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THE "WAY" TO GOD IN BERNARD LONERGAN S.J.

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
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
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A B B R E V I A T I O N

ASC	: A Second Collection
ATC	: A Third Collection
C	: Collection
Con.Gent.	: Contra Gentiles
DOP	: Dictionary of Philosophy
DP	: Doctrinal Pluralism
EF	: Enciclopedia Filosofica
I	: Insight
MT	: Method in Theology
NCE	: New Catholic Encyclopedia
PGT	: Philosophy of God, and Theology
Q.D.de Ver.	: Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate
Sum. Theol.	: Summa Theologica
UB	: Understanding and Being
V	: Verbum



I N T R O D U C T I O N .

Let me begin my introduction by quoting a phrase in Insight: "... , one cannot confine human knowledge within the domain of proportionate being without condemning it to mere matters of fact without explanation and so stripping it of knowledge not only of transcendent but also of proportionate being." ¹ I present the phrase as it brings about three key-words which strictly correlate to the theme of our study, "The 'way' to God in Bernard Lonergan S.J." The three key-words are "knowledge", "being", and "transcendent". We will frequently and intensively come across these words which have brought an important contribution, especially to philosophy.

In these recent years, there are many articles and abundant doctorate dissertations about Lonergan's thought. His most popular thought is his transcendental method, which becomes our topic here. I shall confine myself in this study to Lonergan's transcendental method as far as it concerns his argument, or more correctly demonstration, for the existence of God. Our discussion, therefore, can

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., Insight; A Study of Human Understanding, San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1978, p. 653.

be briefly formulated, "What does it mean to say that his argument to God follows 'transcendental method', and how effective is it as an argument?"¹ My intention, however, is limited to presenting Lonergan's argument and is not a critical study.

In introducing our topic it would be well to begin by determining our main starting-points, which are Chapter XIX in Insight and Chapters I and IV in Method in Theology. We will use, of course, other Lonergan's writings as further reference.

There are many problems which are necessarily correlated to our topic; namely, "theory of knowledge", "methodology", and, especially, how Lonergan treats these words and what he means by them as he strives to demonstrate the existence of God.

Owing to the argument of the existence of God follows the transcendental method, is necessary to know correctly what Lonergan means by the transcendental method. In other words, we should know how our knowledge operates. By discussing it, we hope to have a real ground in apprehending

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1. HEPBURN, R., "The Transcendental Method: Lonergan Arguments for the Existence of God", in Theoria to Theory, Vol. 7, Third Quarter, July 1973, p. 46.

Lonergan's argument to God, because the dynamic structure of human knowledge, which is constructed by experience, intelligence and judgment, analogously constructs our human knowledge of the existence of God.¹ We will speak about it in Chapter I.

The discussion of the cognitional structure, according to Lonergan, will inevitably bring us to the important problem of "being", because knowing is knowing being. Chapter II, therefore, will concentrate the problem of being in its connection with transcendental knowledge. So, what does Lonergan mean by being?

After having an idea of being we will go on with our study by asking, "How does Lonergan demonstrate the existence of God by following the transcendental method and the idea of being?" We will analyse that demonstration, which is our main intention, in Chapter III. Is it a spontaneous or automatic process to proceed from the transcendental method and the idea of being to the existence of God? Can we directly proceed from our knowledge to the knowledge of God? What we really want to know about Lonergan's argument

1. BIOLO, S., La Presenza di Dio; Note di Teologia Naturale: I^a Parte, Rome, Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1979, p. 45.

is whether it is rational or philosophically acceptable to assert that God exists.

In Conclusion I will briefly summarize and observe my study and explain why I put the word "way" in quotation marks, in "The 'Way' to God in Bernard Lonergan S.J."



C H A P T E R O N E

GENERAL TRANSCENDENTAL KNOWLEDGE
IN RELATION TO COGNITIONAL THEORY

In Insight his first work to receive widespread attention,¹ Lonergan intends to include the full range of human knowledge on his methodological plane.² His methodology in Insight is central to the rest of his development of methodology which is called "transcendental method". But we should notice that the term "transcendental method" appears for the first time in Method in Theology.³ To clarify the transcendental knowledge, in the context of transcendental method, we, in this chapter, will firstly analyse the primacy of the theory of knowledge; secondly we

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1. GUTH, W.H., Knowledge Claims and the Intelligibility of Theological Method, London-Ann Arbor, University Microfilm's International, 1978 (a Thesis of The Faculty of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1978), p.237.
 2. TRACY, D., The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, New York, Herder and Herder, 1970, p. 182.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., Method in Theology, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1975, p. 4.
- See also DRILLING, P.J., A Study of the Development of Bernard Lonergan's Thought on the Material Starting Point for the Theology, London-Ann Arbor, University Microfilm's International, 1979 (a Thesis of the University of St. Michael's College, 1978), p. 56.

will apply the transcendental method to it. After grasping these two, we will be able to see the structure of cognitive process and to know the relation between knowing and known; by discussing them, we come to the notion of transcendental knowledge.

I.1. The Primacy of the Theory of Knowledge

Lonergan in Insight invites us to go behind the claims of both common sense and empirical sciences and to resolve the more fundamental issue of discovering what our human knowing is all about.¹ Along with Maréchal, Rahner, and Coreth, Lonergan brings about a new metaphysics in which the being investigated is that which occurs in consciousness. They consider such being as more closely assimilated to meaning and knowledge.²

Lonergan, then, gives primacy to the theory of knowledge, as he says: "Thoroughly understand what it is to

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1. O' CALLAGHAN, M.C., Unity in Theology; Lonergan's Framework for Theology in Its New Context, Washington, University Press of America, 1980, p. 111.
 2. WALLACE, W.A., The Elements of Philosophy; A Compendium for Philosophers and Theologians, New York, Alba House, 1977, p. 329.

understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding." ¹

That thought comes again, more clearly, in the Chapter XIX of Insight, in which Lonergan says: "If there is or if there is to be a higher integration of human living, then it will be known only through a knowledge that goes beyond the various types that hitherto have engaged our attention." ² The invitation to go beyond is a "critical investigation" by answering three basic questions confronting the human subject; that is a thorough explanation of the three basic issues of philosophy. "What am I doing when I am knowing?" (cognitional theory). "Why is that knowing?" (epistemology). "What do I do when I do it?" (metaphysics). ³

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. XXVIII

Cfr. HEPBURN, R., op. cit., p. 46 and New Catholic Encyclopedia, Washington, The Catholic University of America, 1981, Vol. XIV, p. 390.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 634.

3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., Doctrinal Pluralism, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1972, p. 12.

I.2. Transcendental Method and Cognitional Theory

Method, in Lonergan's theory, is conceived as an act to study procedures of sciences which among them there is an analogy.¹ Method begins with apprenticeship, with doing what others have done; with discovering what others have discovered.² Lonergan, moreover, conceives a method as a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding progressive and cumulative results.³ It is progressive as it does not keep repeating the same results; it keeps turning out ever new and fresh results. It is cumulative as the new results are not just juxtaposed to the old; they grow out of it; they correct, qualify and complement what went before to yield a fuller and yet a single view.⁴

In Lonergan's cognitional theory a method is fundamental because it generates a philosophy which "obtains its integrated view of a single universe, not by determin-

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, p. 3; "science" means natural science.
 2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., "Method: Trend and Variations", in A Third Collection; Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. by F.E. Crowe S.J., New York, Paulist Press, 1985, pp. 15 and 21.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, pp. 4 and 13-14.
 4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., ATC, p. 15, see also MT, pp. 4-6.

ing the contents that fill heuristic structures, but by relating the heuristic structures to one another." ¹

Lonergan, in Chapter I of his Method in Theology, finally comes to formulate the transcendental method. In the foot note, he compares his theory of transcendental method with Otto Muck's. ² Lonergan makes a distinction between appropriate methods to particular fields and their common core and ground which he calls "transcendental method". So, the transcendental method is what is common to all method and the ground of all method. ³ Here the word "transcendental" is employed in a sense analogous to Scholastic usage, for it is opposed to categorial or predicamental. It is not confined to any particular genus or category of inquiry. ⁴ But, Lonergan himself says that his actual procedure is also "transcendental" in the Kantian sense, inasmuch as it brings to light the conditions of the possibility of knowing an object in so far as that knowledge is

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 426.
2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, pp. 13-14.
3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., Philosophy of God, and Theology, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973, p. 15.
4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., "Philosophy and Theology", in A Second Collection; Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. W.F.J. Ryan S.J. and B.J. Tyrrell, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974, p. 207.

