nomen generale vel speciale, definitio, vel aliquid tale. Ad interrogationem autem quis, nomen proprium reddi solet, vel aliquid quod aequipollet. Per quid itaque inquiritur de proprietate communi, per quis de proprietate singulari".

being and its origin of the nature²⁵.

Richard distinguishes the rational being in three categories, namely, the human nature, the angelic nature, and the divine nature. In the human nature, the existence of the person is seen according to the quality and its origin. Each human being is distinguished from the other, because of his different quality and different origin. In the angelic nature, because of its simplicity, its origin is the same for all. Indeed, they can be distinguished only by quality. In the divine nature, the divine persons are identical in their *quale quid* but they are distinguished from each other according their origin²⁶. Accordingly, the human nature has the plurality of substance and plurality of person, the angelic nature has the unity of substance and person, and the divine nature has the unity of substance and plurality of person. Indeed, in the divine nature, the plurality of person without plurality of substance is possible.

Applying the notion of existence to the divine nature, Richard proposes that the question *unde sit* not only indicates the origin of the existence, but also that the existence has no origin²⁷. In the divine nature, we can distinguish the common existence to the incommunicable existence. Indeed, each person of the Trinity has a common existence which is not other than the divine substance. Richard defines the personal property as something which makes a being to be one and distinct²⁸. This personal property must be incommunicable, otherwise a person could be two persons. Incommunicability is therefore the characteristic of the person. Consequently, the person

²⁵ *De Trin.*, IV,11: SC 63,254,938A: "In uno itaque hoc verbo exsistere, vel sub uno nomine existentiae, datur subintelligi posse et illam considerationem quae pertinet ad rei qualitatem et illam quae pertinet ad rei originem".

²⁶ *De Trin.*, IV,15: SC 63,260,939CD: "ut igitur breviter perstringamus quod diffusius diximus, patet quod in divina natura variatur existentiarum pluralitas secundum solam originem, in angelica autem natura secundum solam qualitatem, in humana natura tam secundum qualitatem quam secundum originem".

²⁷ *De Trin.*, IV,16: SC 63,262,940C: "Ad considerationem vero originalis causae pertinet, non solum quaerere et invenire originem esse ubi est, imo etiam quaerere et invenire eam non esse ubi non est".

It seem here that Richard tries to make his explanation of the existence applicable to the divine substance, who is eternal and exist from himself.

²⁸ *De Trin.*, IV,17: SC 63,266,941B: "Personalem proprietatem dicimus, per quam quilibet unus est ab omnibus aliis discretus".

must have incommunicable existence²⁹. Richard defines that "a divine person is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature"³⁰. Relating his definition of person the unity of the persons of God, Richard searches for the explanation of the distinction of meaning between the word *essentia* and *sistentia*, which is the same as the distinction between *quid sit* and *unde sit*³¹. He concludes that unity is in *essentia* and the Trinity is in *exsistentia*³².

It seems that in Richard's definition the relation of the person to nature is a possessive relation, the person is the possessor of nature. Such a definition is closed to the Greek mode of thinking which makes Richard's definition different from that of Boethius which is in the Latin theory³³.

Referring to the difference between Richard's definition and Boethius' definition, Th. de Régnon³⁴ notes that the point of difference is that the word *substantia* in Boethius' definition is changed by *exsistentia* in Richard's definition, and *individua* is changed to *incommunicabilis*. Regarding incommunicability, its meaning is not different from individual. By changing the word substance to existence, Richard avoids the idea of a certain substratum in God. E.H.Cousins³⁵, affirms that with the term *exsistentia* Richard introduces the existential mode of origin of the person of God. With the term *individua substantia* the notion of person remains on the level of essence or substance, which cannot adequately approach the persons of Trinity. In explaining the persons of the Trinity, one must pass to the mode of existence of the essence which can be diverse from the same essence, and this is the advance of

²⁹ *De Trin.*, IV,17: SC 63,266,941BC.

³⁰ *De Trin.*, IV,22: SC 63,280,945C: "... persona divina sit divinae naturae incommunicabilis exsistentia".

³¹ Cfr. A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.99; G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.75; P.HOFMANN, *Analogie und Person Zur Trinitätsspekulation Richards von St.Victor*, in: *ThP* 59(1984, p.226.

³² *De Trin.*, IV,19: SC 63,272,943A: "Unitas itaque ibi est juxta modum essendi, pluralitas juxta modum existendi. Unitas essentiae quia unum et indifferens esse; plures personae quia plures exsistentiae".

³³ M.BERGERON, *Le concept latin*, p.127. Cfr. TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p. 248; A.MALET, *Personne et amour*, p37.

³⁴ TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.246.

³⁵ E.H.COUSINS, *The notion of Person in the De Trinitate of Richard of Saint Victor*, Unpublished doctoral diss., Fordham University 1966. Offprints available from University Microfilms, Anna Arbor, Michigan. pp. 185-186.

Richard. Nevertheless, Cousins continues, Richard's defect is that existence indicates the relation in the Son and Holy Spirit, but not in the Father, because in Richard the meaning of existence is *ex alioque* and is not *ex alio*³⁶. In my opinion, Richard does not treat the person as relation, but each person is distinct from the other because of their origin. That the existence of the Father is from himself indicates the logical thinking of Richard who wants to defend the doctrine of the three distinct persons in the triune God.

II. THE PROCESSION AND NAME OF PERSONS IN THE TRINITY

1. The Procession of the Other Persons

Richard's definition of divine person, "the incommunicable existence of the divine nature", affirms the distinction of origin of each person of the Trinity. We noted above that Richard divides the possibilities of existence into three categories, that is, that which is eternal and from itself, that which is neither eternal nor from itself and that which is eternal but not from itself. The beings which are neither eternal nor from themselves are creatures. The two other categories refer to God, both the persons who from eternity is source of the other beings, and the other persons who proceed from him eternally³⁷.

Analyzing the grandeur of love Richard arrives at the affirmation of the Trinity of persons in God, the first person, the *condignus*, and the *condilectus*. As the existence of person is incommunicable, it is necessary that in the divine Trinity only the first person which exists from himself and not from another being, otherwise, that would be an infinity of persons in God³⁸. Only the first person is eternal and from himself. The other two persons are eternal, but do

³⁶ Cfr. *De Trin.*, IV,3-14.

³⁷ See: the proof of the existence of God in chapter II above.

³⁸ *De Trin.*, V,3: SC 63,304,950BC.

not exist from themselves. They proceed from the first person³⁹.

Regarding the procession, the speculation of Richard begins with analyzing the experience of the human being. In the human being, there are three different processions of person from another person, that is, immediate; mediate; and mediate and immediate in the same time⁴⁰. Richard proposes the Biblical examples of each procession. The procession of Isaac from Abraham is immediate because he proceeds directly from the substance of Abraham. The procession of Jacob from Abraham is mediate, because he does not proceed directly from Abraham, but through Isaac. The procession of Seth from Adam is immediate and mediate in the same time. It is immediate because Seth is procreated from Adam, but it is mediate because he is generated through Eve⁴¹. Indeed, in the human being, the procession of the grandchild is mediate, but the procession of child is mediate and immediate in the same time, because between the father and the son comes the mother. But the procession of Eve from Adam and the procession of the Child Jesus from the Virgin Mary are purely immediate⁴². Indeed, the application of these three different processions in the procession of the persons of God will give some difficulties. We cannot apply materially human procession to the divine procession⁴³. Nevertheless, in Richard's method in doing theology, he begins with something from the human experience in order to contemplate the divine

³⁹ *De Trin.*, V,5: SC 63,310.312,952BC: "Sicut enim superius probatum est, totae tres personae sibi sunt coaequales et coaeternae. Sicut ergo ab aeterno est existentia illa quae a semetipsa existit, sic et ab aeterno esse habet quae ab eadem procedit. Ille itaque existendi modus, qui est communis personis duabus, habet esse ab aeterno nec tamen a semetipso".

⁴⁰ *De Trin.*, V,6: SC 63,312,953A: "In rebus humanis videmus quod persona de persona procedit; et ejusmodi processio tribus procul dubio modis fieri contingit. Procedit namque persona de persona, quandoque quidem tantummodo immediate, quandoque tantummodo mediate, quandoque autem mediate simul et immediate".

⁴¹ *De Trin.*, V,6: SC 63,312.314,953AB. S.Gregory of Nazianzus uses the same example for affirming that the different procession does not oppose the consubstantiality of the persons: *Orationes* V,11: PG 36,144-145; Cfr.: S.IOANNES DAMASCENUS, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, I,8: PG 94,817.

⁴² *De Trin.*, V,6: SC 63,312.314,952D-953B; VI,2: 376-380,968D-969D; Cfr. A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.105.

⁴³ Cfr. A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.105; J.C.ROMERO, *Introducción al estudio de Dios trino en Ricardo de San Victor*, Extr.Diss.Univ. Navarra, in: *Excerpta ex dissertationibus in Sacra Theologia*, Pamplona 1987, XI, p.233.

mystery. He proposes to use the image of human procession to understand the divine procession.

In the divine person Richard affirms that the procession purely and simply immediate does not make a defect in God, otherwise God would remain alone. As the principal of all is one, the existence of other persons can be possible only through immediate or mediate procession. The procession of the second person is only possible with the immediate procession, as mediate procession without the existence of the being which proceeds before him is impossible. In the same way a procession which is immediate and mediate in the same time is impossible. Immediate procession precedes mediate procession. Immediate procession can exist without mediate procession, but the mediate cannot exist without the immediate⁴⁴.

In the case of the person of God, Richard affirms that the procession of the persons corresponds only to the priority of nature and the origin of the person, but does not correspond to the temporal order. The three persons of the Trinity are coeternal and have the same perfection as the person from whom he proceeds⁴⁵. Nevertheless, the fact that the first person is the person who exists from himself is only for the first person, and the other persons do not participate in existence from oneself, because it is impossible to have something in the same time from oneself and from another⁴⁶. The being from himself is the incommunicable existence of the first person.

Richard proposes the procession of the *condignus* immediately from the first person as person from person, existence from existence, one from the only one, being able to be proceeded from the not being able to be proceeded, the being who was born from the one who is not born⁴⁷. It seems

⁴⁴ *De Trin.*, V,7: SC 63,316,953CD.

⁴⁵ *De Trin.*, V,6: SC 63,316.318,954AB: "Sicut enim longe superius diximus, perfectio personae unius exigit utique consortium alterius. Et ita fit ut una sit causa alterius ... Ecce quod diximus, quod perfectio personae unius est causa existentiae alterius".

⁴⁶ *De Trin.*, V,8: SC 63,322,955AB: "Numquid ex semetipso et eo ipso sine alterius dono habet quod ex alterius dono habet? Vides jam, credo, quam sit sibi ipsi contraria ista assertio. Est enim omnino contrarium rem eandem et omnino idem ipsum haberi ex alterius dono et haberi sine alterius dono. Quid autem magis impossibile quam unum aliquid simul esse et non esse?".