"a priori".¹ It is the condition of any possibility, that is, necessary but not sufficient condition of any categorical method.² Moreover, Kant's transcendental philosophy was to be a search for the unknown presuppositions underlying all knowledge, for its "a priori" conditions, but this led him to question the realist foundations of human thought and the receptive character of knowledge, and ultimately to a rejection of metaphysics.³

If the transcendental method is conceived as the ground of all method and common to all method, we must ask whether the new knowledge, transcendental method, conforms to the basic characteristics of sciences. The most fundamental characteristics, perhaps, appears in the distinction between a heuristic structure and its determination. By intelligent inquiry and rational reflection, man can determine in advance certain general attributes of the object under investigation. The methods of empirical sciences rest on the anticipation of systems of laws. Our study on transcendental method and proportionate being, then, have been conceived as implementation of integrated heuristic struc-

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MF, p. 14.
 2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., ASC, p. 207.
 3. WALLACE, W.A., op. cit., p. 328.

ture of empirical sciences.¹ Such knowledge is termed transcendental because it is assumed to transcend or to go beyond the limits of human experience.²

To operate the transcendental method, we shall go behind the procedures of the natural sciences to something both more general and more fundamental, i.e. the procedures of the human mind.³ The operation of the human mind, which is seeing, hearing, reflecting, judging etc., is transitive in a grammatical and psychological sense. It is a psychological event because one, who operates, becomes aware of the object. The operation of the human mind intends an object; by seeing there becomes present what is seen. In this operation we conceive the noun "intentionality".⁴ Intentionality is central to Lonergan's analysis of

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 634.

2. SA' EARP, N.A.D., Love and Transcendental Knowledge, Rome, excerpta ex dissertatione ad Doctoratum in Facultate Philosophiae Pontificiae Universitatis Gregoriana 1983, p. 12; LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, pp. 634-636. Cfr. LONERGAN, B.J.F., Section on "Generalized Empirical Method", ATC, pp. 140-144.

3. Ibid., pp. 140-141.

LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, p. 4.

4. Ibid., p. 6.

the transcendental character.¹

The operations, above, are operations of a subject, not merely grammatical, but also in the psychological sense as we have mentioned it. The subject operates consciously. The subject, therefore, is being intrinsically intentional and conscious.² There are different levels of consciousness and intentionality; empirical, intellectual, rational, and responsible.³ On the empirical level, we imagine, sense, perceive, feel, speak, move. On the intellectual level, we inquire, come to understand, express what we have understood. We, on the rational level, reflect, marshal the evidence, pass judgment on truth or falsity of a statement. On the responsible level, we concern ourselves to carry out our decisions.⁴

We, however, should notice that while in Method in Theology Lonergan proposes four levels of consciousness and intentionality, in Insight, he usually comes to formulate that knowledge is compounded of three distinct levels

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1. BRENNAN, E., "The Latent Potential of the Notion of Transcendental", in International Journal for Philosophy, IV, 1, Spring 1973, pp. 9-11.
 2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, pp. 7-8.
 3. Ibid., p. 9.
 4. Ibid.

of activities or operations. But in the Chapter on Ethics he considers that there is also the judgment of values, which later is identified as the fourth level in Method in Theology.¹ He insists that knowing is not a single product of a single activity, and so knowledge is not a simple product of a single activity.²

I.3. The Structure of Cognitional Process

Lonergan affirms that the term "structure", which is a very modern word, corresponds with the old idea of the whole and the parts. A whole has its parts. The whole is a structured whole and the parts are differentiated by their functional relations to one another and to the whole.³ They are all functional parts within the whole. Lonergan ap-

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1. Ibid., pp. 36-39; cfr. DRILLING, P.J., op. cit., p. 57.
 2. MARTOS, J., Bernard Lonergan's Theory of Transcendent Knowledge, London-Ann Arbor, University Microfilm's International, 1973, (a Thesis of De Paul University, Chicago, 1973) pp. 2-3.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., "Cognitional Structure", in Collection; Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. by F.E. Crowe S.J., New York, Herder and Herder, 1967, p. 222. He says also that "Not every whole is a structure." Cfr. THOMAS AQUINAS, ST., Summa Theologica, I, q. 3, aa. 7-8; q. 14, a. 7; q. 85, aa. 4-5.

plies this theory of the whole and the parts, theory of structure, on the cognitional process by accepting human knowing as a dynamic structure and human knowing as involving many distinct and irreducible activities.¹

No one of these activities, alone and by itself, may be named human knowing. In Lonergan's analysis, human knowing, precisely as distinct from animal, is a dynamically structural process.² He, thus, says that neither sensing (empirical activity), understanding (intellectual activity), nor judging (rational activity) is human knowing. Human knowing, not as this or that activity, is a whole whose parts are activities. It is a structure, and, indeed, a materially dynamic structure. But human knowing is also formally dynamic, because it is self-assembling and self-constituting.³

As we have seen knowing, according to Bernard Lonergan, is compounded by the three different interrelated activities or operations which form a single whole. Each of the three activities as self-constituting is a con-

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., *C*, p. 222.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 222-223 and *NCE*, Vol. VII, p. 545.

3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., *op. cit.*, pp.222-223; cfr. MARTOS, J., *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5.

scious act of a subject. The subject is concerned with himself as a knower, as one that experiences, understands, and judges.¹ It is self-appropriation of the subject. The self-appropriation or self-knowledge is distinct from consciousness. Lonergan shows that there are six distinctions among them.² To affirm the importance of the self-appropriation, he explains that "The transition from the neglected and truncated subject to self-appropriation is not a simple matter ... More basically, it is a matter of conversion, of a personal philosophic experience, of moving out of a world of sense and of arriving, dazed and disorientated for a while, into a universe of being."³

If each of the three activities is a conscious act of a subject, then, we can say that there are an empirical consciousness, an intelligent consciousness, and a ra-

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., "The Subject", in ASC, pp. 69-79.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., C, pp. 225-227. One of the main distinction is that "Self-knowledge is the reduplicated structure: it is experience, understanding, and judging with respect to experience, understanding, and, judging. Consciousness, on the other hand, is not knowing knowing but merely experience of knowing, experience, that is, of experiencing, of understanding, and of judging." (p. 225)

3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., ASC, p. 79.

tional consciousness. The consciousness is an awareness immanent in cognitional acts, which are an interrelated process of knowing.¹ The empirical consciousness, which is characteristic of sensing, perceiving and imagining, is content with merely sensible presentations. The sensible presentations, in the intelligent consciousness which is characteristic of inquiry, insight and formulation, are intelligently grasped and the subject formulates the understood. The subject in the rational consciousness, which is characteristic of reflecting, weighing evidence and judging, reflects the understood to determine whether the understanding accurately meets the presentations of empirical consciousness. That is judgment, which grasps of the unconditioned.²

To describe his theory of the three levels of cognitional process, Lonergan makes a table by isolating in each its starting point, its chief activity, and its expression:³

- I. Data. Perceptual Images. Free Images. Utterances.
- II. Questions for Intelligence. Insights. Formulations
- III. Questions for Reflections. Reflections. Judgments.

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p.322; DRILLING, P.J., op. cit., p.56
 2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p.322; NCE, Vol. XIV, p.390.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p.274.

The three levels are a compound structure of interrelated activities, as we have discussed. They are partial, because no one of the levels alone constitutes knowing.¹ In other words, knowing is a conjunction of experience, understanding, and judging.² The second level presupposes and complements the first. The third, where the complete knowing is achieved, presupposes and complements the second. We, moreover, should notice that the first level is under the influence of the second and the third level. By questioning and reflecting, someone approaches the data in particular ways.³

The different levels of cognitional activities together constitute a single knowing. Then, according to Lonergan's cognitional theory, knowing does not occur unless appropriate cognitional activities occur on all three levels. Knowing, therefore, is a compound product of such activity.⁴ Human knowing, which is a dynamically structural process reaches a true meaning in its rational moment; judgment, i.e. the real of the actual.⁵

1. See p. 14 above.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., C, p. 224.

3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 274.

4. MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 7.

5. TRACY, D., op. cit., p. 223.

I.4. Isomorphism of Knowing and Known

The structure of knowing, according to Lonergan, is isomorphic to the structure of the known, or at least they correspond with one another. "For knowing and known, if they are not an identity at least stand in some correspondence and, as the known is reached only through knowing, structural features of the one are bound to be reflected in the other." ¹

In affirming that there is an isomorphism between knowing and known Lonergan, in Chapter XI of Insight demonstrates the activities in which the subject comes to self-knowledge as an exemplar, because the subject knowing and the known are not only isomorphic but identical. ³ In the activities, the subject makes a self-affirmation as a knower. So, our reflection on the subject have been concerned with him as a knower, as one that experiences, understands, and judges. ⁴ The subject experiences, understands, and affirms himself.

As those three activities are compound operations of

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 115.
 2. Ibid., pp. 319-347.
 3. DRILLING, P.J., op. cit., p. 58.
 4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., ASC, pp. 78-79.

a single subject, therefore, there must be a concrete unity-identity-whole that experiences the given, that inquires about the given to generate the development of systematic unities and relations, that reflects upon such developments and demands the virtually unconditioned as its ground for answering "Yes" or "No".¹ It is the concrete unity that grasps and formulates the conditioned as conditioned and that appeals to the given to grasp the virtually unconditioned and to affirm it rationally and absolutely.² The term "virtually unconditioned" means that the intellect judges reflectively that the conditions for the verification of the affirmation have been reasonably met.³

On the cognitional activity, the subject reaches its thing-itself by understanding itself and affirming itself as concrete unity in a process that is consciously empirically, intelligently, and rationally.⁴ As for Lonergan every cognitional activity has its own proper content,

1. the given means a prior field containing what can become fulfilling conditions, see LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 337.

2. Ibid., pp. 336-338.

3. WALLACE, W.A., op. cit., p. 330.

4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 338.

then, in the case of the subject knowing itself, there are three consequences. First, the content of experiencing is experience, data, its consciousness. In this first moment, any understanding or judgment is only potential. The subject experiences the known as potency. Second, the content of understanding is intelligibility, idea, form, which answers the question "What is it?" In this second moment, the form is the "I". Third, the content of judging is affirmation or negation. The subject affirms its understanding, intelligibility, to be so. What is known, then, is the real, a virtually unconditioned, which is an act.¹ The three levels of cognitional activity, therefore, correspond to the three levels of being; i.e. potency, form, and act. These very three terms are familiar to Thomistic metaphysics, and they are introduced by Aristotle.² Therefore, our reflection on the structure of knowing has brought us to grasp the relation between knowing and being, which the main issue for the Chapter II.

I.5. The Notion of Transcendental Knowledge

Before discussing the relation between knowing and

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1. Ibid., pp. 431-433; DRILLING, P.J., op. cit., p. 58-59.
 2. Ibid., p. 59; LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, pp. 432-433.

being, we should have more ground to grasp it. This ground is the possibility of the notion of transcendental knowledge. This section, therefore, is the conclusion of Chapter I and a transition to Chapter II.

Lonergan rejects a mistaken supposition that knowing consists in taking a look or that knowing is immanent not simply in the ontological sense that nothing is known except the content immanent within the act of knowing. Therefore, he does not use a common opposition between immanent and transcendent in his theory of knowledge.¹

One of the most fundamental senses of transcendence is the term "go beyond". It means that our inquiry, insight, and formulation do not merely reproduce the content of sensible experiences and empirical sciences, but go beyond them. Our knowledge is not content with mere objects of supposing, defining, and considering, but go beyond it to the universe of facts, of being, of what truly is affirmed and really is.²

We have seen that there are different modes of being conscious of subject. So too, there are different modes of

1. Ibid., pp. 634-635.

2. Ibid., p. 635.

intending. However for Lonergan, the most important difference is between the categorial and the transcendental. Categories, which are determinations, have a limited denotation and vary with cultural variations. They are, also, categories, as were in Aristotle's categories.¹

Meanwhile, the transcendentals are comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation. They are invariant over cultural changing.² Lonergan holds that the transcendentals are a priori because they go beyond what we know to seek what we do not know yet; they are radical in intending.

They are unrestricted because answers are never complete and so only give rise to still further questions.³ Any theory of our conscious and intentional activity is bound to be incomplete and to admit further clarifications and extensions which are to be derived from the conscious and intentional themselves. They as given in consciousness are the rock which confirms or refutes every account. The rock, then, is the subject in his conscious, unobjectified attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibil-

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, pp. 10-11.

2. Ibid., and see also LONERGAN, "Philosophy and Theology", in ASC, p. 207; and PGT, p. 49.

3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, p. 11.

ity. The point to the labor of objectifying the subject and his conscious operations is that thereby one begins to learn what these are and that they are.¹

We will especially talk about "objectifying" in Chapter II, but it is better if we discuss the meaning of objects, as they had been confused in Western thought since Kant published his Critique of Pure Reason.²

In the world of immediacy the only objects are objects of experience, which are understood in narrow sense and denote either the outer experience of sense or the inner experience of consciousness. But in the world mediated by meaning - experiencing, understanding, and judging - objects are what are intended by questions and known by intelligent, correct, conscientious answers.³ It seems that Lonergan agrees to the latter meaning of objects.⁴ So,

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1. Ibid., pp. 19-20, but Lonergan adds that will become evident in Chapter IV of MI that the more important part of the rock has not yet been uncovered, see Ibid., p. 19.
 2. See Kantian notion of objects in LONERGAN, B.J.F., DP, pp. 14-15 and ASC, pp. 121-124.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., DP, p. 14.
 4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., "Natural Knowledge of God", in ASC, pp. 121-122.

Objects are what are intended in questioning. This intending is neither ignorance nor knowledge, but dynamic intermediary between ignorance and knowledge. Lonergan adds that objects are never completely, exhaustively known, for our intending always goes beyond present achievement.¹

The transcendentals are comprehensive because they intend the unknown whole or totality of which our answers reveal only part of it. Lonergan describes what is happening in every level of activity. Understanding means that it goes beyond experiencing to ask what and why and how and what for. Judging means that it asks whether the answers are true and whether what they ask mean really is so. Finally, on the responsible level we discern between what truly is good and what only apparently is good.² As a conclusion Lonergan says "So if we objectify the content of intelligent intending, we form the transcendental concept of the intelligible. If we objectify the content of reasonable intending, we form the transcendental concept of the true and real. If we objectify the content of responsible intending, we get the transcendental concept of

1. Ibid., p. 123.

see also LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 634.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MI, p. 11.

value, of the truly good." ¹ But we should maintain that these different objectifyings are constituted into a larger whole, a compound activity. ² So to know the good, it must know the real; to know the real, it must know the intelligible; to know the intelligible, it must attend to the data. ³

In the process of going beyond man has been confronted both with his incapacity and his need to go beyond. "Transcendence", then at the present juncture, means a development in man's knowledge relevant to a development in man's being. ⁴ Therefore, our critical investigation of the dynamic structure of knowledge has brought us to the problem of "being". And, although the transcendental knowledge is "going beyond", it is truly knowledge, as it is based on some experience, grasps understanding, and brings to formulation, an affirmative judgment. ⁵ That knowledge is has occurred and does occur. ⁶

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1. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
 2. See about man's compound activity, pp. 14-15 above.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, p. 13.
 4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 635.
 5. MARTOS, J., op; cit., p. 8.
 6. BRENNAN, E., op. cit., p. 10.

C H A P T E R I I

GENERAL TRANSCENDENTAL KNOWLEDGE IN RELATION TO BEING

Our discussion about Lonergan's cognitional theory has brought us to the concept that transcendental knowledge is truly knowledge which contains experiencing, understanding, and judging. In order to be able to affirm that God exists, Lonergan, as we follow here, firstly discusses how our transcendental knowledge grasps transcendent being. That is the issues of this present chapter. We can only grasp the transcendence of transcendent being if we know what Lonergan means by being in his metaphysics and how he finds the immanent source of transcendental knowledge. We will discuss it in Section 1. In Section 2 we will analyse whether our transcendental knowledge is limited in proportionate being or no. Can we grasp transcendent being? Moreover, is it possible that we have an idea of being? To answer this question, it will be our task in the last Section.

II.1. The Notion of Being and the Immanent Source of Transcendence

We have discussed the possibility of general transcendental knowledge in our cognitional theory. The terms

"transcendent" and "transcendental" may give the mis-impression that our knowledge is opposed to what is immanent.¹ But that is not so,² as it will be clear in our separate discussions of the notion of being and of the immanent source of transcendence.

II.1.1. The Notion of Being

In "Cognitional Structure" Lonergan explains the relation between immanence and transcendence by arguing why our knowledge, which is transcendental, should result from immanent activities as experiencing, understanding, and judging.³

Lonergan convinces us that knowledge is fundamentally knowledge of reality. Or more precisely, he says that our knowledge is intrinsically objective, that objectivity is the intrinsic relation between knowing and being, and that being and reality are identical.⁴ By being is meant the goal of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection.⁵ In the general notion of an inner word is its necessity for

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1. Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. by D.D. Runes, Totowa, Littlefield, Adams & Co, 1981, p. 319
 2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 635.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., C, p. 227.
 4. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
 5. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 499.

an act termed intellegere, which Lonergan believes, is to be taken as meaning "understanding".¹ This intrinsic relation of the dynamic structure of human knowing to being and so to reality primary is not pensée pensée but pensée pensante, not intentio intenta, but intentio intendens, noëma but noësis." ²

Then, the intrinsic of cognitional activity is its intentionality.³ The dynamic structure of human knowing intends being. Knowing is knowing being, so there is an isomorphism between them. The self-affirming knower may grasp the fundamental isomorphism between his knowing and the known, being.⁴

Inasmuch as apart from being there is nothing,⁵ so the intention is unrestricted. For there is nothing that we cannot at least question. Lonergan defines being in re-

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., Verbum, Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. by D.B. Burrell cs., Notre Dame, University Press of Notre Dame, 1967, p. 9; THOMAS AQUINAS, ST., Q.D. De Ver, q. 4, a. 2 and Sum. Theol., I, q. 27, a. 1.
 2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., C, p. 228; I, p. 642. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, On the Soul, 407^a 7-8.
 3. TRACY, D., op. cit., p. 149, see Section I.2 above too.
 4. TRACY, D., op. cit., p. 157.
 5. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 638.

lation to intelligence and intellectual activity. Being is the objective of pure desire to know.¹ The pure desire to know does not claim to know being itself but it does claim to head towards being intelligently and rationally, i. e., heuristically.² "Being, then, is (1) all that is known, and (2) all that remains to be known."³ The meaning of being becomes determinate only inasmuch as we know instances of being, i. e., what is already known as being.⁴ For what is known in any instance of knowing is an instance of being and the objective of knowing is being, then, knowing is self-transcendence. It is self-transcendence because by performing the structured set of cognitional activity which constitutes knowing, the knowing subject advances beyond experiences and insights to judgments about what is and what is not true. The transcendence of cognitional activity towards being is primary, and so it is prior to any distinction between subjects and objects.⁵

Thus, Lonergan does not search what is meant by being, but he works in the second order of being by inquiring