⁴⁷ *De Trin.*, V,6: SC 63,954BC: "Ecce habes personam de persona, existentiam de existentia, unam de una sola, processibilem de improprocessibili, nascibilem de innascibili, unam denique uni immediate adhaerentem, quia unam

here that the characteristic of the immediate procession is that the persons participate in the perfection of the first person, except in his existence from himself.

Regarding the third person of the Trinity, Richard affirms the production of *condilectus* as second in relation to the production of *condignus*, as trinity is second in relation to duality. Nevertheless, Richard excludes the possibility of a mediate procession in the persons of God. A.M.Éthier⁴⁸ notes that Richard uses the argument of the beatific vision, the vision *facie ad faciem*, which can be immediate or mediate. In the divinity, Richard affirms, all the persons must have the perfection of knowledge and wisdom, because in the divine person the essence is identical with its wisdom. Indeed, it is impossible that the third person does not see the first person immediately. As the vision is immediate, the union is also immediate. A procession which is purely mediate is impossible in God⁴⁹.

On other hand, the procession of the third person purely immediately from the first person is also impossible. The argument of Richard is that the second person has the same power as the first person. Consequently, the third person must come forth from the first and the second⁵⁰. Richard calls the

de una immediate procedentem".

⁴⁸ A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.106.

⁴⁹ *De Trin.*, V,9: SC 63,326.328,956CD: "Quoniam igitur omnes divinae personae invicem se et immediate conspiciunt, radium summae lucis in alterutrum effundunt aut excipiunt. Et quia immediate vident, immediate adhaerent. Impossibile itaque est in natura divina esse aliquam personam mediata tantummodo alicui alteri germanitate conjunctam. Hac item ratiocinatione confirmatur quod de tertiae personae processione superius dicitur. Quis enim eam neget ceteras personas et videndo cognoscere et cognoscendo videre? Est autem utraque persona una eademque sapientia. Quoniam ergo constat eam nihil habere ex se, consequens est ut ex inspectione sapientiae accipiat sapere et eo ipso accipiat et esse, ubi non et aliud esse quam sapere.

Ecce jam quaesitum est et inventum quod superius propositum fuerat ad quaerendum. Invenimus quod in divina natura sit processio tantummodo immediata, quod ibi sit quae est mediata simul et immediata, quod mediata tantum omnino ibi non sit sed nec esse possit".

⁵⁰ *De Trin.*, V,8: SC 63,320,954D: "Si igitur idem posse est absque dubio ambobus commune, consequens est tertiam in Trinitate personam ex ambobus et esse accepisse et exsistentiam habere".

It seems here, as we noted sometimes above, the dependence of Richard on the so-called *Filioque Symbolum* of Pseudo Athanasius.

procession of the third as immediate and mediate procession⁵¹. A.M.Éthier⁵² interprets the procession at the same time immediate and mediate as the procession of the third person immediately from the first person is mediate in relation to the second person, and being immediate from the second person is mediate in relation to the first person. In my opinion, such an interpretation is not exactly correct. In Richard's thinking, the first person is the source of all existence. Indeed, it seems more correct to interpret the procession of the third person as immediate and mediate relating to the first person. He proceeds immediately from the first person, but also he proceeds immediately from the second person, as the second person has the same power as the first person, consequently at the same time his procession is also mediate in relation to the first person⁵³.

Excluding mediate procession, it seems that the existence of the fourth person who proceeds immediately and mediately from the first three persons is possible, the fifth person from the first four, etc⁵⁴. Analyzing the different modes of loving, *amor gratuitus*, *amor debitus* and *amor permixtus*, Richard excludes the existence of a fourth person, that is, one who only has love without giving and receiving⁵⁵. Richard uses the same triangle in the procession of the divine person, one who is without procession, one who proceeds from the other with a pure immediate procession, and one who proceeds from others with the procession immediate and mediate at the same time⁵⁶.

⁵¹ *De Trin.*, V,9: SC 63,328,956D: "Invenimus quod in divina natura sit processio tantummodo immediata, quod ibi sit quae est mediata simul et immediata, quod mediata tantum omnino ibi non sit sed nec esse possit".

⁵² A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.107.

⁵³ Cfr. J.PIKAZA, *Notas sobre la Trinidad en Ricardo de S.Victor*, in: *EstTrin*, 6(1972), p.94; PETAU, *De Trinitate*, VII,11,2.12,6, pp.80-81.

⁵⁴ *De Trin.*, V,10: SC 63,328,956D-957A.

⁵⁵ *De Trin.*, V,20: SC 63,352,963D.

⁵⁶ Cfr. A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.107-108; H.WIPFLER, *Die Trinitätsspekulation des Petrus von Poitiers*, pp.200-202. H.Wipfler notes that the trinitarian thinking of Richard is based on the scheme "*actio* - *passio* - *correlatio*", which be realized in the triangel :giving - receiving - giving and receiving; *amor gratuitus* - *amor debitus* - *amor permixtus* etc.

2. The Names of the Divine Persons

Reflection on the procession of the divine persons leads to reflection on the names of the divine persons. Richard proposes that the names of the divine persons are drawn from creatures by the method of comparison and transfer⁵⁷. The human being is the image of God. Consequently, although between the human and divine nature the dissimilarity is incomparable with the likeness, there remains some resemblance between them. Therefore we can see in the image of God some idea regarding God himself⁵⁸.

The procession of the human being can take place by the work of nature or by the work of free will. The production of sons from parents is according to the work of nature, but the procession of Eve from Adam is purely according to the free will of the creator. In God, however, the procession of a divine person according to the free will of the creator is impossible, other wise, that person would not be eternal⁵⁹. Indeed, the resemblance between the procession of the divine person and the production of human person must be sought in the production according to the work of nature.

We noted that the production of the human being can be immediate, mediate or immediate and mediate in the same time⁶⁰. The procession of the son from his parents is an immediate procession, because it excludes any intermediate person⁶¹. Certainly, there are many different relationships in the human being, but only the principal is immediate procession. Only immediate procession has the relation between father and son. Nevertheless, although the

⁵⁷ Cfr. TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, 286; A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le De Trinitate*, cit., p.105; H.WIPFLER, *Die Trinitätsspekulation des Petrus von Poitiers*, pp.200–201.

⁵⁸ *De Trin.*, V,1: SC 63,374,967D: "Est autem notissimum ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei hominem factum. Et quamvis incomparabiliter copiosior sit dissimilitudinis quam similitudinis ratio, est tamen humanae naturae ad divinam nonnulla imo multa similitudo; possumus itaque, ut credo, in hoc divinae imaginis speculo cernere, imo et juxta ratiocinantis animi judicium discernere, quid ibi sit vel pro similitudinis ratione approbandum, vel pro ratione dissimilitudinis improbandum".

⁵⁹ *De Trin.*, VI,1: SC 63,374,376,967D.968C.

⁶⁰ *De Trin.*, VI,2: SC 63,376,968D–969A; Cfr.: V,6: SC 63,312,953A; See above.

⁶¹ *De Trin.*, VI,2: SC 63,376,969A: "Immediata processio est illa quae est prolis de utrolibet parente, quae fit nulla alia persona mediante".

procession of Eve from Adam is immediate, their relationship cannot be called the relation between father and son or daughter, Adam is not the father of Eve, because the procession of Eve from Adam is not according to the work of nature. Accordingly, Richard concludes, we can use the relation between parent and son to designate the relation between a person and another person who is produced from him in a principal procession according to the work of nature⁶².

In the divine procession, the procession of the *condignus* is immediate from the first person, as from nature to nature. Accordingly, we can name their relation the relation between the parents and the son. As in the divine nature there is no difference in sex, so we call the principal person the Father, and the person who proceeds immediately from his nature the Son⁶³.

Richard affirms that the procession of the third person is an immediate and mediate procession at the same time. The procession of the third person has a different reason from the procession of the second person, and it also comes after the first procession in order of nature. Regarding the procession of the third person, it seems that Richard discontinues the analogy of family relations. In human being, the second relation is the relation between parents and their grandchildren, which is a mediate production⁶⁴. This is impossible for the third person of the Trinity, because a purely mediate procession in a divine person is impossible. On the other hand, Richard also affirms that the procession of the son from his father can be immediate and mediate in the

⁶² *De Trin.*, VI,2:SC 63,378,969C: "Sed ubi persona alicujus producitur de substantia alterius, producitur, inquam, principali procedendi ordine et secundum operationem naturae, solemus absque dubio unam ex his personarum parentem, aliam prolem nominare".

⁶³ *De Trin.*, VI,4: SC 63,382,970B: "Vides ergo quam convenienter obtinuit usus ut unus ex duobus in Trinitate diceretur Pater et alius diceretur Filius".

Th.de Régnon notes that in this reflection Richard tries to search the name of the first and second person, without referring to the fact that the name Father and Son applying to the first and second person of the Trinity is used in the revelation of the Trinity itself; See: TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.370; Cfr. G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.382 note no 2.

⁶⁴ *De Trin.*, VI,7:SC 63,390,972C.

same time, because between the father and the son comes also the mother⁶⁵. Richard does not speak of the possibility of transferring the immediate and mediate relation between the child and the father and mother to the mystery of the Trinity. In my opinion, we can give two reasons about the exclusion, firstly, the exclusion of the sex problem in God, accordingly in God there is no father and mother⁶⁶, and secondly, as we noted above, that Richard affirms the relation between the first person and the second person as the relation of father and son. Moreover, Richard excludes the filial relation in regarding the procession of the third person. The third person is not the son of the first person, because only the principal generation can be named the relation between father and son. As the procession of the third person from the second is in the same way as his procession from the first person, consequently, he can not be named the son of the second person⁶⁷. Accordingly, Richard excludes the familiar relation in searching for the name of the third person of the Trinity.

Richard further remarks that the name of the third person used by the Scriptures, namely, the "Breath of God", or "Holy Spirit" does not have any resemblance to the human being. Breath indicates something which proceeds from the human being without which the human being cannot live. Further the breath which comes from the human being is not consubstantial with him. Indeed, there is no resemblance to the reality of the Spirit of God who is consubstantial with God and has equality in all with him⁶⁸.

But, Richard continues, we can use such name which has no resemblance to the reality of the human being, as the Scriptures also name the third person as the "Finger of God"⁶⁹. Indeed, there is no resemblance between

⁶⁵ On the example of the production of Seth from Adam and Eve, Richard writes: "nam Seth quidem processit de substantia Adae immediate utique in quantum fuit de proprio semine, mediate vero in quantum fuit de semine Evae": *De Trin.*, V,6: SC 63,314,953A.

⁶⁶ Cfr. *De Trin.*, VI,4: SC 63,382,970B: "In divina autem natura, ut in commune novimus, omnino nullus est sexus".