1. Ibid., p. 348.
2. TRACY, D., op. cit., p. 146.
3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 350.
4. MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 10.
5. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

how its meaning is to be determined. "Inasmuch as knowing is determinate, we could say that being is what is to be known by true judgments. Inasmuch as the desire to know ever goes beyond actual knowledge, we could say that being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments. Hence, being has at least one characteristic: it is all-inclusive. Apart from being there is nothing. Again, being is completely concrete and completely universal." ¹ According to Tracy, Lonergan may further realize that the desire to understand and know all that is, the concrete universe, the totality of true judgments, everything about everything - is, in fact, nothing other than a notion of being. ²

I.1.2. The Immanent Source of Transcendence

Lonergan asserts that there is an immanent source of human transcendental knowledge and intentional consciousness in man himself. The immanent source of transcendental knowledge in man is his detached, disinterested, and unrestricted to know. ³ The detached, disinterest-

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 350.
 2. TRACY, D., op. cit., p. 148.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 636.

ed, and unrestricted desire to know is the origin of all man's questions. The very desire to know, therefore, is also the origin of radical and further questions in his process of going beyond. For it is not only the origin of every scientific question, but it is also the origin of every question, which goes beyond the limitations of the sciences and raises philosophical issues about being.¹ Beyond the data of experience, beyond questions for intelligence and the answers to them, beyond the questions for philosophical reflection concerned with evidence, truth and reality, there are the questions for deliberation. In the last questions we ask what is to be done and whether it is up to us to do it. By them is effected the transition from consciousness to conscience, from moral feelings to the exercise of responsibility in freedom.² Therefore, the process takes man beyond the defined particular issues. It is the origin of every philosophical question about proportionate being, but it is also the origin of further question about being whose answers may not be proportionate to human knowing.³

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 636.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., ATC, p. 132.

3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 636; MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 75.

We have discussed that by operating his transcendental knowledge man strives to answer the questions about the real, the truth. The detached, disinterested, and unrestricted desire in question, then, is a desire to understand correctly.¹ The real is what is; and "what is", is known in the rational act, judgment.²

The intrinsic relation of human knowing to reality is the intelligently and rationally conscious drive of all genuine intellectual activity as it moves beyond data to intelligibility, beyond intelligibility to truth and through and in truth to being as a real, beyond every known truth and being to all the truth and being still to be known.³

In clarifying what he means by affirming that the desire to know is unrestricted, firstly, Lonergan does not mean that to affirm that the desire is unrestricted is to affirm that man's understanding is unrestricted. In other words, he does not assert that correctness of man's understanding is unrestricted. For the desire to know is prior

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 637.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., V, p; 7-8; THOMAS AQUINAS, ST., Sum. Theol., I, q. 3, a. 4.

3. TRACY, D., op. cit., p. 149-150; LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 228.

to understanding and it is compatible with not understanding. The desire to understand, which manifests in inquiry, occurs before one understands.¹ In other formulations, he says what is intending is neither ignorance and knowledge, but a dynamic intermediary between ignorance and knowledge. It is the conscious movement away from ignorance and towards knowledge.² Here, we can detect that intentionality and consciousness play a central role in Lonergan's thought. For the human subject is the single conscious subject.

Secondly, Lonergan does not mean that to affirm that desire is unrestricted is to affirm that the attainment of understanding will be unrestricted. His reason is that the transition from the desire to the attainment has conditions that are distinct from desiring.³

The third clarification is an extension of the second in front of such premise that in every ordered universe desire for attainment entails exigence for attainment. The premise, according to Lonergan, is false, because a desire to commit murder does not entail a duty to commit murder.

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 637.
 2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., ASC, p. 123; see p. 24 above.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 637.

He, therefore, says that to affirm that the desire is unrestricted is not to affirm that, in wisely ordered universe, the attainment of understanding ought to be unrestricted.¹

We cannot doubt about the existence of the unrestricted desire to know. Lonergan asserts that conviction by showing that neither centuries of inquiry nor enormous libraries of answers have revealed any tendency for the stream of further questions to diminish.² Any theory of our knowledge and our intentional and conscious operation is bound to be incomplete and to admit further clarifications and extensions.³

Every investigation is always an initial discovery of an object interested that provokes a subsequent and progressive investigation, for the ultimate basis of explanation is always "other".⁴ In his paper on "The Natural Desire to See God",⁵ Lonergan asserts that the desire and its fulfilment must have the same material object. But the desire to understand cannot have the same formal object as

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 637.

2. Ibid., p. 638.

3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, p. 19; see p. 23 above.

4. BILOLO, S., L'Uomo di Fronte a Dio, Rome, PUG, 1976, pp. 11-2.

5. LONERGAN, B.J.F., C, pp. 84-95.

its fulfilment. The desire to understand is specified by what we already know. The fulfilling act is specified by what as yet we do not know.¹ "Objects are never completely exhaustively known, for our intending always goes beyond present achievement."² These objects, which are intended by a single conscious subject, are cognitive, moral, and religious.³

The existence of the unrestricted desire to know should be intended by a completely open transcendental knowledge of self-conscious subject.⁴ Therefore, "in this respect we may be confident that the future will resemble the past for, unless some one comes forth to speak in the name of stupidity and silliness, he will not be able to claim that some questions, specified or unspecified, are to be able to be brushed aside though there is no reason whatever for doing so."⁵ The completely open transcendental knowledge is achieved in self-transcendence. "One can live in a world, have a horizon, just in the measure that one is not locked up in oneself ... Beyond sensitivity man

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., C, p. 90.
2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., ASC, p. 123.
3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., ATC, pp. 131-133 and MT, pp. 104-105.
4. Ibid., p. 14.
5. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 638.

asks questions, and his questioning is unrestricted." ¹

Moreover, Lonergan holds that man achieves his authenticity in self-transcendence. Such self-transcendence is not only cognitive but also moral and religious, since the objects are cognitive, moral, and religious too; e. g. on the level of questions for deliberation, self-transcendence becomes moral.² Lonergan insists that man has a capacity for self-transcendence.³ This capacity for self-transcendence becomes a corner stone for Lonergan's affirmation of God's existence as we will see it in Chapter III.

II.2. Preliminaries to Conceiving the Transcendental Idea

By analysing transcendental knowledge and capacity for self-transcendence Lonergan has found that man does not content with knowledge of proportionate being; man is always in the process of development. In his process of knowing, as he is intelligent and reasonable, free and responsible, he has to grasp and affirm, except and execute his own developing. Is it possible to do so? To grasp man own developing is for man to understand it, to extrapolate

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MF, p. 104.
 2. Ibid., pp. 104-105; C, p. 132.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MF, 111.

from his past through the present to the alternative ranges of the future. It is to extrapolate both horizontally and vertically, not only to future recurrences of past events, but also to future higher integrations of contemporary unsystematized manifolds.¹ This section, then, is concerned with the latter meaning of extrapolation, that is vertically or to future higher integrations. In Lonergan's terms, it is an extrapolation from our knowledge of proportionate being to knowledge of transcendent being. He obviously asserts his argument of that extrapolation by saying that: "Knowledge of transcendent being involves both intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. But before we can affirm reasonably, we must grasp intelligently; and before we can grasp transcendent being intelligently; we have to extrapolate from proportionate being."²

Next, he describes the term "extrapolation" by comparing it with mathematics. Firstly, the mathematician differs from the logician inasmuch as the mathematician cannot grant all the terms and relations he employs to be mere objects of thought. It is similar with the extrapolation to transcendent idea, though it is conceptual, we be-

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, 636.

2. Ibid., p. 641.

gin from the real basis of knowledge about proportionate being. Therefore, some elements in the transcendental idea will be veriable just as some of the positive integers are veriable.¹

Secondly, the mathematician differs from scientist, because the mathematician is not bound to repudiate every object of thought that lacks positive or empirical verification. So, in the extrapolation to the transcendent idea, we concern simply with concepts, with objects of supposing, defining, considering, and therefore no question of existence or occurence arises.²

We have talked about being, which is identical with the real, but we do not know yet what being is.³ On his analysis of the extrapolation, Lonergan answers the question "What is being?" The purpose of the theory of extrapolation, then, is a further attempt to understand being in its complete and total meaning.⁴

According to Lonergan, that question cannot to be met unless by an unrestricted desire to know. He, therefore, re-

1. Ibid., p. 641 cfr. MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 80.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, pp. 641-642.

3. Ibid., p. 642.

4. MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 81 and 50.

jects the possibility to answer the question by, firstly, the pure notion of being; secondly, the heuristic notion of being; and thirdly, the restricted act of understanding, conceiving, and affirming being.

Firstly, the pure notion of being is the unrestricted desire to know. Although it heads intelligently and reasonably to understanding and affirming, which is as the initiating intentio intendens towards every intentio in-tenta, it is prior to understanding and affirming.¹ Therefore, "The pure notion of being raises all questions but answers none."²

Secondly, the heuristic notion of being is a formulation from whatever is to be grasped intelligently and affirmed. That is the conceptualization of the objective of the pure notion of being. The heuristic notion merely envisages all answers but determines none of the question "What is being?"³

Thirdly, the restricted act of understanding, conceiving, and affirming being is limited to particular beings or particular kinds of being. Particular inquiries, then,

1. See p. 28 above.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 642.

3. Ibid., pp. 642-643.

solve some questions but not all questions of being.¹

Being, for Lonergan as we have discussed, is completely concrete, as apart from being there is nothing.² He, then, concludes that knowledge of that being can only be had by an unrestricted act of understanding, namely, an act of understanding everything about everything.³

Next, Lonergan proceeds to grasp the idea of being as it is absolutely transcendent. Firstly, he clearly explains his reason in his paper on "Cognitional Structure", in Collection, what he means by an "idea", that is the content of an act of understanding.⁴ Secondly, the idea of being is the content of an act that understands being. Thirdly, inasmuch as being is unrestricted, so the act that understands being must be unrestricted too.⁵ Such act does not only take us beyond all human achievement, but also assigns the ultimate limit to the whole process of going beyond. So, the idea of being is absolutely transcendent.⁶

1. Ibid., pp. 642-643 cfr. MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 81.
2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., C, 228-229.
3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 634.
4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., C, pp. 221-239.
5. Ibid., p. 231 and I, pp. 643-644.
6. Ibid., p. 643.

Our investigation on the question "What is being?" has extrapolated us to the absolutely transcendent idea of being. But as we have seen above, man's desire to know in the process of going beyond, which is unrestricted, is confronted to the fact that his capacity to know is limited.¹ That confrontation in the extrapolation arises the critical question. Certainly, says Lonergan, man ask "What is being?". Although the question arises naturally, but man cannot naturally answer it. Otherwise his capacity to know would not be limited.² The idea of being, therefore, is not achieved directly or naturally, nor automatically. It needs a critical investigation and the process of extrapolation.³

Lonergan thinks that though we cannot answer the question "What is being?", for we cannot enjoy an unrestricted act of understanding, we still can determine "a number of features of the restricted to unrestricted understanding and on the side of the object from the structure of proportionate being to the transcendent idea of being."⁴

1. See I.5 above and LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 643.
2. Ibid.
3. MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 83.
4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 644.

The objectivity of human knowing, then, rests upon an unrestricted intention and an unconditioned result in his conscious subject. Inasmuch as human knowing reaches such an unconditioned, then it transcends itself. The possibility of human transcendental knowing is an unrestricted intention that intends the transcendent, and a process of self-transcendence that reaches it. The unrestricted intention directs the process to being; the attainment of the unconditioned reveals that at some point being has been reached.¹ Then, it is possible to heuristically conceive the transcendent being, i.e., by extrapolating our knowledge. Lonergan himself holds that the extrapolating is not only possible but it is also imperative.²

II.3. The Idea of Being

Operating from the real basis of proportionate being, an extrapolation yields an idea of being. We know, in previous section, that the extrapolation is achieved by distinguishing the pure notion of being from the heuristic notion of being and the restricted act of understanding, conceiving, and affirming being. Moreover, inasmuch as the

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., C, pp. 230-231.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 644; MARTOS, J., op. cit., p.84

idea of being is the idea of the total range of the good, of the intelligibility, and the concrete, the idea of being is absolutely transcendent.¹ "What is known by true understanding is being, and the being known by unrestricted understanding's self-knowledge is primary being, self-explanatory, unconditioned, necessary without any lack or defect."² But is it possible that some being might be transcendent and lie beyond the being which is proportionate to our knowledge? Whatever it is, it would be being. For being is defined as the objective of our desire to know. Being is whatever to be grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably.³

Next, Lonergan says "Being is proportionate or transcendent according as it lies within or without the domain man's outer and inner experience."⁴ However, Lonergan does not think that man's experience is only empirical or cognitive. There is also intentional experience as a consequence that there is a single conscious subject, which intends being. So, owing to the intentional self-con-

1. GUTH; W.H., op. cit., p. 280.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 684.

3. Ibid., p. 641.

4. Ibid., p. 640.

sciousness, there is a possibility of transcendent knowledge that is the possibility of grasping intelligently and affirming reasonably a transcendent being. And the proof of the possibility lies in the fact that such intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation occur.¹

Lonergan says that a datum is the content of an act of experiencing, a concept is the content of an act of conceiving, and a judgment is the content of an act of judging; so an idea is the content of an act of understanding.² We can compare this term "idea" with Aquinas' term "intellegere multa per unum" that is to understand many things through a single act of understanding.³ Inasmuch as the unrestricted act of understanding grasps everything about everything, then this very act is one act that grasps the idea of being, which is one idea but about many things.⁴

Again Lonergan affirms that being is intrinsically intelligible. So, the idea of being is the idea of the total of intelligibility. The idea of being is the idea of

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 640.

2. Ibid., p. 644.

3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., V, pp. 52-53; See p. 13 above; THOMAS AQUINAS, ST., Sum. Theol., I, q. 14, a. 7; q. 85, aa. 4-5

4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, pp. 644-645.

the good, because the good is identical with the intelligible. In the Section on "The Idea of Being" of Insight, Lonergan makes some extrapolations as above. Another extrapolation is that there is no paradox in affirming that the the idea of being is one, immaterial, non-temporal, non-spatial, yet of the many, the material, the temporal, and the spatial. In that being there is but one act, but it assigns to a diversity.¹ For what is possible in the content of restricted acts of understanding, is not beyond the attainment of unrestricted understanding.²

After doing all those extrapolations, Lonergan draws a distinction between a primary and a secondary component in the idea of being.³ There are some reasons why he draws the distinction. First, the one is not identical with the many, not the immaterial with the material. Second, in the one idea, he says, there are to be grasped many beings; in the immaterial there is to be grasped the material. By considering these reasons, he decides that there must be a primary component grasped inasmuch as there is a single act of understanding, and a secondary component that is

1. BIOLO, S., *Op. cit.*, p. 24; LONERGAN, B.J.F., V, p. 198.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 645.

3. *Ibid.*, pp, 646-651.

understood inasmuch as the primary component is grasped.¹

The primary component is identical with the unrestricted act. The unrestricted act understands everything about everything including itself.² Inasmuch as the primary component consists in the unrestricted act's understanding of itself, so the secondary component consists in the unrestricted act's understanding of everything else because understands itself that is totally.³ In other words, as we know that it-itself is the idea of being, which is the idea of everything that is to be understood, so we can say that the idea of being, which understands itself, understands also everything else. The distinction between the primary component and the secondary component is apparently grounded on Thomas Aquinas' theory of God's knowledge.⁴ But Lonergan explains in his own way as we will see it in Chapter III.

1. Ibid., p. 646.

2. MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 96.

3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, pp. 646-651.

4. THOMAS AQUINAS, ST., Sum. Theol., I, q. 14, aa. 5-6.

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSCENDENTAL "WAY" TO GOD

By working on our transcendental knowledge and self-consciousness we have come to conceive the possibility of a transcendent being and an idea of being and the possibility to grasp them. But is it merely a heuristic notion of transcendent being and an idea of being? Or can we affirm the existence of such a being? Is that very being that we mean by "God"? There are many questions about God, and we will present it in Section 1. In order to be able to affirm the existence of God, according to Bernard Lonergan, we should know the notion of God as a preparation for affirming God's existence. It will be our issue in Section 2. Next, in Section 3, we will discuss the affirmation of God's existence. Is it possible to proceed directly from the notion of God to the affirmation of God? Is it really reasonable and responsible to affirm God's existence by our transcendental "way"? How can we proceed from our intentional self-consciousness to God's existence? Lonergan himself in his Understanding and Being,¹ systematically explains the Section on "The Affirmation of God" of Insight.

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., Understanding and Being, New York-Toronto, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1980, pp. 292-330.

III.1. The Question of God

As Lonergan himself suggests in Method in Theology, the facts of good and evil, of progress and decline, raise questions about the character of our universe. Behind the multiplicity of answers, he detects that there is a basic unity that comes to light in the exercise of transcendental method.¹ The problem of transcendence consists in finding out whether there is an absolute transcendent being, and, if so, in determination what this being is and why it is higher and better, yet knowable, or enigmata but attainable.²

In Method in Theology Lonergan proposes that there are three different kinds of questions. First, we can inquire into the possibility of fruitful inquiry. It is our question for intelligence and whereby we ask what, and why, and how, and what for. Second, we can reflect on the nature of reflection. It is our question for reflection, and whereby we ask is that so or is it not so, is it certain or is it only probable. We can also deliberate whether our deliberation is worthwhile, whether it is truly good

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, p. 101.

2. NCE, Vol. XIV, p. 234-235; EF, Vol. IV, p. 1296-1297.

or only apparently good. That is the third kind of question. In each case, there arises the question of God.¹

The basic form of the question of God, therefore, arises when one questions one's questioning.² Lonergan holds that the divine is the objective of 'questioning our question.'³ While in Method in Theology Lonergan afterwards treats the fourth kind of question,⁴ in Philosophy of God, and Theology he directly asserts it; i.e., the religious question; we are suffering from an unconditioned, unrestricted love, with whom, then, are we in love?⁵

Next, Lonergan separately discusses each kind of question. The first kind of question is answered when the desire to understand expressed in the question is met by the subjective satisfaction of actually understanding. Then how can that satisfaction become a revelation of the nature of the universe? We assume that the intelligence can grasp and reveal the universe. So we implicitly grant that the universe is intelligible. There, then, arises a question whether the universe could be intelligible without

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, p. 101; PGT, p. 52.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 2.