⁶⁷ *De Trin.*, VI,8: SC 63,390.392,972D-973B.

⁶⁸ *De Trin.*, VI,9: SC 63,394,973D.

⁶⁹ G.Salet notes that the parallelism between the texts of Luk. 11,20: "But if it is by the finger of God that I cast out demons, ...", and Mt. 12,28: "But if it is by the Spirit of God that I cast out demons, ...", invites the tradition to call the Holy Spirit the Finger of God, see: G.SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.394, note no 2; Cfr. S.GREGORIUS MAGNUS, *In Ezech.*, I,

the finger and the reality of the third person of the Trinity, but it refers to his proper character. We use the finger to guide someone toward a certain object. We know that God reveals his mystery through his Spirit, indeed as the function of the finger. And if we call the Spirit the Breath because he proceeds from the Father and the Son eternally, hence the name which we use to call the third person of God as the "Blowing of God", or "Breath of God" or "Spirit of God" indicates the character which is properly of him⁷⁰.

Furthermore the affirmation of the Gospel that "God is Spirit" (John 4,24) verifies the application of the name Holy Spirit to the third person of the Trinity. God is Spirit, accordingly, the Father is Spirit, and the Son is also Spirit, because he has the same perfection of the Father. Consequently, the third person, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, is also Spirit. In the same way, the application of the adjective "holy", so that the third person is named the Holy Spirit. Indeed, the name "Holy Spirit" of the third person indicates his property derived from the Father and the Son⁷¹. Indeed, the *condilectus* has the name the Holy Spirit, the name which indicates his personal reality⁷².

III. THE PROPERTIES OF EACH DIVINE PERSON

1. The Father

Regarding Richard's reflection, we can draw a line from the unique God to the Trinity. Because there is a perfection of love in God, so God needs a *condignus* in order to express fully his love, and a *condilectus* in order to share the joy of love. In reflecting on the procession, he names the relation

hom. 10,20: PL 76,894.

⁷⁰ *De Trin.*, VI,9: SC 63,394.396,973D-974B; Cfr. C.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.81.

⁷¹ *De Trin.*, VI,10: SC 63,396-240,974B-975A.

⁷² *De Trin.*, VI,10: SC 63,400,975A: "Habet itaque nomen ex re, habet nomen pro rationis similitudine".

between the first person and the second, that is the *condignus* as the relation between the Father and the Son. Accordingly, it seems that Richard uses the notion of God, in the sense which the New Testament uses it, that is the Father⁷³. Consequently, we can attribute to the Father all the characteristics of the divine substance which Richard treats in the first book. Nevertheless, Richard affirms that all which is valid to the divine substance is also valid to the persons⁷⁴. Indeed, we must search for the incommunicable existence of the first person of the Trinity, that is the Father.

Referring to the procession of the Son, Richard affirms the perfect equality between the Father and the Son, except for the fact that the Father is the unique being who is not produced from another, who exists from himself. Accordingly, the incommunicable existence of the Father is that he is the being which exists from himself. Richard says that the being which exists from himself must be simple, *sumum simplex*. In the *sumum simplex*, the being, the wisdom and the power are identical. As he has all power, he has power not by participation. For him the participation of the other person in his power is possible. Because of the identification between his power and his being, someone who participates in his power has to participate in his being too, indeed, participates in his existence from himself⁷⁵. It is a contradiction to be from himself and not from himself in the same time. He must have his existence from himself or not from himself⁷⁶.

Accordingly, existence from himself is the incommunicable existence of the Father, and all the other persons proceed from Him. We can deduce to other characteristics which Richard uses in explaining the mystery of the Trinity. Relating to the reflection of love, it is the Father who has *amor gratuitus*, who gives his love gratuitously and the principal of love of the other persons⁷⁷. Relating to the procession, he is the person who proceeds from

⁷³ Cfr. G.BAGET-BOZZO, *La Trinità*, Firenze 1981, p.136-137; J.PIKAZA, *Notas sobre la Trinidad*, p.80.

⁷⁴ *De Trin.*, V,3: SC 63,304,950B: "Quod in primordio hujus operis dictum est de substantia, idem ipsum hoc loco, absque ulla haesitatione dici potest de persona".

⁷⁵ *De Trin.*, V,4: SC 63,306.308,951AD.

⁷⁶ *De Trin.*, V,4: SC 63,308,951D: "Itaque aut utrumque a semetipso habet, aut utrumque a semetipso non habet".

⁷⁷ *De Trin.*, V,22: SC 63,356.358,965A.

no other person.

2. The Son

It seems easier to search for the incommunicable existence of the Son. According to the perfection of love, he is the *condignus* to whom God, the Father, expresses his fullness of love. His existence is necessary in order that God, the Father can communicate his magnitude of charity⁷⁸. He is the medium between the Father, who has *amor gratuitus* and the Holy Spirit, who has *amor debitus*. He has *amor permixtus*, who receives and gives, because he receives the love from the Father and gives to the Holy Spirit⁷⁹. According to his procession, he is the Son, because He proceeds from the Father by the principal procession⁸⁰. But his characteristic is that he proceeds from another, that is the Father, and another person, that is the Holy Spirit, proceeds from Him⁸¹.

Regarding the relation with the Father, who is *ingenitus*, the characteristic of the Son in *genitus*. In the affirmation that the Son is *genitus* Richard makes an affirmation, which makes a division between the scholars, on the affirmation used by the fathers, that is *substantia genuit substantiam*⁸². It seems that here Richard attacks the affirmation of Peter Lombard, that a sub-

⁷⁸ *De Trin.*, VI,6: SC 63,388,971D.

⁷⁹ *De Trin.*, V,9: SC 63,360,963A.

⁸⁰ *De Trin.*, VI,5: SC 63,384.386,970D-971B.

⁸¹ *De Trin.*, V,13: SC 63,336,959C: "alterius tam ab alio procedere quam de se procedentem habere"; H. Wipfler resumes the characteristic of the Son as: "et passio et actio, ab una tantum et alia ab ea, principiata et principians, et accipere et dare"; H. WIPFLER, *Die Trinitätsspekulation des Petrus von Poitiers*, p.200; Cfr. *De Trin.*, V,25: SC 63,310.312,952BC.

⁸² *De Trin.*, VI,22: SC 63,444,987AB: "Sed sic intelligendum est, inquit, quod Patres dicunt: bene Patres dicunt quod substantia substantiam gignit, nostra expositio ad hoc contendit ut credamus quod substantia substantiam non gignit. Fidelis expositio et omni acceptione digna, quae hoc quod sancti Patres pariter clamant contendit esse falsum et quod nemo sanctorum assertum contendit esse verum".

stance is neither generating nor generated⁸³. Accordingly, it seems that the affirmation of the Council of Lateran⁸⁴, which confirms the position of Peter Lombard, condemns the affirmation of Richard. But we must remember that the intention of the Council of Lateran was to condemn a certain Abbé Joachim who taught against Peter Lombard on the unity and essence of the Trinity and professed that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are three different substances and persons⁸⁵.

It seems that the position of Richard is not inconsistent with the decree of the Council of Lateran. In the second book of his *De Trinitate*, which we noted above, Richard expresses formally his position on the absolute unity and simplicity of the divine substance. If Richard affirms that the Father is the *substantia ingenerita* and the Son is the *substantia genita*, it does not mean that Richard confirms the plurality of substances in the Trinity. The affirmation of Richard is based on his conviction that in the Trinity, the substance of the three persons remains the same⁸⁶. Richard explains his theory with the example of the communication of knowledge. In human nature, the teaching knowledge and the taught knowledge is the same and one science, although there are two different doctrines. In the same way, in the divine nature, the ungenerated wisdom and the generated wisdom are one and the same, and accordingly they have one and the same substance, although they are two different persons. As in human nature, the received and the unreceived knowledge are the same although are two doctrines, consequently, in God the

⁸³ Cfr. P.LOMBARDUS, I *Sentent.*, dist. 5: "Ita etiam dicimus quod essentia divina non genuit essentiam. Cum enim una et summa quaedam res sit divina essentia, si divina essentia essentiam genuit, eadem res seipsam genuit; quod omnino esse non potest. Sed Pater solus genuit Filium, et a Patre et Filio procedit Spiritus Sanctus".

⁸⁴ DS 804: "Nos autem, sacro approbante Concilio, credimus et confitemur cum Petro Lombardo, quod una quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis et ineffabilis, quae veraciter est Patres, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus; tres simul personae, ac singillatim quaelibet earundem: et ideo in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas; quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia seu natura divina: quae sola est universorum principium, praeter quod aliud inveniri non potest: et illa res non est generans, neque genita, nec procedens, sed est Pater, qui generat, et Filius, qui gignitur, et Spiritus Sanctus, qui procedit: ut distinctiones sint in personis, et unitas in natura".

⁸⁵ Cfr. DS 803.

⁸⁶ Cfr. TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II,258.

substance of the ungenerated and the substance of the generated are one and the same, although they form two different persons⁸⁷.

Accordingly, the affirmation that the Son is the *substantia genita* and the Father is *substantia ingenita*, is consistent with the decree of the Council of Lateran, because it does not affirm a difference between the substance of the Father and the substance of the Son. The Father and the Son are united in one substance, but the Son is generated from the substance of the Father, who is ungenerated. The affirmation of Richard is a result of his opinion on the divine person. In Richard, there is no abstraction in God. His term existence can refer to the traditional use which does not oppose the word "substance" and "person". His conception of generation of the Son is in agreement with the Nicene Creed, "God of God, Light of Light"⁸⁸.

Referring to the common attribute of the Son, Richard treats the Son as the Image of the Father; such a name can be applied only to the Son, and not to the Holy Spirit. Richard proposes his arguments in two steps, the reason of the Image must be sought in the personal properties, and, that properties are the communion of the Father and the Son in the same action of the procession of the Holy Spirit⁸⁹.

Richard excludes the reason for the nomination of the Son as the Image of the Father in the equality of power, wisdom and goodness between the Father and the Son, because such a reason would lead to the conclusion that the Holy Spirit is also the Image of the Father and the Son, as the Holy Spirit has also the same perfection of the Father⁹⁰. Richard proposes that the

⁸⁷ *De Trin.*, VI,24: SC 63,454,989D-990A: "Sicut in humana natura, scientia docens et scientia edocta est una eademque scientia, verumtamen alia et alia doctrina, sic in divina natura, sapientia gignens et sapientia genita est una eademque sapientia et, quod consequens est, una eademque substantia, verumtamen alia et alia persona. Sicut itaque in humana natura, ex eo quod unius est scientia accepta, alterius inaccepta, nec accepta sit inaccepta, nullatenus sequitur quod sit in eis alia et alia scientia, sed alia et alia doctrina: sic in natura divina, ex eo quod unius substantia est genita, alterius ingenita, nec genita sit ingenita, nullo modo sequitur quod ibi sit alia et alia substantia, sed alia et alia persona".