4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, pp. 104-107.

5. LONERGAN, B.J.F., PGT, pp. 52-53.

having an intelligent ground. Does not an intelligent ground for everything in universe presuppose the existence of God? ¹

To explain the second kind of question, Lonergan makes a summary of Insight Chapters IX, X, and XI. ² Judgment proceed rationally from a grasp of a virtually unconditioned; by a virtually unconditioned is meant any x that has no unfulfilled conditions and by an unconditioned is meant any x that has no conditions. In traditional terms, the former is a contingent and the latter is a necessary being. Now, all the objects in our sensible universe are known only as virtually unconditioned. So they are contingent beings and they can be known to exist only when their existence has been verified. Must there not exist reality of totally different order that transcends the reality of this sensible universe or this world? ³

To begin with the third kind of question, Lonergan asserts that there is no doubt, we are moral beings. We are favour in praising X and blaming Y. But, is whether or not morality begins with the human race? If man is not

1. Ibid., p. 53 and MI, p. 101.

2. Ibid., p. 102.

3. Ibid., pp. 101-102 and PGT, pp. 53-54.

the first instance of moral aspiration, if basically the universe is moral, then once more arises the question of God. Does there exist a highly moral being that becomes a moral ground of the universe? ¹

Briefly, the last kind of question is concerned with some who have found that, underneath the many forms of religious experience, there exists an unrestricted being in love, a mystery of love and awe, a being grasped by ultimate concern, a happiness that has a determine content but no intellectual apprehended object. ²

In remembering our cognitional structure, Lonergan notes that these four kinds of question are distinct but they are also cumulative. ³ The question is manifested in many varieties of human culture. The varieties may introduce alien elements that overlay, obscure, distort the pure question; the question that questions questioning itself. But, the facts of the obscurity and the distortion presuppose what they obscure and distort. There is such transcendental tendency of the human question, says Lonergan. ⁴

1. Ibid., p. 54 and MT, pp. 102-103.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., PGT, p. 54.

3. Ibid.

4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, p. 103.

Moreover, Lonergan says that the question of God lies within man's horizon. Man's achievements lie within his horizon a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness. It cannot be ignored even by the atheist, the agnostics, and the contemporary humanist, inasmuch as their negations presuppose the spark on our clod, our native orientation to the divine.¹ That is why Lonergan says that is much more important to raise the question of God than to prove it, because at the present time people deny that the question exists.²

III.2. The Notion of God

If we carefully read Insight, we could notice that the problem of God emerges for the first time when Lonergan discusses the notion of being.³ Therefore, we can hold that there should be a necessary relation between the problem of God and the notion of being.

The conception of God as the unrestricted act of understanding coincides with Aristotle's conception of the unmoved mover as νόσις νοήσεως, if νόσις has the same

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, p. 103.

2. Ibid.

3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., PGT, pp. 15-16.

forms are grasped by mind in statement or insight in De Anima that forms are grasped by mind.¹ "Perciò il Pensiero assoluto (Dio) dev'essere concepito come noësi nel senso di pura autocoscienza ("pensiero di pensiero", νόησις νοήσεως).² "Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking."³

Augustine believed that our knowledge of truth originated not from without but from within us yet not simply from within us but in some illumination.⁴ He affirmed the absolute transcendent being as a justification of the value of human knowledge in its truth, necessity, and certainty.⁵ The problem of truth is the central and principal issue in his metaphysics.⁶

Thomas Aquinas envisaged the absolute transcendent

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1. Ibid., p. 677, see ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, 1041^a 30 ; 1049^b 26; 1074^b 15-1075^a 11, and On the Soul, 434^b 29-435^a 2.
 2. EF, Vol. III, p. 917, see ARISTOTLE, On the Soul, 407^a 7.
 3. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, 1074^b 34.
 4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 370.
 5. NCE, Vol. XIV, p. 235, see AUGUSTINE, ST., Confessions, VII, a. 11; De Vera Religione, c. 39, n. 72.
 6. EF, Vol. I, pp. 89-90.

being as the cause of the world in its beginning and in its continuance, as regards both its existence and its essence.¹ In section on "The Notion of God", of Insight, we find Aquinas' theory of being and the existence of God; i. e., though being is per se and naturally known to us² and it cannot be unknown to us,³ though our intellects are created participations of uncreated light,⁴ still, there is no valid ontological argument for the existence of God.⁵ God's knowledge of being is a priori; God's own being is self-explanatory and necessary. By Aristotelian theorem of identity of knower and known, God's being is identical with God's understanding. God is the act of understanding that grasps everything about everything.⁶

The concept of a supreme being, according to Kant, is in many respects a very useful idea; but just because it is a mere idea, it is altogether incapable, by itself alone, of enlarging our knowledge in regard to exist. Kant,

1. NCE, Vol. XIV, p. 235, see THOMAS AQUINAS, ST., Sum. Theol., I, q. 2, a. 3 and q. 45, aa. 1_2.
2. THOMAS AQUINAS, ST., Con. Gent., II, 83, 31.
3. THOMAS AQUINAS, ST., Q.D. de Ver., q. 11, a. 1.
4. THOMAS AQUINAS, ST., Sum. Theol., I, q. 84, a. 5.
5. Ibid., I, q. 2, a. 1.
6. ARISTOTLE, On the Soul, 407^a 7-8; LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, pp. 369-371.

therefore, negates the possibility of an ontological argument for the existence of God.¹ He is certain that we will never discover conclusive demonstrations of the proposition that there is God,² as a result of his rejection of metaphysics.³

Lonergan seems to agree with Aquinas' theory of that intrinsic identity between God's being and God's understanding by insisting that it is one and the same thing to understand what being is and to understand what God is.⁴

In Chapter XIX of Insight, Section 9, "The Notion of God", is the bridge between Section 7, "The Idea of Being", and Section 10, "The Affirmation of God". Lonergan says about Section 9 as it is concerned exclusively with the formulation of the notion of God; whether this notion refers to existent reality, is a further question to be considered in Section on "The Affirmation of God".⁵

A proof, for Lonergan, leads to an affirmation, however it is only Section on "The affirmation of God" that

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1. KANT, I., Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N.K. Smith, London, Macmillan, 1985, A. 592-602.
 2. Ibid., A. 741-742.
 3. See p. 10 above.
 4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 658.
 5. Ibid.,

contains the explicit affirmation of God's existence.¹ I do not especially discuss Section 8 of Insight Chapter XIX, that is "Causality", as Lonergan in that section limits himself to the negative conclusion that knowledge of transcendent being cannot be excluded, if there is a proportionate being, and being is intelligible.² The purpose of that section is to show that a transcendent being relevant to our problem must possess two basic attributes. First, it must not be contingent in any respect. Second, besides being self-explanatory, it must be capable of grounding the explanation of everything about everything else.³ That section, therefore, is not to demonstrate the existence of transcendent being or God.

Lonergan opens the section on the notion of God by asserting if God is a being, he is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation.⁴ Summarizing his preceding theory of knowledge and the idea of transcendent being, he says: "But by asking what being is, already we have been led to the conclusion that the idea of being would be the content of an unrestricted act of understand-

1. MARTOS, J., *op. cit.*, p. 132.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 655.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, p. 669.

any account of our conscious and intentional operations is bound to be incapable and to admit further clarifications and extentions, Lonergan continuously asks: "Is God, then, merely an object of our thought? Moreover, is God real? Is he an object of reasonable affirmation? Does he exist ? " So, there are at least four important questions as above.¹

Inasmuch as, firstly, the real is being and apart from being there is nothing; secondly, being is to be known only by reasonable affirmation; thirdly, existence is the respect in which being is known precisely as it is affirmed reasonably, then, it is one and the same to ask those four questions.² The very questions ask for a judgment that manifests in affirmation or negation.³ Lonergan says that our transcendental knowledge of God's existence is just our knowledge of the truth of the judgment, Deus est.⁴ Therefore, we should know also the meaning of truth and how to verify it.

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 669 and MT, pp. 19-20.
 2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, pp. 552 and 669.
 3. MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 148.
 4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., V, p. 8.

III.3.2. All Forms of the Ontological Arguments Are Fallacious

Lonergan recalls his theory of extrapolation and says that when we grasp what God is, our grasp is not an unrestricted act of understanding but a restricted act of understanding that extrapolates from itself to an unrestricted act. What we grasp is not the unrestricted act but the extrapolation that proceeds from the properties of an restricted act to the properties of the unrestricted act. There remains a further question whether the unrestricted act is just an object of thought.¹

Next, inasmuch as our conception of understanding is separated from affirmation or negation in judging, all forms of the ontological arguments are fallacious. The Anselmian argument that proceeds from the assertion "Deus est quo maius cogitari nequit", the Cartesian argument that seems proceed from the concept to the existence of a perfect being, and the Leibnizian argument that argues from the possibility to the actuality of God are false.² For they proceed from the conception of God to his exist-

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 670.