⁸⁸ G.BAGET-BOZZO, *La Trinità*, pp.136-137.

⁸⁹ TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.207.

⁹⁰ *De Trin.*, VI,20: SC 63,434.436,984CD: "Existimabit forte aliquis, quod Filius idcirco dictus sit imago Patris, quod ei sit in potentia, sapientia et bonitate per omnia similis et omnino aequalis. Sed si ex hac consideratione diceretur Filius imago Patris sui, cur non eadem ratione Spiritus sanctus dicitur

concept "image" involves the external similitude and the internal similitude, as a bronze statue of a human being has an external similitude with the human being which is of flesh and bone⁹¹. In the case of the Son as the image of the Father, the exterior similitude is their relation with the other persons. The Father is the person who has and gives, the Son is the person who receives and gives, and the Holy Spirit is the person who receives only. Indeed, the Son is the image of the Father, because he resembles with the Father in having and giving⁹². As the image involves the similitude and dissimilitude, Richard concludes that the Son is the image of the Father, because between the Son and the Father, there is a similitude in giving, and dissimilitude in receiving⁹³. In generation, the Father gives the divine substance to the Son, and in the procession of the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son give the same substance to the Holy Spirit. In the case of the procession of the Holy Spirit, there is a unique donation with two different donators, the Son gives because he received, the Father gives without having received⁹⁴.

Richard further speaks of the idea that the Son is the Word of the Father. Richard affirms that the word comes only from the heart and manifests

imago Patri simul et Filii? ... Si Filius itaque dicitur imago Patris pro huiusmodi similitudine vel aequalitate, quare non oportet de Spiritu sancto pro similibus similia sentire?.

⁹¹ *De Trin.*, VI,11: SC 63,402,975D-976A; Cfr. A.M.ÉTHIER, "*Le De Trinitate*", p.111.

⁹² *De Trin.*, VI,11: SC 63,402,975CD: "Sed huius quaestionis nodum, ut credo, citius solvimus, si ad proprietatem considerationem recurrimus. Commune est omnibus, ut superius jam diximus, omnem plenitudinem habere. Commune Patri et Filio tam habere quam dare. Proprium autem Spiritui sancto habere nec alicui dare. In hoc igitur solus Filius expressam in se Patris similitudinem habet et imaginem tenet, quod sicut divinitatis plenitudo manat de uno, sic et eadem plenitudinis largitio manat de alio. Nec minus aliquid nec alio modo accipit Spiritus sanctus ab uno quam ab alio. Nulla autem persona omnino a Spiritu sancto plenitudinem divinitatis accipit; et idcirco imaginem Patris in seipso non exprimit. Ecce habes cur imago Patris dicatur solus Filius et non etiam Spiritus sanctus".

⁹³ *De Trin.*, VI,20: SC 63,438,985C: "Oportet itaque ad proprietatem considerationem recurrere, qui ista de quibus loquimur cupit plenius agnoscere. Est autem, ut saepe jam diximus, omnibus commune plenitudinem divinitatis habere. Proprium vero est Patri non accepisse, sed dare; proprium est Filio tam accepisse quam dare. Convenientia itaque est in dando, differentia vero in accipiendo".

⁹⁴ TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.276; Cfr. G.BUONAMICI, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p. 81; C.OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.521.

the intention of one who thinks. The Son is the Word of the Father, because the Son manifests the Father, who is primordial wisdom⁹⁵. On the fact that there are two different words, that is, the word of the heart and the spoken word, Richard proposes that the spoken word reveals the inner word, the word of heart⁹⁶. As the word comes only from the heart and reveals the wisdom of heart, we can name the Son the Word of the Father, because the Son manifests the paternal glory of the Father. In the Father, there is the whole conception of truth, the Son expresses the truth, and the Holy Spirit listens to the truth⁹⁷. Hence, Richard concludes, the Son is the Word of the Father, that is, his internal Word, when he manifests the truth of the Father to the Holy Spirit, and external Word, when he reveals the truth of the Father to created natures⁹⁸.

3. The Holy Spirit

The Father is the principal of all procession, the Son proceeds from the Father and the principal of the procession of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son. Accordingly, the incommunicable existence of the Holy Spirit is that he proceeds from the Father and the Son, and from him no other person proceeds⁹⁹. Referring to his procession, the Holy Spirit cannot be named the Son, because only the person who proceeds by the

⁹⁵ *De Trin.*, VI,12: SC 63,404,406,976C: "Addamus itaque quia verbum nascitur de corde solo et ipso propalatur proferentis intentio. Jure igitur solius Patris sola genitura Verbum nominatur, per quod ipse, qui principalis est sapientia, manifestatur. Juxta hoc itaque nuncupatio Verbi pro similitudinis ratione videtur convenire".

⁹⁶ *De Trin.*, VI,12: SC 63,406,976CD.

⁹⁷ *De Trin.*, VI,12: SC 63,406,408,977A: "Quoniam ergo Verbum de solo corde procedit et per ipsum cordis sagacitas innotescit, recte a simili Dei Filius Verbum Patris dicitur, per quem paterna claritas manifestatur. In Patre omnis veritatis conceptio, in ejus Verbo omnis veritatis prolatio, in Spiritu sancto omnis veritatis auditio, ...".

⁹⁸ *De Trin.*, VI,12: SC 63,408,977BC.

⁹⁹ *De Trin.*, V,12: SC 63,334,958D: "Quemadmodum ergo non potest esse in divinitate nisi una sola persona quae non procedat ab alia, sic absque ambiguo non potest esse nisi una sola a qua non procedat alia aliqua".

principal procession has the relation of Father and Son¹⁰⁰. He is not the image of the Father, because in his personal properties, there is no resemblance between him and the Father, the Father is the person who gives without receiving, he is the person who receives only without giving¹⁰¹.

Referring to the perfection of love, the Holy Spirit is the *condilectum*, whose existence is necessary in order that God, the Father, can communicate the delight of love¹⁰². In other words, he is the common love who joins the love of the Father and the love of the Son. As the *condilectus*, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, he receives love from the Father and the Son. Accordingly his love is *amor debitus*, which is not other than a response to the love of the Father who has *amor gratuitus*¹⁰³. Indeed, he has no *amor gratuitus*. Referring to the conception of *amor debitus*, R.Lavatori¹⁰⁴ notes that the Holy Spirit is the love given by the Father and the Son, which expresses their fullness of joy and happiness¹⁰⁵.

Further Richard treats the nomination of the Holy Spirit as the Gift of God (*Donum Dei*), such an appellation is difficult to be explained in other Trinitarian speculation¹⁰⁶. Here Richard treats the personal properties of the Holy Spirit which has influence externally, that is in creatures¹⁰⁷. Richard explains the appellation of the Holy Spirit as the Gift of God, departing from the reality that the Holy Spirit has the *amor debitus*. The mission of the Holy Spirit is the infusion of *amor debitus* in the human being, to transform to the resemblance of his personal properties¹⁰⁸. Because of the Holy Spirit, the

¹⁰⁰ *De Trin.*, VI,8: SC 63,392,973A: "Sed ille qui tertia in Trinitate persona est principali, ut probavimus, germanitate innascibili conjunctus non est; unde nec ejus filius recte dici potest".

¹⁰¹ *De Trin.*, VI,11: SC 63,402,975CD.

¹⁰² Cfr. *De Trin.*, III,11: SC 63,192,923A; III,15: SC 63,202,925C; VI,6: SC 63,388,971D-972A.

¹⁰³ *De Trin.*, V,16: SC 63,344,961CD; V,18: SC 63,348,962BD.

¹⁰⁴ R.LAVATORI, *Lo Spirito dono del Padre e del Figlio. Ricerca sull'identità dello Spirito come dono*, Bologna 1987, p.164.

¹⁰⁵ Cfr. *De Trin.*, VI,14: SC 63,412,978BC.

¹⁰⁶ TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.323.

¹⁰⁷ Cfr. A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.115.

¹⁰⁸ *De Trin.*, VI,14: SC 63,412,414,978BC. We can see such idea in: S.AUGUSTINUS, *Sermones*, 128,4: PL 38,715; GUILLAUME DE SAINT-THIERRY, *De contemplando Deo*, VII: PL 184,374-375.

human being, can participate in the love of God, such participation can happen only in the *amor debitus*, the personal property of the Holy Spirit. Accordingly, He is the Gift of God for the human being¹⁰⁹. In fact, the Holy Spirit as the Gift of God infuses in the human being, the *amor debitus* which obliges the human being to response the *amor gratuitus* of God. The love of the human being to his Creator, is only the obligatory response, without the possibility of the human being to have *amor gratuitus*. It seems, that Richard forgets the free will of the human being, which can respond to the love of God with his spontaneity and availability¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁹ *De Trin.*, VI,14: SC 63,416,979A: "In quantum igitur auctori nostro debitum amorem reddimus, in tantum pro certo Spiritus sancti proprietati configuramur. Ad hoc namque homini datur, ad hoc illi inspiratur, ut illi in quantum sibi possibile est configuretur".

¹¹⁰ R.LAVATORI, *Lo Spirito santo*, pp.164-165.

CHAPTER V:

EVALUATION OF RICHARD'S DOCTRINE ON THE TRINITY



I. THE DOCTRINE OF THE ONLY ONE GOD

1. The Necessary Reason

Richard assures the existence of a necessary reason by which we can explain the mystery of faith¹. This is the argument which Richard develops in his treatise on the Trinity. Because of his conviction on the necessary reason, although, he affirms also that the reasoning has to come after faith, it seems that he proposes the use of reason only in understanding the mystery of Trinity. Despite his great respect for the authority of the Fathers, we almost cannot find any citation of the opinion of the Fathers in the treatise *De Trinitate*². Here there seems to be a case of Richard's consistency with the spirit of the twelfth century movement, introduced by St. Anselm and Abelard, that is, the use of reason in understanding the mystery of faith. The Fathers by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, developed the formulation of faith in order to express the faith in the controversies with the other persons³. After the profession of faith being formulated, it is the competence of reason to explain the mystery of faith⁴. Accordingly, in his *De Trinitate* Richard proposes the exposition of the mystery of the Trinity, according to reason alone. He proposes his own explanation of the mystery of the Trinity, with his independent spirit. He does not mention any of the Fathers in order to be able to criticize the respected Fathers or to repeat the accurate argument of

¹ Cfr. *De Trin.*, I,4: SC 63,70,892C.

² In reality, we can find four direct quotations of the fathers, that are, the passage of *Expositio fidei catholicae ad Alipium et Augustinum episcopos* of Pseudo Jerome (PL 34,2181-2182) on the distinction between the person and personal property: *De Trin.*, IV,3: SC 63,234, 932BC; the Jerome's word in the *Epistula ad Damasum papam* (PL 22,357,no.41) on the danger of the use of the terminology "hypostasis": IV,4: SC 63,236,932D; the passage of *De Trinitate* of St. Augustin (*De Trin.*, 7,4: PL 42,939; 7,6:42,943) on the difference conception of the Trinity between the Greek and the Latin Fathers: *De Trin.*, IV,20: SC 63,278,944C; and the definition of person of Boethius (*Liber de persona et duabus naturis* 3: PL 64,1343): *De Trin.*, IV,21: SC 63,945A. Cfr. J. RIBAILLIER, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.18.

³ Cfr. *De Trin.*, IV,5: SC 63,238,933BC.

⁴ Cfr. *De Tabernaculo*, Prologus: PL 196,211; *In visione Ezechielis*, Prologus: PL 196,527.

a person who has a bad reputation⁵. In this spirit he proposes his treatise. Accordingly, although he does not name any Fathers, the influence of the early Fathers can be seen in Richard's speculation on the Trinity. We will examine them in advance.

We noted the influence of St. Anselm on the use of the necessary reason in doing theology. In fact, Richard adopts from St. Anselm not only the way of doing theology, but also the argument for the existence of God. In his *Monologium* St. Anselm proposes three arguments as proof of the existence of God, namely, the participation in goodness, the causality of being and the degree of perfection⁶. It seems that Richard adopts directly the argument of the degree of perfection from St. Anselm. In the same way, the third argument of Richard, which proposes the possibility of existence which concludes in the existence of the Supreme Being which is the source of all power, wisdom and essence. Such an argument is an application of St. Anselm's argument of causality.

But the argumentation of the first argument which Richard proposes, regarding the diversity of being seems to be different from that of St. Anselm, although St. Anselm arrives also at the existence of the being who exists from himself. St. Anselm is consistent with his way of thinking, that is, through the different degrees of existence, which exist from the existence of another, to absolute existence which exists from himself⁷. Richard proposes his argument by presenting the experience of the existence of different beings, and departing from the being which is under the human experience arrives at the conclusion that the Supreme Being must be a being which is eternal and exists from himself⁸. Indeed, Richard uses the argument of the causality of the existence which St. Anselm proposes, but he develops the argument on the basis of the idea of the different mode of existence which seems to be adopted from John Scotus Erigena, although Richard excludes the possibilities of the existence of a being which exists from himself but is not eternal⁹. With

⁵ TH. DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.239.

⁶ Cfr. C. HENRY, *Histoire*, pp. 10-11.

⁷ Cfr. S. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologium*, 4: PL 158, 148B-150A.

⁸ Cfr. *De Trin.*, I, 6-8: SC 63, 74-79, 893D-895A.

⁹ Cfr. C. OTTAVIANO, *Riccardo di S. Vittore*, p.507; G. SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.76-77, footnote no.1.

the different modes of existing, Richard anticipates the possibilities of the existence of the other two persons of God, who are eternal but not from themselves. In the books where he treats the divine procession, he refers to the same difference of beings.

As the Supreme Being, who is eternal and exists from himself, God is the source of all other beings which exist. Richard's reflection comes to the identification of the supreme being with the divinity. Accordingly, God must have all perfection that can be imagined. He is the Supreme Being than which nothing is greater, nothing is better¹⁰. We seem to find here the influence of St. Anselm, as St. Anselm proclaims that God is "that than which nothing greater can be thought"¹¹. As St. Anselm uses the argument as the foundation of his speculation on the mystery of God using the reason alone, Richard uses the argument also as the major premise of his speculation. From the fact that God is Supreme Perfection, it is possible for Richard to attribute all perfection to God himself. Based on this Supreme Perfection which can be thought, Richard deduces his argument of the supreme love which essentially needs the plurality of persons¹².

Hence, on the demonstration of the existence of the unique God, and its necessity of being unique, Richard advances two necessary reasons which become the basis of his further reflection, that are, firstly, God is the Supreme Being which is eternal and from himself, and secondly, the Supreme Being has all the perfection. He is the *Summum omnium*, all perfection is in Him and identical with himself.

It seems that both the affirmations, that God is the Supreme Being who is eternal and from himself, and that He is the *Summum omnium*, are the important foundations of the reasoning of Richard in regard to the mystery of the Trinity. By establishing the solid unity of God, Richard treats the first two books of the *De Trinitate*, Richard makes the basis of his reflection on the Trinity. Richard uses the Greek method in explaining the mystery of the Trinity, departing from the unity and uniqueness of the divine substance he arrives by deduction at the establishment of the substantial unity of the

¹⁰ *De Trin.*, I, 18: SC 63,96,899C: "Nihil ergo Deo majus, nihil utique melius vel ab ipso Deo potest definiri, vel per intelligentiam attingi".

¹¹ S. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologium*, 16: PL 158,165; *Proslogion* 3: PL 158,228.

¹² Cfr. A.M. ETHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, pp. 82-84.

persons¹³.

2. The Identification Between God and his Divinity

The interesting point in Richard's theory of the unique God is that he defends the absolute identity between God and his divinity. God is the Being which exists from himself. His Godness is not other than the supreme Substance¹⁴, and he is not other than his divinity, and all the attributes which refer to Him are identical to each other¹⁵. Indeed, Richard proposes the uniqueness of God, who exists from himself and there is no other than himself. His divinity is identical with himself, as he identifies the substantiality with the substance itself. We can deepen the position of Richard by regarding the problem of his era, that is, the controversy with the Bishop of Poitiers, Gilbert de la Porrée¹⁶, who was condemned at the Council of Rheims, 1148¹⁷.

In the Council of Rheims, according to the notice which we have from the *Libellus contra capitula Gilberti Pictaviensis episcopi* of Geoffroy of Auxerre¹⁸, Gilbert was accused on four points of his affirmations: firstly, that there is a real difference between God on the one hand, and his essence and

¹³ Cfr. TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.279.

¹⁴ *De Trin.*, I,16: SC 63,90,898B: "Sed si summa substantia hoc ipsum quod Deus est habet ex divinitate sua, quae nihil habet nisi a semetipsa, profecto ipsa deitas non aliud aliquid est quam summa substantia".

¹⁵ *De Trin.*, I,13: SC 63,86,897B.

¹⁶ Gilbert de la Porrée was born in Poitiers on 1080. He became a student of Bernard of Chartres, Anselm of Laon and the Paris master. He taught in Poitiers, Chartres and Paris before his nomination as Bishop of Poitiers in 1142. He was died in 1154. Cfr. M.E.WILLIAMS, *The teaching of Gilbert Porreta on the Trinity as found in his commentaries on Boethius*, in: *AnGr* 56(1951), pp.1-2.

¹⁷ DS 745.

¹⁸ PL 185,617-618. Another sources which report the condemned thinking of Gilbert de la Porrée are: the *Historia Pontificalis* of John of Salisbury - the modern edition was made by R.L.POOLE, Oxford 1937; and the *Res Gestae Imperatoris Friderici* of Otto of Freising - the edition made by G.Waitz, in: *Scriptores Rerum Germanicum*, Lipsiae 1912.

attributes on the other hand; his substantiality, divinity and goodness are not God but the *forma* by which he is God; secondly, there exists a real difference between the essence of God and the three persons of the Trinity; thirdly, it is only the three persons who are eternal, and the relations between them and their properties, are not eternal and are not God; and fourthly, the divine nature did not become incarnate. Regarding the first affirmation on the difference between the substantiality and the substance of God, the Council of Rheims declares that there is no theological reason which can separate nature and person, and in regard to God, the divine essence is not used in the ablative sense, but also in the nominative sense¹⁹. Indeed, the Council of Rheims affirms that in God the substance is identical with his substantiality and all the divine attributes are not other than God himself.

The reflection of Richard in the first two books of *De Trinitate* begins with the exposition of the existence of God, the Supreme Being, who is eternal and from himself. He has his divinity from himself, otherwise, he would be inferior to his divinity. His divinity is incommunicable, and his divinity is identical with himself. He is immense. He has his immensity from himself, and his immensity is identical with himself. He is supreme wisdom, but he does not have his wisdom from another, his wisdom is identical with himself. He is omnipotent, but he has his power not by participation, but from himself. His power is identical with himself. Richard concludes that there exists only one God, who is eternal and from himself. He is the supreme substance, the source of everything else, and all which He has, he has from himself, and He is identical with his power and wisdom²⁰. In the same way, after treating the different divine attributes, Richard turns to the simplicity and unity of the divine substance and the identity of all which He has with Himself²¹.

¹⁹ DS 745: "De primo tantum [*capitulo*] Romanus Pontifex diffinivit, ne aliqua ratio in theologia inter naturam et personam divideret, neve Deus divina essentia diceretur ex sensu ablativi tantum, sed etiam nominativi".

²⁰ *De Trin.*, I,17: SC 63,94,899A: "Solus itaque et unus Deus est a semetipso et eo ipso ab aeterno. Et juxta quod de summa substantia, quae non est aliud quam ipse probatum est, ab ipso est omne quod est, a semetipso habet totum quod habet et ipse idipsum est quod ipsa potentia, quod ipsa sapientia".

²¹ *De Trin.*, II,19: SC 63,146,912A: "Est itaque in illa vera et summa felicitate et vere et summe felici divinitate, est, inquam, summa et substantialis unitas et in ipsa unitate vera et summa simplicitas, ubi, ut superius probatum est, idem ipsum est totum quod est".

Accordingly, we can say that the affirmation of Richard regarding the only one God, which he treats in the first two books of the *De Trinitate*, seems to underline the affirmation of the Council of Rheims against Gilbert de la Porrée²². Here is seen the faithfulness of Richard to the truth of faith. It seems that in his era, the disciples of Gilbert de la Porrée continued to defend the teaching of their master, and had a certain influence on Christian theology. Considering the danger of the heresy, although Richard does not intend to enter directly into controversy with Gilbert de la Porrée, it seems clear that the first two books of *De Trinitate* were situated in such a controversy. As a master who has to guide his disciples, Richard analyzes and defends the affirmation of the Council of Rheims regarding the divine substance.

II. THE THEORY OF THE TRINITY OF GOD

1. The Argument Based on the Perfection of Love

The reflection of Richard continues with searching the necessary reason for the Trinity of persons. He is consistent with his idea that a necessary reason can be found in order to explain the mystery of Trinity. Actually, the speculation of Richard on the plurality of God is based on reasoning alone, without referring to the authorities of the Fathers or the Scriptures. After establishing that God is the Supreme Being who has and is all perfection, Richard turns to the attribute of God as Supreme Love. Basing himself on the

²² MANSI, t.21,712-713: "Credimus et confitemur simplicem naturam Divinitatis esse Deum, nec aliquo sensu catholico posse negari quin Divinitas sit Deus; et Deus, Divinitas. Sicubi vero dicitur: Domini sapientia sapientem, magnitudine magnum, Divinitate Deum esse, et alia hujus modi: credimus non nisi ea sapientia, quae est ipse Deus, sapientem esse: nonnisi ea magnitudine, quae est ipse Deus, magnum esse: nonnisi ea aeternitate quae est ipse Deus, aeternum esse: non nisi ea unitate unum, quae est ipse; non nisi ea Divinitate Deum, quae est ipse; id est, seipso sapientem, magnum, aeternum, unum Deum". Cfr. A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, cit., p.3; C.J.HEFELE, *Histoire des Conciles*, cit., V, p.837.

fact that God is Supreme Love, Richard derives the necessity of the plurality in God, because perfect love, that is the love of friendship, occurs in the other person to whom the lover addresses his love. Indeed, love needs a plurality of persons.