2. Ibid., pp. 670-671.

ence, logically and directly. If we cannot directly and logically argue from the conception of God to his existence, how we could affirm and verify our conception of God.¹ The ontological arguments yield no more than an analytic proposition. The analytic proposition becomes an analytic principle only if we can affirm in a concrete judgment of fact that God does exist, says Lonergan.²

Again, if the ontological arguments are fallacious, it seems that there is no possibility of affirming rationally the existence of God. But, Lonergan obviously says that the ontological arguments are to be rejected, for conception alone is an insufficient ground for judgment. Then how could Lonergan affirm the existence of God?³

III.3.3. Sufficient Reason

Our human knowledge, as we have been apprehended, operates in three different levels, or more precisely in four different levels, of activities.⁴ These activities are operations of a conscious subject as self-knower or self-

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 670; MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 152.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 670.

3. Ibid., p. 672.

4. See pp 11-12 above: empirical, intellectual, rational, and responsible levels.

understanding, whereby we can affirm our self-transcendence as self-affirmation. Those operations are important in Lonergan's theory of God's existence. In The Trinity we find the heritage of Augustine that influences Lonergan's theory: "For with what understanding does man grasp God, who does not yet grasp his own understanding itself, whereby he desires to grasp Him? And if he already grasps this, let him carefully note that there is nothing in his own nature better than his own reasoning, ..." ¹ Then according to Lonergan, self-understanding and self-affirmation are necessarily needed in understanding and grasping God's existence. Accepting the condition of self-affirmation and self-consciousness of knower, the proof of God's existence will follow. ²

The sufficient reason, for Lonergan, is attained by nothing more - nor less - the virtually unconditioned. ³ The human affirmation of God, like all human judgments by which one can say "yes" or "no", be the affirmation of an unconditioned. That is the third level of our cognitional activities; i.e., rational consciousness in our judging.

1. AUGUSTINE, ST., The Trinity, V, c. 1 (p. 176).

2. GUTH, W.H., op. cit., p. 284.

3. See p. 18 above.

"It is the emergence and the effective operation of a single law of utmost generality, the law of sufficient reason, where sufficient reason is the unconditioned." ¹

As Lonergan has rejected the ontological arguments, it may seem for someone that there is no possibility of affirming rationally the existence of God.² For there it seems no possibility of verifying an unrestricted act of understanding either in our external or in our internal experience. But Lonergan rejects this objection because it rests on the identification of the notion of verification and of experience. For our experience is not only empirical, cognitive, or positive but also intentional. So he rejects the positivist who holds that verification is a matter of positive experiencing, that verification of a hypothesis, concept or definition consists of finding it, or at least evidence for it, in empirical experience.³ It is not experience but critical reflection that asks

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 322; see SMITH, M.E., Subjectivity, Experience and the Knowledge of God in Bernard Lonergan S.J., Rome, excerpta ex dissertatione as Doctoratum in Facultate Philosophiae Pontificiae Universitatis Gregoriana, 1977, pp. 41-43.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 671.

3. Ibid., p. 671; MARTOS, J., op. cit., pp. 152-153.

whether the data corresponds to the law and whether the correspondence suffices for an affirmation of the law.¹

Inasmuch as Lonergan says that "...what has to be added to mere concept is not an experience of God but a grasp of the unconditioned,"² the possibility of transcendent knowledge is not primary the possibility of experiencing God but the possibility of intentionally anticipating, intelligently grasping and reasonably affirming his existence in our self-conscience. For grasping the unconditioned and making the consequent judgment is an immanent act of rational consciousness that each one has to perform for himself and no one else can perform for him.³ Therefore, the affirmation of God's existence is a personal judgment.

Lonergan does not see his task as finished when he derives the notion of an unrestricted act of understanding from the notion of being. For we cannot directly proceed

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 671.
 2. Ibid., p. 672.
 3. Ibid.; according to Tracy, if one has accepted that Lonergan's philosophical position one must stand by one's own intelligence and reasonableness as the criteria for all reality; see TRACY, D., op. cit., p. 172. Lonergan may not agree with Tracy's interpretation.

from a notion to an affirmation. Lonergan says that by asking what causality is, we shall be led to affirm that there is such an unrestricted act. Our ordinary causal explanation of an object involve "final", "exemplary" and "efficient" components. In universal scope, then, there is a "last end", a "primary exemplar of the universe of the proportionate being" and a "first agent". For being is thoroughly intelligible and we, therefore, cannot rest in any causal explanation where the explicans is some "mere matter of fact".¹

Lonergan assumes that exemplary causality is a fact illustrated by inventions, that efficient causality is a fact illustrated by the use to which the products of invention and industry are put. Such facts are instances of a principle capable of bearing human knowledge from the realm of proportionate being to that of transcendent being.² For being is intelligible and "One cannot confine human knowledge within the domain of proportionate being without condemning it to mere matters of fact without explanation and so stripping it of knowledge not only of

1. Ibid., pp. 651-652; HEPBURN, R., op. cit., pp. 47-48.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 652.

transcendent being but also of proportionate being." ¹

As far as we have discussed, the affirmation of God's existence proceeds in rational necessity from grasp of the unconditioned. We cannot enjoy a direct and automatic process from the notion of God to the affirmation of his existence. The idea of God is not innate, immediate, nor sufficient of itself to prove God's existence. The affirmation of God's existence is not a matter as taking aspirin relieves a headache. Lonergan, therefore, does not affirm the existence of God on the basis of the notion of God.² Then, how he rationally and reasonably proceeds from the notion of God to his existence. So there remains our question: "How does Lonergan rationally verifies and reasonably affirms the notion of God?" and "How does he reasonably work for it?"

III.3.4. The "Way" to the Existence of God

To affirm the notion of God, according to Lonergan, is equivalent to say that God exists. Inasmuch as the transcendent being (God) is known only in reasonable affirmation, "It is one and the same thing to say that God

1. Ibid., p. 651.

2. SMITH, M.E., op. cit., pp. 46-47; LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 672.

is real, that he is an object of reasonable affirmation, and that he exists." ¹ So Lonergan casts the verification of the notion of God in the form of an argument for the existence of God. ² The existence of God is known as the conclusion, because grasping a virtually unconditioned and making the consequent judgment is an immanent act of rational consciousness. ³

The argument can be presented in different ways - in terms of motion, contingency, order, and so on - but there is one comprehensive way that includes all the rest. ⁴ In its general form, the argument is this: "If the real is completely intelligible, God exists. But the real is completely intelligible. Therefore, God exists." ⁵

By recalling all his theories of transcendental knowledge, being, idea of being and notion of God, Lonergan clearly and systematically explains the validity of that argument. ⁶ His explanation turns on the concept of

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 669; GUTH, W.H., op. cit., p. 283.
 2. MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 154.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 672; see p. 63 above.
 4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., UB, p. 303.
 5. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 672.
 6. Ibid., pp. 672-675.

intelligibility.¹ In the minor premise, one argues that being is completely intelligible, that the real is being, and that therefore the real is completely intelligible. In the major premise, one says if the real is completely intelligible, then complete intelligibility exists. If complete intelligibility exists, the idea of being exists. If the idea of being exists, then God exists. Therefore, if the real is completely intelligible, God exists. Lonergan, in Insight, explains that argument in a long-clear comment.²

However, the importance of that argument and the comment are reduced by his statement: "Still, a conclusion can contain no more than its premises."³ Lonergan, at this point seems to agree with Aristotle who held that logical ideal demands rigor. Aristotle, indeed, wanted not only conclusions that necessarily follow from premises but also premises that are necessary truths.⁴ Considering that logical ideal, Lonergan says: "If at the start one does not know that God exists, at least that knowledge must

1. SMITH, M.E., op. cit., p. 39.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, pp. 672-675.

3. Ibid., p. 675.

4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., ASC, p. 201; see ARISTOTLE, Posterior Analytic, 71^b 16 ff.

emerge in the process if it is to be present at its end. Where, then, in the process does knowledge of God's existence make its implicit entry?"¹

That statement, in my view, has its echo in other Lonergan's statement whereby he says: "Finally, it is only in the climate of religious experience that philosophy of God flourishes. I do not think it difficult to establish God's existence. I do think it a life-long labor to analyse and refute all the objections that philosophers have thought up against the existence of God."² Someone may suddenly conclude that knowledge of God is merely entered into human knowledge in the horizon or the climate of religious experience.

However, let us discuss what Lonergan himself answers to that question in Insight. His answer to that question seems to be a summary of his argument. To answer it, he draws a distinction between (1) affirming a link between other existence and God's existence, and (2) affirming the other existence that is linked to God's existence.³ In the Section on "The Affirmation of God" of Insight, Lonergan

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 675.
 2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., PGF, p. 55.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 675.

gan merely asserts that the second element is concerned with the affirmation of some reality as describing in the Chapter on "Self-affirmation",¹ and it is expanded to the affirmation of the universe of proportionate being in subsequent chapters.²

In the Section on "The Affirmation of God", Lonergan only explains the first element as "the process that identifies the real with being, then identifies being with complete intelligibility, and finally identifies complete intelligibility with the unrestricted act of understanding that possesses the properties of God and accounts for everything else."³ The process, therefore, consists of three identifications. We will work out on each identification.