Considering the application of the analysis of love in the explanation of the mystery of Trinity, St. Augustine affirms the three parameters of love, namely are, the lover, the beloved and the love itself²³. Nevertheless, although St. Augustine searches for the image of the Trinity in the human being, he does not develop the conception of the three parameters of love. He prefers to develop his theory on the internal human being itself, so that his theory is famous as the psychological theory. Three triads in particular emerge strongly in his thinking along this line: mind, knowledge and love; memory, understanding and will; memory about God, understanding of God and love of God²⁴. St. Anselm, who was influenced by St. Augustine and had a great influence in Richard of St. Victor, also searches for the explanation of the mystery of Trinity in the human being, so that he explains the mystery of Trinity as the trinity of God with his Word and Love. It seems that it is Richard who develops the speculation of the mystery of Trinity based on investigating love itself, so that his concept is closed to the triads, the lovers, the beloved and the love itself. Let us examine whether Richard adopts the theory of St. Augustine in developing his theory of the divine Trinity based on the mystery of love.

Regarding the argumentation of Richard, J. Bligh²⁵ notes that there are three principal parts of Richard's arguments, that are, firstly, that human charity implies the plurality of persons, secondly, that the supreme charity is

²³ S. AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 8, 10, 14: PL 42, 960.

²⁴ On the trinitarian theology of St. Augustine see: A. SCHINDLER, *Wort und Analogie in Augustins Trinitätslehre*, Tübingen 1967; L. LEGRAND, *La notion philosophique de la Trinité chez Saint Augustin*, Paris 1930; D. PUSKARI, *Il mistero trinitario nella predicazione di S. Agostino*, Estr. Diss. Univ. - Lateran, Roma 1979; O. DU ROY, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin. Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391*, Paris 1966; I. CHEVALIER, *Saint Augustin et la pensée grecque. Les relations trinitaires. Analyses explicative des textes*, in: *DT* 18(1940), pp. 317-384; R. TREMBLAY, *La théorie psychologique de la Trinité chez saint Augustin*, in: *ER* 8(1952), pp. 83-109.

²⁵ J. BLIGH, *Richard of St. Victor's "De Trinitate": Augustinian or Abelardian*, in: *HeyJ* 1(1960), p. 134.

the same nature with the human charity, and thirdly, that the perfection of love needs an equal person to be loved. Let us examine the three important points in order to search the sources of Richard's speculation on the mystery of Trinity, and his contribution in searching to understand the mystery of faith, especially the mystery of Divine Trinity.

Regarding the affirmation that the true love needs a plurality of persons, J.Bligh²⁶ notes that it is definitely non-Augustinian, as Richard takes it from the homily of St.Gregory the Great²⁷. I agree with the observation of J.Bligh. As we noted above, Richard's concept of love tends to the ecstatic conception which searches the perfection of love in abandoning himself in order to give his love toward the other person. Consequently, the perfection of love can happen at least in two persons. Indeed, St.Augustine also teaches on the need of something as the object of love, but something to be loved can be himself²⁸. Although we cannot exclude the influence of St.Augustine in Richard's theology, it seems that his conception of love which needs a plurality of persons is more influenced by St.Gregory the Great.

The argumentation that the Supreme Charity is of the same nature as the charity among men is never rendered explicit by Richard²⁹. Nevertheless, in the exposition of the existence of the Supreme Being, Richard seeks arguments from the created nature to the uncreated nature. In his exposition, the Supreme Being has all perfections which can exist. Indeed, he has the perfection of love, and all the inferior love comes forth from the Supreme love. The Platonic principle of participation is the reason why Richard brings the reflection of the human love to the divine love.

On the necessity of a divine person to whom God directs his love, Richard uses the argument of *caritas ordinata*. St.Augustine employs such *caritas ordinata* in explaining the way of life. St.Augustine confirms that the man who lives justly and holily is he who is a correct valuer of things, that is

²⁶ J.BLIGH, *Richard of St.Victor "De Trinitate", cit.*, p.135.

²⁷ S.GREGORIUS MAGNUS, *Homilia in Evangelium*, I,17: PL 76,1139.

²⁸ Cfr. S.AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, VIII,8,12: PL 42,958: "Caritas non est quae nihil diligit. Sicut enim verbum indicat aliquid, indicat etiam se ipsum, sed non se verbum indicat, nisi se aliquid indicare indicet: sic et caritas diligit quidem se, se nisi se aliquid diligentem, non caritatem se diligit".

²⁹ J.BLIGH, *Richard of St.Victor "De Trinitate", p.135.*

to say, he who has well-ordered love, to love his equal³⁰. It is possible that Richard did not learn such concept directly from St. Augustine, as the concept was common property in the twelfth century³¹, but it seems to be more realistic to say that Richard learns such a concept from St. Augustine, as we noted that the theological basis of the school of St. Victor was the theology of St. Augustine.

It is clear that in developing his Trinitarian system Richard employs the doctrines of love which are known as those of St. Gregory the Great and St. Augustine, but the application of the doctrine of love to divine love in order to search for a necessary reason of the divine Trinity is an original contribution of Richard. St. Augustine has two reasons in refuting the deduction of the mystery of Trinity from the triad of the lover, beloved and love. The first argument is that St. Augustine refuses to search for the image of the Trinity in three persons, the father, mother and child, because he is convinced that the image of God is a single human being³². The second argument, if the image of God must be searched in one human being, the lover and the beloved are not distinct³³. Richard, departing from the existence of the Supreme absolute unique God, who is supreme Love, using the ecstatic concept of love, arrives at the trinity of persons in God. Here he is different from St. Augustine and St. Anselm. This is the originality of his thinking.

The theory of Richard is based on the perfection of the love of friendship. In this argument, St. Thomas objected that until we know the

³⁰ S. AUGUSTINUS, *De Doctrina Christiana*, I, 27: PL 34, 29: "Ille autem iuste et sancte vivit, qui rerum integer aestimator est: ipse est autem qui ordinatam dilectionem habet, ne aut diligat quod non est diligendum, aut non diligat quod est diligendum, aut amplius diligat quod minus est diligendum, aut aequae diligat quod vel minus vel amplius diligendum est, aut minus vel amplius quod aequae diligendum est".

³¹ Cfr. J. BLIGH, *Richard of St. Victor "De Trinitate"*, p. 135; H. PETRÉ, "Ordinata caritas". *Un enseignement d'Origène sur charité*, in: *RSR* 42 (1954), pp. 40-57.

³² Cfr. S. AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 15, 5: PL 42, 1000; 12, 6, 6, 8: PL 42, 1001. 1002. J. RIBAILLIER notes that St. Augustine refutes the searching of the image of the Trinity in three persons because the three persons can not form one substance: *Richard de Saint Victor*, p. 23. But it seems that the argument of J. Riballier is against the argument which St. Augustin himself proposes in his treatise; Cfr. J. BLIGH, *Richard of St Victor's "De Trinitate"*, p. 119, footnote no. 5.

³³ Cfr. S. AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 8, 7-8: PL 42, 857-958.

plurality of persons in the divinity, we cannot say that love of another is possible in the Trinity³⁴. Hence, until we know from revelation the existence of the divine Trinity, we cannot say that the divine love out of himself is possible. In my opinion, this argument does not annihilate the original thinking of Richard. As we noted above, the intention of Richard in writing the *De Trinitate* is giving an explanation for the mystery of faith, which he has accepted from revelation, using the reason. Indeed, in his speculation, the revelation of the mystery of faith remains a presuppose argument. From his mystical spirit which esteems the value of experience, Richard learns the perfection of love, which is none other than the love of friendship. He transfers the idea of human love to God, so that he can explain the mystery of Trinity, because God is the Supreme Love.

2. The Triad: "Giving - Receiving - Giving and Receiving"

The development of Richard's speculation is specified by the triad: "giving - receiving - giving and receiving". The triad comes in several times in Richard's argumentation: "*amor gratuitus - amor debitus - amor permixtus*"; "without procession - immediate procession - mediate and immediate procession" etc. Richard's argument is that perfection must have the perfection of beauty. Using the arithmetic idea of Boethius³⁵, Richard proposes the perfection of the triad, "giving - receiving - giving and receiving". Indeed, this triad, which H.Wipfler names "*actio - passio - correlatio*"³⁶, makes the theory of Richard different from the other theory. He does not search for the difference between the persons of the Trinity only in *relatio* as St.Thomas. It is possible that he was inspired by the distinction of nature of John Scotus Eriugena³⁷. Nevertheless, we must say that such a triad is very helpful in explaining the exclusion of the fourth person in the divine Trinity, that is, the exclusion of the person who does not give and does not receive. It is clear, as in the arithmetical harmony, that the addition of the

³⁴ Cfr. S.THOMAS, *Summa Theologica*, Ia, 32,1.

³⁵ BOETHIUS, *De Arithmetica*, I,43: PL 63,1147-1156.

³⁶ H.WIPFLER, *Die Trinitätsspekulation Richards*, p.200.

³⁷ Cfr. JOANNES SCOTUS ERIUGENA, *De Divisione Naturae*, 1,1: PL 122,441-442.

fourth will destroy the symmetry, the order and the beauty of the triad, and consequently will eliminate the necessary perfection of the divine nature³⁸.

Referring to the application of the triad of love in the personal properties of each person relating to the different love, Richard affirms that the Father has *amor gratuitus*, the Son has *amor permixtus* and the Holy Spirit has *amor debitus*. Here comes the difficulty. R.Lavatori³⁹ notes, if the distinction among the three persons according to the distinction of love is too absolute, it will lack the communication of love between the persons. This is against the perfection of love itself.

3. The Existential Definition of Person

Richard criticizes Boethius' definition of person, that is, "the individual substance of a rational nature", and proposes his own definition, that is, "the incommunicable existence of the divine nature". Richard's reason in promoting his own definition is the incompatibility of Boethius' definition to the person of God; such a definition cannot establish the distinction between the unity and trinity of God, because God, as the only one God must be "an individual substance of a rational nature". Consequently such a definition can bring to the conclusion that which rejects the unity of the three persons, or rejects the distinction of persons.

The definition of Richard has two important elements which makes a difference from that of Boethius, namely, "incommunicability", and "existence". On incommunicability, Richard departs from the conception, against Gilbert de la Porrée, that the personal properties are identical with the person itself. Consequently, the characteristic of person must be searched in its personal properties, which is not common in all beings. Incommunicability indicates something which is not common to all persons⁴⁰. Here is the precision of Richard's definition. Incommunicability precisely indicates the distinction of each person, which the other person does not have and cannot receive from other person. Something incommunicable is not only something

³⁸ A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, cit., p. 108.

³⁹ R.LAVATORI, *Lo Spirito Santo*, p.162;165.

⁴⁰ *De Trin.*, IV,17: SC 63,264,941A: "Illud veraciter incommunicabile est quod commune quidem non est sed nec esse potest".

individual, but indicates a character which is identical with the person itself.

The second original element of Richard's definition of person is "existence". In Richard's thinking, the word "existence" connotes two notions simultaneously: *exsistere* is *sistere-ex*. Indeed, the *exsistentia* indicates the essence and the origin of person⁴¹. With such a notion of the term "existence", Richard can easily explain the unity of the plural persons in the Trinity, the persons are united in their mode of being, and they are different in their mode of existence; unity of essence because they have the same and identical being, plurality of person because they have different modes of existence⁴². This is the originality of Richard's theory⁴³.

Indeed Richard's definition of person, "the incommunicable existence of divine nature", makes the understanding of the divine person clearer. Richard does not need to search for the meaning of person in relation, but in their existence itself. Consequently, his definition regards the divine person not in relation to the other person, but first of all in themselves, which exist from himself or another. The relation comes after. The Father, first of all is the person who exists from himself, who does not proceed from any other person, then He is called "the Father", because of the analogy of his relation to the second person who proceeds from him immediately.

III. RICHARD AND THE TRINITARIAN TRADITION

1. Richard and the Patristic Tradition

The scholars are accustomed to divide the Trinitarian system of the Fathers in two ways, namely, the Greek way of thinking, which searches the

⁴¹ Cfr. É.GILSON, *The Christian philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, with a Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works by I.T.ESCHMANN, translated by L.K.SHOOK, London 1957, p.51.

⁴² *De Trin.*, IV,19: SC 63,272,943A: "Unitas itaque ibi est juxta modum essendi, pluralitas juxta modum exsistendi. Unitas essentiae quia unum et indifferens esse; plures personae quia plures exsistentiae".

⁴³ TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II,p.251: "Par ce résumé, on voit combien la théorie de Richard est originale et belle".

explanation of the mystery of Trinity starting from the unique God, that is the Father, who manifests himself in the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the Latin way of thinking, which searches in the only one Godhead, the Trinity of persons, that are the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Richard has a great respect to the authority of the Fathers, although he does not cite any of the Fathers by name, his book is inspired by the opinion of the Fathers. Let us examine if the speculation of Richard is in the line of the Greek system or in the line of the Latin system.

In the fourth book of his *De Trinitate* Richard himself affirms that "we are not Greek"⁴⁴. Nevertheless he affirms that the Greek has the same faith, because everywhere in the Church of Christ the faith is the same⁴⁵. It seems that his affirmation against the Greek is more in the use of terminology, as he cites St. Jerome on the danger of the use of the word *hypostasis*⁴⁶. He prefers to use the terminology which was used by St. Augustine, "three persons and one substance"⁴⁷. Accordingly, the observation of A.M. Éthier⁴⁸ is correct, that in terminology Richard adopts the formulation of the Latin Fathers.

Nevertheless, we must note that the influence of a Latin way of thinking in the Trinitarian theology, is not only in terminology. Richard's doctrine on the procession of the Holy Spirit is in the line of Latin theology, that is, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Indeed, as we noted, Richard depends on the so-called *Filioque Symbolum* of Pseudo Athanasius, the position that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son is the position of Latin theology.

The second point which relates Richard to Latin theology is the concept of love. We noted that in explaining the Trinity based on the perfection of

⁴⁴ *De Trin.*, IV,4: SC 63,236,932D: "de nomine Graeco taceamus qui Graeci non sumus".

⁴⁵ *De Trin.*, IV,20: SC 63,274,943C: "Multum dissentire et omnino contrarium videtur quod Latini unam in divinitate substantiam, Graeci tres esse fatentur. Sed absit ab eis diversa credere et hos vel illos in fide errare! ... Scimus autem quod ubique terrarum Christi Ecclesia psallit quia in personis est proprietas, in essentia unitas".

⁴⁶ *De Trin.*, IV,4: SC 63,236,932CD: "Ut autem de nomine hypostasis taceamus, in quo secundum Hieronymum, veneni suspicio est, ...". Cfr. HIERONYMUS, *Epist.*, 15, ad Damasum papam: PL 22,357.

⁴⁷ S.AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, VII,4,8: PL 42,941.

⁴⁸ A.M.ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.20.

love, Richard was inspired by St. Augustine, but he develops his reflection basing on the doctrine of St. Gregory the Great. The important point regarding the doctrine of love is that Richard names the Holy Spirit as the common love, between the Father and the Son. The speculation on the Holy Spirit as the divine love is characteristic of Latin theology⁴⁹.

In terminology, it seems that the tendency of Richard is to adopt faithfully the Latin terminology, but in the way of Trinitarian thinking, it seems that Richard is more in the line of Greek theology. The first point which relates him to Greek theology is his speculation on the plurality of persons, that is, departing from the unique God, which seems in Richard's thinking to be identical with the Father, to the necessity existence of the second and third person. In this point, G. Salet⁵⁰, departing from the conception which regards Greek Trinitarian searches for unity from the three persons, affirms that Richard's speculation is in the line of Latin theology, even Augustinian, because he departs from the unity to the Trinity. G. Salet affirms that the treatise of Richard is nothing other than a treatise "*De Deo Uno*". In my opinion, it is true that Richard begins with the unique God to explore the Trinity. It seems that the unique God of Richard is identical with the Father. With his speculation on supreme love, Richard searches for the existence of the *condignus* and *condilectus* in God itself. Such a theological method is more Greek than Latin. The second point which connects him with the Greek is regarding the mediate and immediate procession. Such a terminology is purely Greek, and was not used in Latin theology until the twelfth century⁵¹.

Accordingly, we can see both lines of Trinitarian theology in Richard's speculation. He adopts from the both traditions the elements which affirm his speculation. His definition of person, "the incommunicable existence of divine nature", affirms his position, because existence can indicate *persona* of Latin theology, and *substantia* which was the translation of *hypostasis* of the Greek

⁴⁹ M.T.L. PENIDO, *Prélude grec à la théorie "Psychologique" de la Trinité*, in: *RT* 45(1939), p.665: "Dans la patristique grecque nous n'avons rencontré aucun pressentiment des spéculations augustinienne encore moins des spéculations médiévales sur l'Amour divin, source jaillissante de la troisième personne. Ces doctrines sont une création latine, sans fondement dans la tradition orientale".

⁵⁰ G. SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p.28.

⁵¹ Cfr. A.M. ÉTHIER, *Le "De Trinitate"*, p.21, footnote no.1

theology⁵².

2. The Influence of Richard in the Medieval Theology

In the development of Trinitarian theology in medieval era, the position of Richard is important. Studying St. Augustine through S. Anselm and Hugh of St. Victor, his master in the School of St. Victor, Richard's theory is different from that of St. Augustine. M. Schmaus⁵³ speaks of Richard's Trinitarian theology as a rival of the theology of S. Augustine, because the theory was based on the Greek Fathers, Aristotle and Plotinus. O. González⁵⁴ and G. Salet⁵⁵ are against such a position by saying that the theory of Richard is Augustinian. We noted above the difference between Richard and S. Augustine.

Regarding the development of the Trinitarian system in the medieval theology, Th. de Régnon⁵⁶, A. Stohr⁵⁷ and P. Hofmann⁵⁸ treat the two lines of the Trinitarian system in medieval theology, namely, the Augustinian line which was developed by Peter Lombard and has the greatness in St. Thomas Aquinas, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the line of Richard which

⁵² Cfr. G. BAGET-BOZZO, *La Trinità*, p.136: "Avendo fuso in un unico registro concettuale (quello di "existentia") sia il termine di sostanza sia quello di persona, Riccardo può usare liberamente il linguaggio tradizionale, che non contrappone sostanza e persona".

⁵³ M. SCHMAUS, *Augustinus und die Trinitätslehre Wilhelmus von Ware*, in: *Aurelius Augustinus*, Köln 1930, p.315: "Nur einmal während dieser anderthalb Jahrtausende erstand der augustianischen Trinitätstheologie eine ernste Konkurrenz in einem eigenwilligen und schöpferischen Kopft, in Richard von St. Viktor. Dieser originelle Denk trank aus den griechischen Kirkenväter, aus Aristoteles und Plotin".

⁵⁴ O. GONZALEZ, *Misterio trinitario y existencia humana. Estudio histórico-teológico en torno a San Buenaventura*, Madrid 1966, p.337.

⁵⁵ G. SALET, *Richard de Saint Victor*, p. 28.

⁵⁶ TH. DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.129.

⁵⁷ A. STOHR, *Die Trinitätslehre des heiligen Bonaventura. Eine systematische Darstellung und historische Würdigung*, Münster 1923, p.33.

⁵⁸ P. HOFMANN, *Analogie und Person*, p.191.

has influenced Alexander of Hales⁵⁹, S.Bonaventure⁶⁰ and John Duns Scotus⁶¹. Indeed, the development of Trinitarian theology of Richard comes as a rival of the development of the Augustinian theology which has its maturity in St.Thomas. Let us examine the influence of Richard in the authors who continue his theory.

Alexander of Hales declares himself a faithful disciple of Richard. He keeps Richard's structure in explaining the mystery of Trinity, that is, establishing the unique God with his attributes before treating the Trinity. He expounds Richard's definition of person and explains its superiority in relation to that of Boethius. In brief, he adopts all the thinking of Richard except on the argument of "*substantia generat substantiam*"⁶². It seems that the declaration of the Council of Lateran has influenced the thought of Alexander of Hales, so that he does not agree with his master in the thesis "*substantia*

⁵⁹ English Franciscan theologian known by the scholastic titles of *Doctor irrefragabilis* and *Doctor doctorum*, was born at Hales Owen, Shropshire, in 1185, and died at Paris, on August 21, 1245. About his life and doctrine, especially on the divine Trinity, see: TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, pp.337-431; F.GUNTEN, *Personne et relation dans la Trinité d'après Alexandre de Hales*, Exc.Diss.Angelicum, in: *DT*, 28(1950), pp.32-62; 171-194

⁶⁰ Doctor of the Church, cardinal bishop of Albano, minister general of the Friars Minor, he was born at Bognoregio in the vicinity of Viterbo about 1217, and died at Lyon on July 15, 1279. About his life and doctrine, especially on the divine Trinity see: E.SMEET, *Bonaventure (Saint)*, in: *DThC*, II,1,961-986; I.C.BARDY, *Bonaventure, St.*, in: *NCE*, II,658-664; TH DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, pp.433-568; O.GONZALEZ, *Misterio trinitario*, A.STOHR, *Die Trinitätslehre des heiligen Bonaventura*; J.G.BOUGEROL, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Bonaventure*, Tournai 1961.