Firstly, the expansive moment, which is the most important ground for that process, is the first; "for if the real is being, the real is the objective of an unrestricted desire to understand correctly; to be such an objective, the real has to be completely intelligible, for what is not intelligible is not the objective of a desire

1. Ibid., pp. 319-347.

2. Ibid., pp. 348 ff.

3. Ibid., p. 675.

to understand, and what is not completely intelligible is the objective, not of an unrestricted desire to understand correctly, but of such a desire judiciously blended with an obscurantist refusal understand." ¹

It is interesting to note that Lonergan, in Insight, only one time talks about the term "expansion in philosophy".² According to Lonergan it is possible in philosophy to distinguish between its cognitional theory; i.e., the basis, and its pronouncements on metaphysical, ethical, and theological issues; i.e., the expansion.³ We have seen before that self-knowledge is distinguished from self-consciousness. The cognitional theory is our operation in knowledge and the pronouncements are our operation in intentional consciousness. It is very important to note that Lonergan, as we will discuss, uses the pronouncements instead of the cognitional theory in working out for his affirmation of God's existence. So, he affirms its existence

1. Ibid., p. 676.

2. Ibid., p. 387; But, he briefly talks too about the deductive expansion and the homogenous expansion, *ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

3. Ibid. p., 387.

more in our intentional consciousness than in our knowledge as we will see in the rest of this chapter.

The meaning of expansion, in my view, is similar with the meaning of extrapolation.¹ Moreover, I think that the expansion and the extrapolation are named, "conversion" in Method in Theology. Conversion is a change of direction but it involves more than a change of horizon.² Conversion is a personal philosophic experience.³ Lonergan, in Doctrinal Pluralism, describes conversion in its three-dimensional. "It is intellectual inasmuch as it regards our orientation to the intelligible and the true. It is moral inasmuch as it regards our orientation to the good. It is religious inasmuch as it regards our orientation to God."⁴

Those three dimensions are distinct, so that conversion can occur in one dimension without occurring in other two. But at the same time, the three dimensions are solidary. Therefore, conversion in one leads to conversion in other two, and relapse from one prepares for relapse from the others.⁵

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1. Ibid., pp. 589-590; 641-644; 670 and see II.2. above.
 2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, pp. 54 and 269.
 3. LONERGAN, B.J.F., ASC, p. 79 and see pp. 15 ff. above.
 4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., DP, p. 34.
 5. Ibid.

Our observation on the transcendental has showed us our radical intending that goes beyond evermore. So our conscious and intentional activity is bound to be incomplete and to admit further clarifications and extensions which have their source in the conscious and the intentional themselves. The rock is the subject in his conscious, attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility.¹ Lonergan insists a great deal on the authenticity of subject in an intellectual conversion in Insight. But if Method in Theology may be taken as direction in which Insight was moving, then that direction implies not only intellectual but also moral and religious conversion.² We need a conversion to affirm that "the real is being".³ That is our first identification.

Secondly, if that conversion or expansion is achieved the rest follows. For conversion affects all of man's conscious and intentional operations. Conversion calls forth a reflection that makes the thematic movement.⁴ So in that expansion, that the real is being, is implicitly accepted

1. See pp. 22-23 above.

2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., PGT, p. 12.

3. MARTOS, J., op. cit., p. 164.

4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, p. 131 and see pp. 22-23 above.

that the real is complete intelligibility, because being is complete intelligibility. The real cannot be complete intelligibility, if complete intelligibility is unreal. The very intelligibility cannot be real, if the unrestricted act of understanding is merely an object of thought. Our inquiry on complete intelligibility has led us to the realm of the unrestricted act of understanding. "For the intelligibility of the merely conceived is not real; the intelligibility of material reality is dependent on a merely empirical residue and so it is incomplete; the intelligibility of inquiring and developing intelligence is seeking its own completion and thereby proclaiming its incompleteness; and so the only possibility of an intelligibility that is at once complete and real is the unrestricted act of understanding." ¹ By this achievement, we have been introduced to the third identification.

Lonergan, in the last stroke, asks: "Yet who are we pretend to knowledge of every possibility?... Might not intelligibility be both real and complete in some quite different fashion that lies beyond the narrow confines of our comprehension?" ² If we do not want to fall into our

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 676.

2. Ibid.

tendencies of obscurantism, then, the possible is possible being; being is intrinsically intelligible as being is the objective of an unrestricted act of understanding. The intelligible is identical with understanding itself or else related to it as something that could be understood. The latter intelligibility is incomplete, because it is conditioned in its very intelligibility by its own relation to something else. At the same time our desire to understand is satisfied and unsatisfied by our achievement of an act of understanding that is restricted. Our inquiring and developing to understand is never complete. If that is so, it is but the unrestricted act of understanding which can both satisfy and keep open our desire to understand. " So there remains only the unrestricted act of understanding . Nor is there any paradox in our claiming to envisage all possible alternatives; for if we can know that our attainment is extremely limited, we can do so because our knowledge springs from an unrestricted desire to understand correctly..."¹

Inasmuch as the unrestricted act of understanding belongs to the properties of the transcendent being, which

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 676.

is God,¹ then, we can rationally and reasonably affirm that God exists. In other words, Lonergan argues that man's capacity to know intentionally reality demands as its condition the infinite identity of being and knowing, who is God. If consciousness has an unrestricted horizon that is absolute being, this demands reasonably acknowledging the absolute being as an unrestricted act of understanding. Such an acknowledgement rests upon the virtually unconditioned judgment that unless God exists reality is not fully intelligible.²

By grasping the unconditioned through expansion or intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, human concern reaches beyond man's world or proportionate being to God or the transcendent being. That grasp is founded on man's conscious intentionality more than on man's knowledge, as the transcendental notion, which our question for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation, merely constitutes our capacity of self-transcendence. That capacity becomes an actuality when one falls in love. Moreover, as the question of God is implicit in all our questioning,

1. Ibid., pp. 674-675.

2. WALLACE, W.A., op. cit., p. 331.

4. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, p. 116.

so being in love with God is the basic fulfilment of our desire to know and our conscious intentionality.¹ To conclude with this chapter, I would like to quote Lonergan's phrase that pronounces his spirit in answering the question of God. "We seek understanding, and God is all-intelligent; we seek sufficient evidence and God is all-knowing; we seek moral excellence and God is goodness and love."²

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1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., MT, pp. 104-105.
 2. LONERGAN, B.J.F., ATC, p. 218.



C O N C L U S I O N

We have tried all along to show that Lonergan gradually and expansively proceeds from the primacy of the theory of knowledge to the existence of God. Let me make a short observation of Lonergan's thought as long as I have presented it in this study.

The most shocking aspect of Insight, according Lonergan himself, is the primacy it accords knowledge. It seems that a psychological act, named "intellegere", is the basis of a perfect demonstration of the nature and the power of the human soul. Therefore, Lonergan's theory is in some sense Aristotelian and Thomism. In my opinion, it is true that the most shocking aspect of Insight is the primacy it accords knowledge, but in his later books, especially when he talks about the affirmation of God's existence, the most important aspect is the concept of conscious intentionality of the human subject. The word "intellegere" in Insight is getting more and more central in Lonergan's later works. The objectivity of human knowing rests upon an unrestricted intention and an unconditioned results in his self-conscious subject. He brings

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., C, pp. 152-153.

about a new point for insisting a great deal on the authenticity of subject in an intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.

Knowing, according to Lonergan, is a compound of three distinct activities; i.e., experiencing, understanding, and judging. Knowing is a transcendent operation that infinitely opens and continually heads beyond the known to a totally to be known that is being. The process of man's knowledge of proportionate being to man's affirmation of the transcendent being does not proceed directly or automatically. It needs a reasonable grasp of the unconditioned., making the consequent judgment is an immanent and personal act of rational consciousness. To reasonably grasp transcendent being we necessarily need an expansion, an extrapolation, or a conversion. The affirmation of God's existence, then, is not a direct and innate process from a notion to an affirmation.

The affirmation of God's existence, in Bernard Lonergan, is more an act of conscious intentionality than an act of cognitive operation. He distinguishes two aspects in philosophy; its cognitional theory, which is the basis, and its pronouncements on metaphysical, ethical, and theological issues, which is the expansion. In his

affirmation or in his "way" to God is working more on the expansion than on the basis. Therefore, I put the word "way" in quotation marks in the title of my study "The 'Way' to God in Bernard Lonergan S.J.", because Lonergan's theory of God is closer to the pronouncements on metaphysical, ethical, and religious issues, which are our intentional self-consciousness, than to the cognitive theory.


Lonergan says: "Inasmuch as it is difficult to know what our knowing is, it also is difficult to know what our knowledge of God is."¹ For the people who reject the metaphysical thought and for the positivists, Lonergan's theory of the affirmation of God, which consists in his transcendental knowledge that needs an extrapolation, an expansion, and a conversion, is not valid.

However, in my view, Lonergan has given us a fair, subtle, and coherent demonstration of God's existence. We cannot deny the openness and the transcendental aspect of our human consciousness. We cannot deny our self-knowledge and our self-affirmation. The facts of intentionality, self-consciousness and authenticity of human subject do not allow to deny them.

1. LONERGAN, B.J.F., I, p. 683.

Therefore, Lonergan's theory of the affirmation of God's existence is one of the most valuable efforts of human-conscious subject. By operating our conscious intentionality we go beyond our conception of God and our notion of God to his existence. That theory gives a new spirit to Augustine's conviction: "I shall go beyond this force that is in me, this force which we call memory, so that I may come to you, my Sweetness and my Light."¹

1. AUGUSTINE, ST., Confessions, X, xvii, 26.



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