⁶¹ Franciscan philosopher and theologian, born at Duns, Scotland, in 1266, death Cologne, November 8, 1308. He is known by the scholastic titles of *Doctor subtilis*, *Doctor maximus*, and *Doctor Marianus*. On him and his doctrine, especially on the Trinity see: P.RAYMOND, *Duns Scot*, in: *DThC*, IV,2,1865-1947; J.FINKENZELLER, *Offenbarung und Theologie nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Skotus, eine historische und systematische Untersuchung*, in: *BGPTMA* 38,5, Münster 1961; E.GILSON, *Jean duns Scot, introduction à ses positions fondamentales*, in: *EPhM* 42, Paris 1952; F.WETTER, *Die Trinitätslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, in: *BGPTMA* 41,5, Münster 1967; E.WÖLFEL, *Seinsstruktur und Trinitätsspekulation, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der natürlichen Theologie bei Johannes Duns Scotus*, in: *BGPTMA* 40,5, Münster 1965.

⁶² Cfr. ALEXANDER DE HALES, *Summa Theologica*, I, q.42, membr. 3, art. 1.



*generat substantiam*⁶³.

On the thinking of S.Bonaventure, Gonzalez⁶⁴ notes that Richard's influence is minimum, because the influence of Pseudo Dionysius which is very strong in S.Bonaventure comes after Richard. Indeed, according to Gonzalez, the influence of Richard in S.Bonaventure is only in the spirit of searching for the understanding of the mystery of faith. A.Stohr⁶⁵ defends the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius in Richard, and indeed, St.Bonaventure was inspired by Richard in using the principles of Pseudo-Dionysius in his theology. G.Baget-Bozzo⁶⁶, Th de Régnon⁶⁷, I.C.Bardy⁶⁸, confirm such a position by saying that St.Bonaventure is in the line of Richard's theology. St.Bonaventure uses the axiom that good is self-diffusive (*bonum est diffusivum sui*) to explain the mystery of Trinity⁶⁹. Good as the perfection of goodness, is the source of life, accordingly is the source of the two processions which are different from each other; the first procession is according to nature (*per modum naturae*) and the second procession according to will (*per modum voluntatis*)⁷⁰. Indeed, the persons of God are different from each other because of their origins, as in Richard's thinking. In fact, St.Bonaventure borrows the idea of Richard on the *condignus - condilectus* and the distinction of love. The originality of St.Bonaventure, is the affirmation that the Father is the original source (*plenitudo fontalis*) in whom the two Divine persons have their principle, reason and root⁷¹.

Like St.Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus regards the different processions between the Son and the Holy Spirit. The procession of the Son is according to nature (*per modum naturae*), and the procession of the Holy Spirit is

⁶³ Cfr. TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, pp. .

⁶⁴ O.GONZALEZ, *Misterio trinitario*, p.363.

⁶⁵ A.STOHR, *Die Trinitätslehre de heiligen Bonaventura*, p.31.

⁶⁶ G.BAGET-BOZZO, *La Trinita*, p.138.

⁶⁷ TH.DE RÉGNON, *Études*, II, p.

⁶⁸ I.C.BARDY, *St.Bonaventure*, in: NCE, II, 660.

⁶⁹ Cfr. S.BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, I, dist. XIX, pars 1,q.2.

⁷⁰ S.BONAVENTURA, *In quatuor libros Sententiarum*, I, dist. XIII, q.3.

⁷¹ Cfr. S.BONAVENTURA, *In quatuor libros Sententiarum*, I, dist. XXVII, pars.I, q.2.



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according to will (*per modum voluntatis*)⁷². From Richard, Duns Scotus adopts the definition of person, that is, "the incommunicable existence of divine nature"⁷³, with special emphasis on the incommunicability of person. Incommunicability does not only indicate the actual negation of communication but is against the communication⁷⁴. Indeed, the person first of all is incommunicable, and represents neither substance nor relation. Incommunicability is common to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Only in the concrete order can persons be distinguished by their relations⁷⁵. Indeed, Duns Scotus defends Richard's position on the definition of persons and the distinction of persons because of their incommunicable existence, that is, their origin.

Hence, we can say that the thought of Richard on the Trinity has influenced Alexander of Hales, S. Bonaventure and John Duns Scotus. It seems that the deduction of the mystery of Trinity from the perfection of love remains unique to Richard. The authors after him do not develop further such a reflection, but inspired by Richard's reflection they develop their own explanations. Richard's definition of person has more influence on Alexander of Hales, S. Bonaventure and John Duns Scotus. They defend the definition of Richard in opposition to the use of the definition of Boethius, and based on the definition of person speculate on the distinction and unity of persons in Trinity.

⁷² Cfr. JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Questiones in librum IV Sententiarum*, 1.I, dist. II, q.VII, no. 18-33.

⁷³ Cfr. JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *In librum IV Sententiarum*, 1.I, dist. XXIII.

⁷⁴ JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *In librum IV Sententiarum*, 1.III, dist. I, q.I no 10: "Persona divina non tantum habet negationem communicationis actualis et aptitudinalis, sed etiam habet repugnantiam ad communicationem et ut quod et ut quo, et repugnantia tamen non potest esse nisi per entitatem positivam".

⁷⁵ Cfr. JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *In librum IV Sententiarum*, 1.I, dist. XXVI; *Report.*, 1.I, dist. II, q.II; *Quodl.*, q.IV, no 4; q.XIX no.5.

In the twelfth century, the history of Christian doctrine has its special characteristics. The revival of some theological schools in France notes the activity of Christian thinkers to seek the understanding of the mystery of faith, after being formulated and defended by the Fathers. Two persons were the symbol of the revival of the use of reason in theology. They are S.Anselm, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Peter Abaelard who taught in Paris. S.Anselm introduced the necessity of seeking the necessary reason for understanding the mystery of faith. Peter Abelard, with his *Sic et Non* method, introduced speculation on the mystery of faith using reason alone, helped by philosophy. We can say that in the opposition between the method of St.Anselm and Peter Abaelard the theological method of the scholastic was formed.

Richard of St.Victor, who taught in the School of St.Victor in the second half of the twelfth century, learnt both methods, that of S.Anselm and Peter Abelard. As he was the student of Hugh, he learned also the doctrine of St.Augustine. Further, his mystical spirit made him contemplate the mystery of faith in order to express it in the daily life. In such a condition, he wrote his *De Trinitate*.

In fact, the speculation of Richard begins with demonstrations of the existence of God, which he adopted from S.Augustine and S.Anselm. In the line of the Council of Rheims which condemned Gilbert de la Porrée, he affirms the identity between God and his divinity. He concludes that God must be the Supreme Good, and accordingly He is Supreme Love, who has the perfection of Love.

Based on the attribute of God as Supreme Love he explains the mystery of Trinity. St.Augustine has the intuition of the triad of "lover - beloved - and love", but he did not use the triad to explain the mystery of divine Trinity, because, he failed in his search for unity of the three persons, namely "the lover, the beloved and love itself". Richard using the ecstatic concept of love, which he adopted from St.Gregory the Great, seeks the explanation of the mystery of Trinity in the only one God himself. As he is Supreme Love, in order that his love be perfect, it is necessary that there exists the *condignus*, which has the same nature with him. The perfection of love needs the existence of the *condilectus* who participates in the joy of love between God and his *condignus*. Here is the explanation of Richard, which is original and different from that of S.Augustine and S.Thomas. The three persons of God are united in love, and they are different from each other because of their different modes of loving, that is, the Father has *amor gratuitus*, the Son has

amor permixtus and the Holy Spirit has *amor debitus*. It seems that with such a distinction Richard succeeds in establishing the only three persons of God who are united in love, but such a distinction negates the initiative of love of the third person, indeed it seems to be contradictory with the perfection of love itself.

Regarding the persons, Richard attacks the definition of Boethius and proposes his own definition, that is "the incommunicable existence of divine nature". With such a definition, Richard gives an important contribution in the development of the Trinitarian theology. In fact, in scholastic theology, there are two lines of Trinitarian theology, namely, the line of St. Thomas, which defends Boethius' definition of person, and the line of Alexander of Hales, S. Bonaventure and John Duns Scotus who defend Richard's definition of persons. It seems that the definition of Richard is more compatible to the divine person than that of Boethius, because in such a definition we can explain the unity of essence in three existences which are different each other because of their origin: the Father is the person which exists from himself, the Son is the person which proceeds from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is the person which proceeds from the Father and the Son. Here, it seems that Richard defends the Latin position on the procession of the Holy Spirit, that he proceeds from the Father and the Son, although he affirms the procession of the Son as "immediate procession" and the procession of the Holy Spirit as "mediate and immediate procession at the same time", which are Greek ideas. Further, in Richard there is no distinction in terminology between the "generation" of the Son, and the "procession" of the Holy Spirit.

Faithful to his method of seeking the understanding of the mystery of faith by reason alone, Richard uses the analogy of the human procession to establish the names of the persons of God. The first and second person are named Father and Son, because as in the human procession, the immediate procession is the relation between the parent and his son. Here it seems that Richard ignores the fact that the name the Father and the Son are revealed names. The Son is the image of God, because he has the likeness of the Father in being the source of the other person, that is in "giving". On the third person, Richard excludes the analogy of the familiar relationship. Richard turns to the common name which the Scriptures use to call the third person of God, the "Breath of God", the "Holy Spirit". The Holy Spirit is the "Gift of God" because his mission is to infuse the *amor debitus* in the creatures.

Regarding the position of Richard in the history of Trinitarian doctrine,

it seems that he was influenced by both Latin and Greek theology. He himself declares that he is not Greek, but he adopts the Greek idea of the "immediate and mediate" procession. It seems that the influence of Latin theology is greater. He prefers the Latin terminology, and he defends the Latin position on the procession of the Holy Spirit "from the Father and the Son". Nevertheless, his theory is different from that of S. Augustine, and among the scholastics his Trinitarian theology is the beginning of the line which was developed by Alexander of Hales, S. Bonaventure and John Duns Scotus, which was in opposition to the line of St. Augustine, Peter Lombard and S. Thomas. Indeed, he has a special position in the development of scholastic Trinitarian theology.

Richard exposed the Trinitarian doctrine using reason alone. His exposition was based on the attribute of God as the Supreme Love. Without referring to divine revelation, he exposed the Trinity of God, as the community of love between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. It seems that he succeeds in his speculation. On this point it seems that Richard's speculation can help us to understand the immanent Trinity, which is revealed in the mystery of salvation as the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Scriptures say that "God is love" (I John. 4:8.16), and the manifestation of the Trinity in the relation with the human salvation is nothing other than the communication of God's love to the human being, "for God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life" (John 3:16).



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